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| 2005/1/7-8 [Politics/Domestic/California, Reference/Law/Court] UID:35584 Activity:high |
1/7 Anyone has any luck suing a person/business outside of California
through small claim court? How can the court order the defendant
to appear in this case?
\_ The same way that they order people in the state to appear.
Just because a person is out of state doesn't mean that he/she
can't be sued and required to show up in court. The only issue
here is whether the court will uphold that it has jurisdiction
over the case.
\- this is not strictly correct. a business has to have
"dealings" in california to be sued in a CA court.
in the case of a person, this is more unlikely unless
possibly the suit is over some issue that required being
in CA ... like say a car accident or some tort involving
such a physical act. there are things called "long arm
statues" which is how corts can compel non-residents/remotely
incorped busness to appear, but i am not sure if small claims
courts have differnt long arm statues. for a real/large business
it is highly likely that they have enough business presence
in CA .. in which you can probably check with the sec of state's
office who the califnornia agent is for process service/summons.
for somebody who runs a hotdog stand in louisiana, you probably
cant sue them for food poisioning in CA court. on an amusing note
on the jurisdiction question you may want to look at Mayo v.
Satan and His Staff. --psb
\_ Yes, psb, we know this. What do you think "jurisdiction over
case" means? It is strictly correct. If you don't know what
\- as someone i know used to say "i dont mind tautologies;
they're always true!". saying you can sue in court X
if court X has jurisdiction i suppose is meaningless and
unhelpful more than true/untrue. "the court feels" ...
is driven by guidelines such as the ones i discuss.--psb
"jurisdiction over the case" means don't comment. Also, you
don't need a business presence in CA to be sued in CA. All
that is required is that the court feels that it has original
jurisdiction on the matter involved. Under the UCC this means
the place of business, and if the business was conducted
in CA then the court will find it has original jurisdiction.
If all fails, you can go file a suit in Federal Court, and
there will NOT be ANY questions about original jurisdiction,
but for a small claims matter it's not worth the money.
\-mr. d. ass: you also misuse the term "original
jurisdiction" ... that is in contrast to appelate
jurisdiction, not geography or "diversity juris-
diction". as you suggest, federal ct may be an
option, but whether it is worth the money is not
fully up to the plaintiff, but there is a minimum
specified in the USC and USCA. See e.g.
http://csua.org/u/amm
\_ Uhm, no, there is really only the concept of
"original jurisdiction". It encompases what you
refer to as "geographic jurisdiction", which in
reality is a fiction. So STFU dumbass. Original
Jurisdiction always comes from the lower courts,
and appellate courts have original jurisdiction
in certain types of cases. There also isn't
really a term caled "appellate jurisdiction,"
which is a fiction also. However, since it's
unfortunately come into common usage I suppose
that it can be considered as such.
Read up on some Prosser/Keaton.
\_ I belive the problem here is that the two of you
are confusing two separate ideas: personal jx and
\- i'm not the one confused. the OP is the one
specifcally asking about the geographic/diversity
issue.
\_ Sorry. The guy who was responding to you is
a doofus, and I should be doing hw instead of
writing about jx...
writing about jx on the motd...
subject matter jx. A ct must have both in order
to hear a case. SMJX is sometimes refered to as
"original jx" in the context of fed cts.
In order for a ct to hear a case, it must first
have SMJX. In general state cts are cts of general jx
and have original jx over all cases. Fed cts are cts
of limited jx and have original jx only over two types
of cases, federal question (USC Title 28 Sec 1331) and
diversity (USC Title 28 Sec 1332). The jx of the fed
cts are limited by Article 3 of the Constitution.
In order for a case raise a fed question the complaint
must arise from the constitution, treaties of the US
or laws of the fed gov.
In order for a case to be in diversity two requirements
must be met: (1) the claim must be greater than $75K (if
you are trying to sue in small claims, you can't meet
this) and there must be complete diversity in citizenship
"across the v". Complete diversity means that no plaintiff
and no defendant must be citizens of the same state. A
corporation is considered a citizen of 2 places, the
place where it is incorporated and the place where it has
its primary place of business. The primary place of bus.
can be determined using one of two tests: (1) the nerver
center test (where are the admin offices located) or (2)
the muscle test (where the manufacturing occurs).
