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| 2007/10/7-11 [Politics/Domestic/California, Politics/Domestic/California/Arnold] UID:48258 Activity:moderate |
10/7 Let's make every vote count. Unless it hurts us.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/10/07/MNSESIOTG.DTL
\_ Changing the electoral system of the most populous state in the
country, while leaving the rest of the states the same, is not
"making every vote count"; it's a transparent attempt to undermine
the electoral process. If you want to change all 50 states, we'd
have something to talk about. -tom
\_ I'd take a 50 state change. And no, CA wouldn't even be the
first leading the way, but the third. And if you read the
article, they have no concern about voters but their own power.
How many quotes in there are about killing babies and shooting
guns and other forms of violence?
\_ I'd consider a 50-state change, but that's not what's on the
table. I'm sure the Republicans would fight heartily against
a 50-state change. This is a political move (led by
Guliani's campaign) and was defeated politically
by the opposing party. No surprise at all. -tom
\_ Of course, that can never happen. States aren't allowed to
make those compacts. Frankly I think it'd be better if
every state went to the congressional district solution,
but I'd be okay if CA did it. That would probably go for
TX, NY and FL as well. The states are too big.
\_ 'States aren't allowed to make those compacts'?
E_LACKS_FACTUAL_BASIS. You're a moron. -!tom
\_ What part of "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State" in Article I, Section 10,
paragraph 3 of the constitution don't you understand?
http://csua.org/u/joe
\_ The part in Article II that says "Each state
shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a number of electors...."
http://csua.org/u/joj If a number of states
pass state legislation conditional on other
states passing similar legislation concerning
a winner-take-all award of electors, that would
not constitute the Agreement or Compact you
cite above.
\_ I believe that making the allocation of
electors conditional on how other states
allocate their electors would be an illegal
compact. Do it or not. None of this crap
about "who else is going"? Otherwise, all
compacts could be "we'll do this if State B
implements it as well" would be a way to get
around this paragraph every single time.
\_ Welcome to Constitutional Law 101.
\_ I believe you are not a fucking lawyer,
and that you should shut the fuck up before
you highlight your lack of domain-specific
knowledge further.
\_ Jesus, even I wouldn't go that far. It's
the motd, not Debate Club. -!pp
\_ You'd be wrong about the (R) fighting a 50 state change.
Because they'd win the Presidency hands down if the last
several elections are anything to go by. Anyway, I don't
care who came up with an idea if the idea is good. The
source of a good idea seems to be a reason to dismiss an
idea to you. To me that is just ad hominem.
\_ No, you forget that Gore won the popular vote in 2000.
\_ In the current climate of gerrymandering by both
parties, district-based electoral votes are
meaningless. A direct apportionment by popular vote
would be more representative, esp. if coupled with
Instant Runoff Voting. --erikred
\_ Ok, true, I forgot the gerrymandering part. I still
like the concept even if the implementation would
be flawed due to policians picking their voters
instead of voters picking their politicians. I'm
not entirely thrilled with true direct democracy
given how stupid the average citizen is. As a
separate issue I think IRV is too complex for most
people to figure out. You think the butterfly
ballot and hanging chads thing was a mess? Wait
til people start complaining they didn't understand
IRV or it wasn't clear or whatever so they ended up
with Pat Buchanan in office.
\_ Question: why would you expect less direct
methods to succeed in the face of postulated
stupidity of the voter? -- ilyas
\_ The point (to me) of having to win voting
blocks (of whatever size) instead of just
across the entire set of individuals helps
prevent a regional candidate from squeaking
in. When regional votes count you have to
please the entire nation to some degree not
just a large enough group who all think the
same.
\_ Alright, but given your own assumption
of voter stupidity how does pleasing a wider
section of voters help? You are slicing
the same stupid pie. -- ilyas
\_ It spreads the stupidity such that a
candidate must gain the confidence of
*different* sets of stupid people. Just
taking a single geographic region or
heavily taking cities/rural areas alone
won't be enough. Call it a 'stupidity
smoothing function' if you like. I don't
think you'll find that many stupid people
all thinking the same thing across
multiple slices of the country.
