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| 7/9 |
| 2005/1/12 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:35685 Activity:insanely high |
2/27 Editorial defending Washinton Post's pro-war stance:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8531-2003Feb26.html
[Resuscitated from 2003:]
\_ The huge problem with this editorial is "[Saddam] unquestionably
possessing and pursuing biological and chemical weapons". It's
still a question. If a group of smart people can't get this
right, what can you say?
\_ What smart people? The French? Or the Germans who sold them
all of it between '91 and now?
\_ The Washington Post editorial staff, of course.
If you can do a good job convincing people of your assertions
please contact Colin Powell.
\_ hmm... theory of evolution...
\_ It is not a question to anyone with half a brain. Bush lied
to you, get over it, stop trying to rationalize it.
\_ So how do you know there are no WMDs? -- randomly curious
\_ I'm not the guy you're asking, but:
"While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions
have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally
destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in
1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad
resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a
policy ISG attributes to Baghdad's desire to see sanctions
lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force
against it should WMD be discovered."
Duelfer report, Key Findings
\_ So basically you take the word of Duelfer (and later
Kay). That's fair, just keep in mind findings !=
truth, and people may reasonably disagree. I mean
there's only so much inspectors can do in a hostile
country.
\_ They've had access to everyone in the old government
and all sites for >18 months. They've talked to
everyone. There were no weapons.
\_ Duelfer was second. Kay was first. They both
agree.
Remember, these guys were handpicked by Dubya.
Kay went in KNOWING he'd find weapons. He came out
saying, "We were almost all wrong."
Don't you think he could have said, "We still think
he had them, they could be in Syria or buried
somewhere, or Saddam blew them all up just before
we attacked." I'm sure Dubya would have loved that,
and Kay would have loved to tell him that -- so
why didn't Duelfer or Kay say those things?
Instead, Kay threw away his career, and Duelfer
finished the job.
\_ Because an inspector has to announce what he has
to given the evidence. No evidence = can't
credibly say weapons are there. No evidence
!= no weapons are there. Do you see the
difference?
\_ I'm going to agree with the guy who said
"beyond a reasonable doubt".
\_ Duelfer also reported that Saddam's generals thought
there were WMD's. See:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html
\_ "Senior military officers and former Regime
officials were uncertain about the existence of
WMD during the sanctions period and the lead up
to Operation Iraqi Freedom because Saddam sent
mixed messages."
This doesn't translate to "no doubt" and
"slam dunk" exactly.
\_ From the same link:
"Saddam surprised his generals when he informed
them he had no WMD in December 2002 because his
boasting had led many to believe Iraq had some
hidden capability, according to Tariq .Aziz.
Saddam had never suggested to them that Iraq
lacked WMD. Military morale dropped rapidly
when he told senior officers they would have to
fight the United States without WMD."
Sounds like his generals were expecting it. If
Saddam's own generals were uncertain, how could
we ever have had intelligence showing now WMD's?
\_ That is why Dubya's demand that Saddam
prove something that was not falsifiable
was such a dumbass thing for him to do.
Not as dumb as you for going along with it
though, since you are a Cal student and
should understand logic better than that.
\_ Not dumbass. Clever like a fox.
\_ If Saddam had no WMDs, how could we ever
have intelligence showing there was
"no doubt" Saddam had WMDs?
\_ It was definitely beyond a reasonable
doubt. Statements like "no doubt" and
"slam dunk" were mistakes.
\_ Are you saying that it was beyond a
reasonable doubt that WMD stockpiles
would be found?
\_ Bullshit. The people who knew the
most and had no axe to grind all said
that SH probably did not have any
WMD. You were conned.
that it was uncertain whether SH
had WMD or not. You were conned.
\_ I don't know as in am 100% certain, but lets say that
it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
\_ The post you are responding to was from Feb 27, 2003,
pre-invasion
\_ Oh, I see. My bad. DAMN THAT LIBERAL MEDIA!!!
\_ Why is this resucitated? Just some random thing or is this relevant
to anything?
\_ [wall is talking about aaron in 2003, so I revived this]
The point is that the Post editorial staff, for some reason,
knew unequivocally that Saddam had WMDs and active WMD
programs. Dubya reaffirmed this certainty on the eve of
the war.
When the Post claimed this, poster said, "What?"
When Powell showed the Security Council, China, Russia, and
France said, "What?"
When Tenet said it was a slam dunk, Dubya said, "What?"
When Tenet showed him how it was a slam dunk, Dubya said, "What?"
-- but still took the country to war
"No doubt", "slam dunk", "unquestionably" indeed.
\_ CAC will delete this in five minutes, because it makes
Bush look bad.
\_ The time order was more like Bush told us that it
was certain that SH has WMD, then the press started
partoting him.
parroting him. Read _Manufacturing_Consent_ by Chomsky.