Personal jx is a different idea. It is refers to the
power of a ct to compel a person to appear before it and
defend a suit. PJ is proper in a state if the defendant
(1) resides there or (2) was personally served with
process in the state. PJ may also be proper over non-res
defendants IF the state has a long arm statue authorizing
the exercise of PJ over non-res defendants. Almost all
states have such statues. Some states (ex NY) enumerate
the circumstances under which PJ may be properly exercised
by the states cts over non-res, while others (ex CA) say
that any exercise of PJ consistent with Due Process is
okay.
Even if there is a statue that says that PJ can be
exercised by the ct, that exercise must be consistent
w/ the requirements of Due Process which according to
the USSC means that that the defendant has to have min
contacts w/ the state AND the exercise of PJ must be
consistent with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justices (see Intl. Shoe)
If the case is related to some specific action of the
defendant w/ or in the state, then even a single
contact may be enough (specific jx). If the case is
unrelated to the contacts of the defendant in the
state, then lots of contacts are need.
There are lots of factors that a ct considers when
figuring out if PJ is fair: (1) the burden on the
defendant to defend in the state, (2) the interest
of the plaintiff in efficient resolution, (3) the
interest of the state, (4) interests of other states
and (5) shared interests of many states.
I'm sure this was WAY more than you possibly wanted
to know. Anyway, the upshot of all this is that if
you are suing a non-resident corp in small claims
ct you will probably not have any basis for being
in fed ct and you will probably have a hard time
compeling the corp to appear. However, you may be
able to get a judgment by default and then via
Full Faith and Credit get a lean on the corp's
property in its home state. Then you can show up
at the annual shareholders meeting and say that
you are not leaving the bldg until the deadbeat
corp makes you whole. This is an effective way
to get your money and your ass kicked in one go.
\_ http://www.tamerlane.ca/library/cases/humour/mayo_v_satan.htm
\_ Sorry, you're wrong. If you actually understood
substantive law instead of merely googling for
stuff you'd understand what
"original jurisdiction":
really means. And PSB, stop junking up the motd
with your google transcripts. I'm sure we can
all cut and paste from the web. That doesn't mean
you know shit about the law.
\- are you the person whose orginal contribution
[sic] was the tautology above?
\_ My friend, if you actually knew anything
about law you'd realize that it is filled
with tautologies. Res ipsa loquitur.
An example of this include the following:
the description of cause-in-fact or
actual cause
the description of proximate cause
the concept of what a reasonable person is
the concept of what negligence is
the definition of intent
the definition of voluntary
Take a 1L course in substantive law,
see if you can pass it. Then come back
and we'll talk.
\_ First time poster, long time listener
here. The description of 'actual cause'
is not as simple and tautological as you
may think. Email me for technical
details. -- ilyas
\- the law may be filled with tautologies
but your first respose was totally
useless. Well 99% useless. You claim
1. you may be able to reach out to
someone in another state 2. and you can
do so if the court decides you can.
while i suppose point #2 is sort of a
"legal realist" answer [the law is what
courts say it is ... as opposed to some
metaphysical body of a priori principles
of justice], it's not helpful to the OP.
if you are an attorney and gave me
advice like that, i'd not only think the
"law's an ass" but my lawyer was too.
some tautolgies ... or "analytic
statements" are trivial, some are
merely uninteresting and some are
useful or insightful. 1=1 is trivial.
x^23+x^5+x+5=8 has solution x=1 is
a useless factoid. sum 1/2^x from 1
to infinity = 1 is "interesting" ...
so all of these are "tautologies across
the equal sign", but only one is a
valuable observation.
\_ Thanks. I am doing this for someone. I have sent two
emails to the debtor and I was never able to reach the
debtor by phone. Small claim court is the next logical
step?
\-email is pretty worthless. send a demand letter by registred
or cert mail or whatever it is called.