\_ If you just want to average, you leave
yourself open to well known biases,
anchoring, etc. Averaging over
stupid opinions doesn't give you good
outcomes if good opinions are 'far
away.' Further, if you want
to average, you can just bypass the
voting thing entirely. -- ilyas
voting thing entirely. Still, it
would be nice to harness the 'wisdom
of the crowds' effect, though I think
markets do that better than voting
schemes. But then using markets to
make political decisions is batshit
crazy, right? -- ilyas
\_ How would you use a market? Require
people to bid for the right to vote?
\_ I submit to you that ordering your choices 1,
2, 3 would be much easier than asking Amerians
to select one, and only one, candidate, and
tough shit if he doesn't win outright.
\_ Of course it isn't easier. "Pick one" is easier
than "pick an ordered list".
\_ I haven't thought about voting schemes a lot,
but your notion of 'easier' seems misapplied.
What's difficult about 'picking one' is
choosing which candidate matches your
beliefs better, out of a field of candidates
who are generally not very well matched to
your beliefs. This creates 'hard choices,'
since the winner takes all. In this case,
an ordered list makes the choice less hard,
since you are signalling your beliefs much
better. Voting isn't a computational
problem but a signaling one. -- ilyas
\_ I haven't thought about voting schemes a
lot, but your notion of 'easier' seems
misapplied. What's difficult about
'picking one' is choosing which candidate
matches your beliefs better, out of a field
of candidates who are generally not very
well matched to your beliefs. This creates
'hard choices,' since the winner takes all.
In this case, an ordered list makes the
choice less hard, since you are signalling
your beliefs much better. Voting isn't a
computational problem but a signaling one.
-- ilyas [formatd]
\_ Sorry, I meant easier to implement. True,
making that one pick is not easier
for a conscientious voter, especially
with >2 candidates and tactical concerns.
But the practical apparatus, instruction,
and reporting of results are obviously
harder than pick one. AFAIK this is
the primary complaint. Personally I
actually have long supported IRV, ever
since I heard about it in high school
or whatever.
\_ I submit to you that the typical American
voter barely knows anything about their first
choice much less has 3 choices in mind they
could actually rank.
\_ IRV is not monotonic, and thus not strategy-free.
I think this makes it a terrible idea. Approval
voting >> IRV. Simpler too. -dans
\_ Approval voting is not strategy free either.
I think its simplicity is a major point in
favor though. It's very close to the simple
FPTP system logistically. However I feel it
does not really address the "spoiler problem"
which is the main benefit to alternative voting
systems as I see it.
\_ Okay, just brushed up on this (I haven't done
serious research or study of voting systems
since 2004), and you are correct, approval
voting is not strategy free. There exists,
however, fairly strong evidence that it is
about as resistant to tactical voting as one
can hope for without introducing
non-determinism. We seem to be having some
problems with semantics because approval
voting *eliminates* the spoiler problem, how
do you feel it fails to address it? IRV,
however, partly because it is not monotonic,
and due to several other side effects risks
*severe* spoiler effects. -dans
\_ Due to the Primary system (which won't go
away with IRV), approval voting already has
tactical voting built in. I consistently
re-register as a member of whichever party
has the Primary I want to vote in. Je suis
un saboteur.
\_ That's reasonable, but it has nothing to
do with approval voting itself. And,
arguably, approval voting makes the
primary system unnecessary, though I
understand why it probably wont' go away
for political reasons. -dans
\_ Consider candidates ABC and I think A>>B>>C.
Do I vote for B or not? Voting for B hurts
A's chances. But I really don't want C to
win. IRV lets me just rank them A,B,C and
leads to a reasonable result in general.
The results may not always match some
theoretical rule but I don't think it has
practical problems in most cases. It's not
perfect but it lets me state my preferences
better than approval voting.