This is how it always happens.
\_ To be precise, Dubya himself never really stated it
clearly until his speech on the eve of the attack.
It was mainly Cheney and other minions saying this.
Dubya stated it somewhat in State of the Union 2003, but
not too clearly. |
| 7/9 |
|
| www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8531-2003Feb26.html References 1. |
| www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html Iraq's WMD Contents Report Title: Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on I raqs WMD, 30 September 2004 Regime Strategic Intent We will never lower our heads as long as we live, even if we have to destroy everybody. Key Findings Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability t o reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted. He in itiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraqs strategic policy. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspectionsto gain support for lifting sanctionswith his intention to preserve Iraqs intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring. OFF rescued Baghdads economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. Saddam wanted to recreate Iraqs WMD capabilitywhich was essentially destr oyed in 1991after sanctions were removed and Iraqs economy stabilized, b ut probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previousl y existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capabilityin an increment al fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting eco nomic risksbut he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical ch emical warfare (CW) capabilities. All senior level I raqi officials considered Iran to be Iraqs principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shia revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them. Note on Methodological Approach Interviews with former Regime officials who were active in Iraqs governin g, economic, security, and intelligence structures were critical to ISGs assessment of the former Regimes WMD strategy. While some detainees sta tements were made to minimize their involvement or culpability leading t o potential prosecution, in some cases those who were interviewed spoke relatively candidly and at length about the Regimes strategic intent. Secretary of the President, Abd Hamid Al Khatab Al Nasiri, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz Aysa, and Minister of Military Industry Abd-al-Tawab Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh answered questions in writing several times, providing information on both the former Regime and the mindset of those who ran it. Analysts used subsource development and document exploitation to crossche ck detainee testimony, leverage detainees in debriefs, and to fill gaps in information. For example, analysts interviewing Huwaysh gained insigh ts into his personality from subsources, while translated technical and procurement-related documents were critical to verifying the accuracy of his testimony. Likewise, we confronted Vice President Taha Yasin Ramada n Al Jizrawi with a captured document indicating his major role in alloc ating oil contracts and he divulged details on corruption stemming from the UNs OFF program. Nonetheless, the interview process had several shortcomings. Detainees we re very concerned about their fate and therefore would not be willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in l ight of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the use of passive interr ogation resistance techniques collectively by a large number of detainee s to avoid their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues; place bla me or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradic t the detainees statements, such as deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fled the country; and provide debrief ers with previously known information. However, the reader should keep i n mind the Arab proverb: Even a liar tells many truths. Some former Regime officials, such as Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chem ical Ali), never gave substantial information, despite speaking colorful ly and at length. He never discussed actions, which would implicate him in a crime. Moreover, for some aspects of the Regimes WMD strategy, like the role of the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), analysts c ould only speak with a few senior-level officials, which limited ISGs as sessment to the perspectives of these individuals. Former Iraqi Regime Officials Varied in Their Level of Cooperation The quality of cooperation and assistance provided to ISG by former senio r Iraqi Regime officials in custody varied widely. Some obstructed all a ttempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the forme r Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, someti mes to the point of self-incrimination. The two extremes of cooperation are epitomized by Ali Hasan Al Majida key Presidential Adviser and RCC m emberand Sabir Abd-al-Aziz Husayn Al Duri, a former Lieutenant General w ho served in both the Directorate of General Military Intelligence and t he Iraqi Intelligence Service. Ali Hasan Al Majid was loquacious on many subjects, but remained adamant in denying any involvement in the use of CW in attacks on the Kurds and dissembling in any discussion of the sub ject. His circumlocution extends to most other sensitive subjects of Reg ime behavior. By contrast, Sabir has been forthcoming to the point of di rect association with a wide range of Iraqi activities, including the ma nagement of Kuwaiti prisoners, the organization of assassinations abroad by the former Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), and the torture of poli tical prisoners. Who Made Iraqs Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy Saddams Place in the Regime The Apex of Power Saddam controlled every peak position of authority in Iraq and formally d ominated its state, administrative, Bath party and military hierarchies. By the time of Desert Storm, there was no constitutional threat to his position of authority. He had also appointed himself Paramount Sheikh in a bid to dominate the countrys tribal system. By the late 1990s, he beg an seeking more formal control over the nations religious structures. Also directly reporting to him were the Republican Guard (RG), Special Republican Guard (SRG), Fedayeen Saddam, the four intelligence agencies, the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC)a and the Al Quds Army. Personalized Rule Saddam dominated all Iraqi institutions by the early 1990s and increasing ly administered by personal direction. Major strategic decisions were ma de by Saddams fiat alone, although subordinates acted upon what they per ceived to be indirect or implied orders from him. Moreover, Saddam, pa... |