\_ If the person you are trying to sue is a non-resident
the ct may not have any effective way to compel them
to appear and defend (provided PJ is proper in the
state in which you bring your suit). Since the cap on
small claims is $2,500, many non-residents will just
\_ Not neccesarily true, certain
districts allow you to sue up to
$5000. It depends on the district
and the state.
decide that it is not worth the hassle and won't appear.
You will be given a judgment by default, but in order
to enforce this judgment you will have to travel to
a state where the defendant resides and ask a ct in
that state to enforce the judgment (the ct has to b/c
of Full Faith and Credit).
Enforcement is a bit easier if the non-resident has
property in the state in which you sue. As part of
your suit you can ask the ct for a pre-judgment
attachment of the property. If the defendant is a
no-show, then you will be awarded judgment by default
and you can ask the ct to order a sheriff's sale of
the property to satisfy your judgment.
\- law person: for a good time you may wish to look up
789 F. Supp. 395 ... also avail at:
http://home.lbl.gov:8080/~psb/Humor/Noble-v-BradfordMarine
Last line is sort of funny, w.r.t. jurisdiction. |
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| csua.org/u/amm -> www.washingtonwatchdog.org/documents/usc/ttl28/ptIV/ch85/sec1332.html costs The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between - citizens of different States; citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled. Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff. Words ''all civil actions'' were substituted for ''all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity'' in order to conform to Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Words ''or citizens of the District of Columbia, Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any State or Territory'' which were inserted by the amendatory act April 20, 1940, are omitted. The word ''States'' is defined in this section and enumeration of the references is unnecessary. The revised section conforms with the views of Philip F Herrick, United States Attorney, Puerto Rico, who observed that the act of April 20, 1940, permitted action between a citizen of Hawaii and of Puerto Rico, but not between a citizen of New York and Puerto Rico, in the district court. In that case the 1940 amendment was held unconstitutional insofar as it affected the District of Columbia. However, two other district courts upheld the amendment. Therefore, the revised language covers civil actions between - Citizens of a State, and citizens of other States and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; Citizens of a Territory or the District of Columbia, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; Citizens of a State or Territory, and citizens of the District of Columbia; Citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof. The revised section removes an uncertainty referred to in the McGarry case, supra, as to whether Congress intended to permit citizens of the Territories or the District of Columbia to sue a State or Territory itself rather than the citizens thereof. L 94-583 substituted ''citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and'' for ''foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties''. L 88-439 inserted proviso deeming an insurer of liability insurance, in an action to which the insurer is not joined as a party-defendant, a citizen, of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as the State the insurer has been incorporated by and the State where it has its principal place of business. Act July 26, 1956, included the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. L 104-317 provided that: ''The amendment made by this section (amending this section) shall take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act (Oct. L 100-702 provided that: ''The amendments made by this section (amending this section) shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the 180th day after the date of enactment of this title (Nov. L 100-702 provided that: ''The amendment made by this section (amending this section) shall apply to any civil action commenced in or removed to a United States district court on or after the 180th day after the date of enactment of this title (Nov. L 100-702 provided that: ''The amendment made by this section (amending this section) shall apply to claims in civil actions commenced in or removed to the United States district courts on or after the 180th day after the date of enactment of this title (Nov. L 88-439 provided that: ''The amendment made by this Act to section 1332, title 28, United States Code, applies only to causes of action arising after the date of enactment of this Act (Aug. L 85-554 applicable only in the case of actions commenced after July 25, 1958, see section 3 of Pub. |