\_ "This voting for 3 people thing really
confuses me and I've now been disen-
franchised! I want to re-vote! Wah!"
\_ It would sure as hell be easier to
divine voter intent in IRV than
hanging chads.
\_ Um, the idea is terrible. It's a blatant power grab.
Furthermore, past events are not a predictor of future
behavior. There are some very interesting shifts in
the behavior of substantial voter demographics in red
states. Oh, and you don't seem to know what ad hominem
means. You're a moron. That's ad hominem. -!tom
\_ Ad hominem: attacking the man, not the idea. Thank
you for showing us how little you know. The idea is
great. It gets us closer to true democracy instead
\_ Little known fact: The founding fathers didn't
want "true democracy". They thought the people
as a whole, were dumb. So much stupid shit
happens these days that I am inclined to agree
with them. There's a reason we are a
'representational democracy'.
\_ I'm aware of that and the FF were right. But
the country was much smaller then and I don't
think they foresaw half a dozen states of 50
determining the POTUS with no realistic say
for the rest of the country. Going to county
sized voting blocks would still be
representational without going 100% democracy.
\_ I take it back, you're not a moron, you're a
disingenuous tool.
\_ Who cares what you think? You've yet to post
anything that could be mistaken for rational
thought or adding value to this discussion.
of the current system of Red/Blue states where if
you're in the "wrong color" state your vote has no
power. It is not a power grab. I don't care which
"color" President gets elected. I want votes to
count. What do *you* want? You want "your guy"
whoever that is to be in office no matter how they
got there. *That* is what power grabbing is about.
\_ Stating the fact that Giuliani's campaign was
leading the push is not an ad hominem. Stating
that it is a naked political push to crack CA's
electoral vote bloc is not either. Saying "I
don't like it because Giuliani's a doo doo head"
would be, but no one said such a thing. The
\_ In context, it was clearly meant as "G.
came up with this so it must be bad".
\_ Bullshit. You're laying your opinion
of the matter on others' comments.
\_ Welcome to the motd. Ready to play?
other two states that break up their votes along
district lines each have 3 electoral votes. For
them it makes sense to do this so they can grab
attention from the candidates. For CA it would
\_ 3 votes isn't attention grabbing.
\_ In a tight race, it can be.
\_ "In a tight race your vote might
count, maybe, otherwise screw you."
That isn't what our voting system
was supposed to be like.
\_ I don't see how you've put any
proposal forward which would change
this.
\_ I stated I think we should do
it by county or by voting
district or polling place or
whatever instead of as giant
state sized blocks. I've also
explained why I think this will
improve voter 'value' in more
than the current top 6 states.
\_ If the race isn't tight,
your vote still wouldn't
count.
be a sacrifice of the state's sway in electoral
politics. I would tend to agree with an amendment
\_ We have no sway. We're the bank for the
party who comes through here doing no
campaigning at all because they know our
votes don't matter. They just take our
money.
to institute such a change nationwide, though it
would be a big bite out of the 10th.. I would
also agree with abolishing the electoral college,
but that's just me. --scotsman
\_ I'm not saying CA should be the only state
doing it. I'd go for a nationwide change.
But not doing it out of pure partisan power
play politics puts party before nation. I
have no interest in that. Nation first.
\_ How would the nation be better off if
California (and only California) split
its electoral votes? -tom
\_ It would bring candidates here to
earn our votes because it would
suddenly matter. Other states would
see that and follow suit. Voila!
Now everyone's vote matters more and
the nation is better off.
\_ With us voting last and our
primaries near last, the elections
are often 'called' before they even
get to us. Granted recent years
much of this has changed.
\_ That's another story. As a CA
resident our insanely late
voting date always irked me.
This time we're Feb 5th only
a few weeks after the first
votes take place so we finally
get a say in things. We're
still the bankroll for both
parties and they don't
campaign here at all but at
least our votes might count
for something.
\_ The Democrats have been
campaigning like mad in
California, where have you
been? Each major candidate
has been to the Bay Area
alone in the last six weeks.
\_ Proud statements, but it's not a
persuasive argument for CA switching.
Politics is the process by which the
nation runs. Go find a benevolent
monarchy if'n you don't like it.
\_ See my response to tom just above.
But I do find your "love it or leave
it" line amusing. I wonder if you
see the irony in that statement in a
dicussion of how to better run our
representational democracy. :-)
\_ In your argument, you've decided
to reject the process that under-
pins democracy out of hand. I
wonder if you see the irony in
thinking you're astute enough
to declare something ironic.
Are you the same person who
claimed "earmarks" == "pork"?
\_ In what way have I rejected the
process that underpins
democracy? Au contraire mon
frere! I want more people in
more places (all places) to
know their vote is valued.
\_ You reject "politics". We
are a representative
democracy. Do you support
Mike Gravel's direct
democracy initiative?
\_ Eh, I'm gonna have to go with !tom on this one.
Maraland passed a similar law with the stipulation
"when enough other states change to swing the
electoral college." To do it in just one state
is whack. That said, yeah CA is WAY too large.
\_ Sure, but if you split it into NorCal/SoCal,
SFBA and LA would still be the 500lb.
gorillas.
\_ That's only because human beings should
have more of an effect on the electoral
process than dirt does. -tom
\_ What? Dirt? Huh?
\_ The Bay Area has people.
Modoc County has dirt. -tom
\_ So you think people in Modoc County
shouldn't count? LA has way more
people than SF. By your logic, we
should only count LA's votes. Oh,
and San Jose since they have more
people than SF, too.
\_ If Modoc, Salinas, King, Fresno,
San Diego, and Orange all swing
against LA, LA loses.
\_ Ok, and so? It takes 6
counties, 2 of them heavily
populated to top LA. What
is wrong with that?
\_ Nothing. It just proves
that people count more
than dirt.
\_ So you disapprove of the Senate?
\_ As arbitrary divisions of
representation go, this one
is still oddly more repre-
sentative than are Districts.
\_ You're inconsistent (or
you're inconsistent with
tom). Either dirt counts or
it doesn't.
\_ You're beating a straw
man. Note that I said
"more of an effect." -tom
\_ And in the Senate, the
dirt matters more than
the people.
\_ If so, Alaska would
get more Senators
than RI.
\_ Arguably, the Senate
is neither about dirt
or ppl, just arb. pol.
distinctions. -pp
\- Trying to get this implemented ni a large state with a
long history of voting for a particular party is patently
unfair unless coupled with a number states whose combined
electoral votes show a similarly strong record voting for
the other party. I could agree with legislation to divide
CA's electoral votes by popular vote if that condition was
met. The alternative of course, is implementation over
all states.
Were third (and nth) parties considered as well?
\_ You may wish to peruse:
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/10/andrew-gelman-w.html |
| 7/11 |
|
| csua.org/u/joe -> www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution_transcript.html#1.10.3 Printer-Friendly Version The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription Note: The following text is a transcription of the Constitution in its original form. Items that are hyperlinked have since been amended or superseded. We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three. When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies. No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day. Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal. Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or ... |
| csua.org/u/joj -> www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articleii.html " parchment Article II Section 1 The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each state having one vote; A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice President. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States. No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:--"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Section 2 The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. Section 3 He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States. Section 4 The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. |
| economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/10/andrew-gelman-w.html Why the square-root rule for vote allocation is a bad idea, by Andrew Gelman: Commentators and experts have taken two positions on the allocation of votes in a two-stage voting system, such as block voting in the European Union or the Electoral College in the United States. this article by Richard Baldwin and Mike Widgren), there is the claim that mathematical considerations of fairness demand that countries (or, more generally, blocks) get votes in proportion to the square root of their populations. this article by Gideon Rachman), there is the claim that such mathematical rules are irrelevant to the real world of politics. This debate has real-world importance, in particular because of Poland's recent lobbying for square-root allocation in the European Union, in opposition to Germany's support of something closer to proportionality. I make