| www.tamerlane.ca/library/cases/humour/mayo_v_satan.htm Gerald MAYO v SATAN AND HIS STAFF United States District Court Western District of Pennsylvania 54 FRD 282 December 3, 1971 Gerald Mayo, pro se. Plaintiff, alleging jurisdiction under 18 USC 241, 28 USC 1343, and 42 USC 1983 prays for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He a lleges that Satan has on numerous occasions caused plaintiff misery and unwarranted threats, against the will of the plaintiff, that Satan has p laced deliberate obstacles in plaintiff's path and has caused plaintiff' s downfall. Plaintiff alleges that by reason of these acts Satan has deprived him of his constitutional rights. We feel that the application to file and proceed in forma pauperis must b e denied. Even if plaintiff's complaint reveals a prima facie recital of the infringement of the civil rights of a citizen of the United States, the Court has serious doubts that the complaint reveals a cause of acti on upon which relief can be granted by the court. We question whether pl aintiff may obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this judi cial district. The complaint contains no allegation of residence in this district. While the official records disclose no case where this defend ant has appeared as defendant there is an unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire where this defendant filed an action of mortgage forecl osure as plaintiff. The defendant in that action was represented by the preeminent advocate of that day, and raised the defense that the plainti ff was a foreign prince with no standing to sue in an American Court. Th is defense was overcome by overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Whethe r this would raise an estoppel in the present case we are unable to dete rmine at this time. If such action were to be allowed we would also face the question of whet her it may be maintained as a class action. It appears to meet the requi rements of FedR of CivP 23 that the class is so numerous that joinde r of all members is impracticable, there are questions of law and fact c ommon to the class, and the claims of the representative party is typica l of the claims of the class. We cannot now determine if the representat ive party will fairly protect the interests of the class. We note that the plaintiff has failed to include with his complaint the r equired form of instructions for the United States Marshal for direction s as to service of process. For the foregoing reasons we must exercise our discretion to refuse the p rayer of plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. It is ordered that the complaint be given a miscellaneous docket number a nd leave to proceed in forma pauperis be denied. |
| home.lbl.gov:8080/~psb/Humor/Noble-v-BradfordMarine ORDER OF REMAND This matter comes before the court sua sponte. After an extreme close-up review of the record and excellent authorities, the court enters the following order. Hurling Chunks On October 11, 1988, while berthed at the facilities of BRADFORD MARINE, INC. The blaze hurled chunks of flaming debris to other vessels, destroying those owned by LYN C NOBLE ("NOBLE") and ROBERT C MUIR ("MUIR"). Thereafter, NOBEL and MUIR commenced, on June 7, 1989, and July 15, 1989, respectively, separate actions in the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida. TIME as a new party, that Defendant, on May 9, 1990, removed the proceeding to federal court, claiming original jurisdiction insofar as the Plaintiff's causes of action or rights arose under the Article III, Section II of the United States Constitution. n1 PRIME TIME asserted that removal was timely because it came within thirty days of service of the Amended Complaint. Similarly, the MUIR action was also removed after that Plaintiff amended his Complaint so as to add PRIME TIME as a Defendant. Upon BRADFORD's objection, this court, by Order dated June 28, 1990, remanded the NOBLE action to the state court for the failure of all Defendants to join in the removal. On August 31, 1990, in accordance with Rule 6 of the General Rules of the Southern District of Florida, n2 the MUIR suit was transferred to the undersigned. Thereafter, PRIME TIME filed a Supplemental Notice of Removal (DE 2), bearing both the NOBLE and MUIR captions, attempting to effect a phoenix-like ascent to federal court through the MUIR proceeding. sponte whether its subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked. See 14A Charles A Wright, Arthur R Miller & Edward H Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure @ 3721 (2d ed. If the case, as stated by the initial pleading, is not removable, removal may be effected within thirty days after receipt or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading from which it may be ascertained that the case is removable. and strictly construed in accordance with Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure to comply with time requirement of Section 1446 is a defect causing "improvident" removal. The addition of a new Defendant in an Amended Complaint, however, does not start the time for removal anew when the original Complaint itself was removable. Unless the amendment sets forth a new basis of federal jurisdiction, subsequent events do not make a removable case "more removable" or "again removable." Thus, the failure of initial Defendants to remove during the original thirty day time period is deemed a waiver of the right of removal which is binding on subsequently added Defendants. A Schwing and a Miss Because of the court's admiralty jurisdiction, MUIR's original Complaint, like his Amended Complaint, provided BRADFORD with a basis for removal. As a result, PRIME TIME's removal, almost ten months after MUIR commenced suit, is untimely and is a defect deemed "way" improvident. For similar reasons, the court finds that removal of the NOBLE case, which had been remanded, was also untimely. |