a different claim, which is that mathematical rules are relevant to the real world, but that when the mathematics and statistics are done correctly, we find that proportional allocation is much more fair than square-root allocation, in the sense of giving more equal voting power--probability of decisiveness--to individual voters. This sense of voting power is the criterion used by the square-root-rule proponents. Thus, I am taking them at their own word and saying that, under their own rules, the square-root rule is not fair. The basic idea I'll work with the EU as an example, since this is where the controversy is right now. The position of Germany is that each country should get a vote proportional to its population. Your voting power--the probability that your vote is decisive--is equal to the probability that your vote is decisive within your country (that is, the probability that your country would be exactly tied without your vote), multiplied by the probability that your country's electoral votes are decisive in the block voting system (so that, if your state flips, it will change the electoral vote winner), if your state were tied. If your state has N voters and a block vote of B, the probability that your country is tied on any particular issue is approximately proportional to 1/N, and the probability that your country's block votes are necessary is approximately proportional to B So the probability that your vote is decisive--your "voting power"--is roughly proportional to B/N, that is, the number of block votes per voter in your state. The allocation is roughly fair if a country's vote is proportional to its population. The key issue: closeness of elections in large and small states The point has sometimes been obscured, unfortunately, by "voting power" calculations that purportedly show that, counterintuitively, voters in large states have more voting power ("One man, 3312 votes," in the oft-cited paper of Banzhaf, 1968) and recommend the square-root rule, discussed by Penrose in a paper from 1946. This claim of Penrose, Banzhaf, and others is counterintuitive and, in fact, false. The claim is based on the same idea as we noted above: voting power equals the probability that your country is tied, times the probability that your country's block votes are necessary for a national coalition. The hitch is that Penrose, Banzhaf, and others computed the probability of your country being tied as being proportional to 1/sqrt. This calculation is based (explicitly or implicitly) on a binomial distribution model, and it implies that elections in large states will be much closer (in proportion of the vote) than elections in small states. Actually, though, elections in large states are not much closer than elections in small states. Gelman Large elections are very slightly closer than small elections, but much much less than would be implied by the square-root rule. If you wanted to set a power-law based on the consensus of the data, it would make more sense to set a 09 power rule. But this is much closer to proportionality than to the square-root (or 05 power). Engaging the argument My claim (and that of Jonathan Katz and Joe Bafumi, my coauthors), thus, is that even if one accepts the voting power criterion, the square-root rule is inappropriate. Is it possible that the consensus of experts in voting power in Europe are wrong, and three political science professors from the United States got it right? Let me try to engage the voting-power experts on their own turf. this article on Vox ("Research-based policy analysis and commentary from Europe's leading economists") from 15 June 2007, RIchard Baldwin and Mika Widgrn write: People versed in the game theory of voting know that the square-root is almost sacred. This column reviews the logic of the square root for readers with some numeric skills. Strange as it may seem, ensuring that the EU's keystone decision-making body - the Council of Ministers - is such that each EU citizen has equal power - requires just this. Each Council member should have power in Council that is proportional to the square root of her nation's population. In her national election, a typical German citizen has less power than a typical Luxembourger. Each group of voters chooses one government but German voters are 160 times more numerous. A first guess is that in her national election, a German voter is only 1/160th as influential as a Luxembourg voter is in hers. In this case, making EU citizens equipotent in the Council would require that the German Minister is 160 times more power in the Council than the Luxembourg Minister. It seems right - 1/160th as powerful in the national election and 160 times more powerful in the Council. But this is wrong since it misses a subtly that requires some mental gymnastics to comprehend. In national elections, two things change as the number of voters rises. First, the likelihood of being critical in a particular winning coalition decreases and - as intuition dictates - it declines linearly with the number of voters. Thus, the German has 1/160th the chance that a Luxembourger does of making or breaking a given winning coalition, but for the German this is applied to many more coalitions. Taking this into account one can see that the German voter's power is less than that of a Luxembourger in their respective national elections, but the figure is not 1/160th as powerful, it is higher. The precise answer is that for all EU citizens to be equally powerful in the Council, their Ministers should have power in the Council that is proportional to the square root of their national populations. For people trained in game theory and mathematical statistics, the square root is a snap. power per citizen in national elections declines with the square root of the population, so national power in the Council should increase with square root in order to have a fair system, ie a system where each EU citizen is equally powerful in the Council of Ministers. Consider a randomly selected yes-no issue and suppose that member nations decide their stance on this issue by a referendum; define P_N as the probability that a typical citizen's vote is critical in the referendum outcome. Define P_ms as the probability that the member state is critical in the Council vote. A citizen's probability of being critical is thus P_N times P_ms and our fairness metric requires this to be equal for all member states. P_ms has nothing to do with the number of voters (proxied by population), but P_N falls at the square root of population. The mathematics of combinatorics gives us an exact formula assuming a voter's stance is randomly determined on a randomly selected issue. Taking M as the minimum number of votes in a winning coalition and n as the number of voters, one can use the binomial distribution to work out the answer. The precise, the formula is complex, but it can be well approximated as the square root of 2/n(Pi), where n is the number of voters and Pi is 314 etc. I gave a long quote because I want to be fair to their argument. Anyway, the last paragraph above shows their key mistake: they count all possible coalitions (arrangements of N voters) equally, which corresponds to the implicit assumption that all coalitions are equally likely, which in turn is equivalent ... |
| www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/10/07/MNSESIOTG.DTL To resolve this issue we have provided you with an alternative "Safari Back" button to help you navigate through our site. We will continue to work toward resolution of the issue and regard this as a "temporary" fix. Another option is to consider use of the Firefox browser which does not experience this issue. Peter Ragone, longtime aide to Mayor Gavin Newsom, said o.. Even as Democrats feared having to spend as much as $40 million for a bruising, bloody fight expected to drag on for months, this makeshift group of California Democratic operatives needed just weeks to pummel a Republican-funded push for a ballot measure that threatened to change the outcome of the 2008 presidential election. The ruthlessly effective battle plan of the California Democrats' group raises the specter that, as the 2008 election looms, Republicans may have to confront a far more aggressive Democratic ground game that has revived the old "Clinton war room" philosophy. "We need to fight back and not be reluctant - that if they come after you with a knife, to pull out a gun," said California Democratic strategist Chris Lehane, former spokesman for President Bill Clinton's White House and Vice President Al Gore's 2000 presidential campaign. The group took aim at the Presidential Election Reform Act, a proposed California ballot measure that would change the way the state apportions its Electoral College votes and likely benefit the Republican nominee. After two terms of Republican control of the White House - and angered by what they perceived as a history of electoral "dirty tricks" by GOP strategists such as President Bush's key adviser Karl Rove - the Democrats' response in California could serve as an indication of what lies ahead in the 2008 battle for the White House. "We ran it like a military operation," says Margie Sullivan, a former chief of staff to three Clinton Cabinet secretaries who was closely involved in the effort. "You had this SWAT team of talented, hyper-engaged people. Lehane and Sullivan are some of the lead players in the group, which includes many former insiders from the Clinton administration. They named their group after the brigade of American volunteers who fought against fascism in the Spanish Civil War. After events such as the 2000 Florida presidential election recount, the 2003 California recall election that ousted Democratic Gov. John Kerry, "Democrats are waking up to reality, " said Doug Boxer, the son of US Sen. Barbara Boxer and a Bay Area consultant who was political director for the effort against the ballot measure. "It doesn't mean (Democrats are) jettisoning their values system ... but the Clinton administration played hardball on a lot of things, and we'd gotten away from that," Boxer said. Veteran California Republican strategist Dan Schnur conceded that the recent Democratic effort against the ballot measure was astonishingly effective. But he argued that the result - Republican supporters have for the most part backed away from the measure - may have been due more to the high stakes and a hunger to get back into the White House than brilliant campaign strategy. "There's an old saying: Nothing concentrates your attention like the prospect of your own destruction," Schnur said. "They correctly identified this as a mortal blow to their Electoral College prospects next year. If they hadn't mobilized with everything they had, they would have been signing their own death warrant." Interviews with lead players in the effort last week reinforced that scenario: Democrats from local to national levels shifted into gear almost as soon as rumors surfaced in May that Republicans might try to "steal the election" in the Democratic-leaning state with a ballot measure to benefit the GOP nominee. Instead of the winner-take-all system used in all but two states, the measure provided that 53 of California's 55 electoral colleges votes would go one-by-one to the presidential candidate who wins each of the state's 53 congressional districts. Analysts said such a change could swing about 20 of California's Electoral College votes - about as many as key states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania - from the Democratic candidate, who would be favored to win the statewide popular vote, to the Republican candidate who could win Republican-dominated congressional districts. By the time the GOP-backed group called "Californians for Equal Representation," led by attorney Thomas Hiltachk - who has represented Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and the state GOP - submitted the ballot measure to the state attorney general's office on July 17, the ad-hoc Democratic group was already engaged in a flurry of action. Lehane had contacted Sullivan and Tom Steyer, a longtime major party donor and lead fundraiser for Kerry who heads San Francisco-based Farallon Capitol. They roused a crew of party operatives including Peter Ragone, longtime aide to San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, who acknowledged that many believed the GOP effort was a longshot. that when Republicans start with these shenanigans, you have to hit them hard. The goal, Sullivan said, was to "strangle the baby in the cradle" and kill the ballot measure early, rather than let it qualify for the ballot - where it would be much tougher and more expensive to beat. As the campaign in favor of the measure prepared to circulate the petitions and get the voter signatures needed to qualify it for the ballot, Doug Boxer contacted every major Democratic elected official from mayors to state legislators to California's US senators and urged them to speak publicly against the Electoral College plan. Steyer and Sullivan hit the phones, rounding up financial backing and commitments from deep-pocketed donors like Nancy Parrish, a leading supporter of Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton's presidential campaign and Hollywood producer Norman Lear, who put up $50,000. Also at the ready: producer Steven Bing and major Democratic donor and developer Walter Shorenstein, Sullivan said. Pollster Paul Maslin's early focus groups found that a slim majority of Californians initially backed the Republicans' call for an end to "winner take all," so the Democrats began a daily drumbeat aimed at the media - press conferences, meeting with the state's leading editorial boards and outreach to Internet Web sites and blogs. The Democrats wanted to "tell our side of the story" additionally through TV and radio ads to erode public support and scare off potential GOP donors, Lehane said. At one point, "Norman Lear pitched in on a script change," Lehane said. it's was kind of like Picasso giving you advice on painting." Frank Russo, publisher of the California Progress Report, a popular Democratic Web site, said the strategy achieved "a clarion call that went out to all the troops," prompting netroots activists such as the Courage Campaign and Daily Kos loyalists to pound the issue to the grassroots. "It was like the old Who song: We won't get fooled again," he said. Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean flew to San Francisco for a press conference with labor leaders to "make it very clear from the beginning that the new Democratic Party is not going to take it lying down - we still stand and fight," said DNC spokesman Karen Finney. Then came a turning point - Schwarzenegger's public slap at the measure, which he said suggested a "loser mentality" by his party and an attempt to change election rules in the middle of the game. Democrats still felt they had a big challenge: unmasking the money people behind Hiltachk's group - which by early September had said it had collected 40,000 signatures to put the measure on the June 2008 ballot. Many of the original backers of the GOP ballot measure also were supporters of GOP presidential candidate Rudy Giuliani. Then came the news that the single $175,000 contribution to Hiltachk's Sacramento group was from a separate organization run by a Missouri GOP attorney named Charles Hurtt III - another Giuliani donor. Democratic attorney James Harrison announced the party would file a complaint with federal election officials alleging money laundering - and the state's Fair Political Practices Commis... |