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| 6/1 |
| 2003/5/8-9 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:28371 Activity:very high |
5/7 I've never seen a convincing explanation of why exactly G.H.W Bush
didn't go all the way to Baghdad in '91. Can anyone provide such
an explanation?
\_ he had a 100hrs victory with less than 200 casualties, a figure
that he didn't expect to hold in taking the country. Then again,
what were the final tallies on this ass kicking?
\_ ghwbush said the world coalition he had gathered then
had given him authority to kick iraq out of kuwait, not
overthrow the iraqi government. that doesn't seem too
incredibly far fetched to me. - danhr
\_ The objective of the 1991 Gulf war was free Kuwait from Iraq and
prevent Iraq from controlling 40% of Arab's oil reserve. The
objective was achieved without invading and occupies Iraq.
It was a big miscalculation on Iraq's part. Iraq had invaded
Iran in the past with USA's blessing, Hussin didn't expect
USA would turn against him second time around.
\_ Um, Iraq informed the US of the plan to invade Kuwait.
The US did not object, so Iraq took that to be implicit
approval. Then Bush and fellows feigned shock when the
the invasion took place.
\_ Iraq also claimed our forces were NOT at the airport, or
within 100km of Bagdad. Their credibility of facts sucks.
\_ More proof that Israel is in control of US foreign policy.
\_ Nyet, comrade! They only talked to some low level official
in country and got an ambiguous reponse. They heard what
they wanted to hear. Please try to avoid mass rewrite of
key elements of history.
\_ Ambassador April Glaspie was a low level official?
\_ Yes. Ambassador to >insert 3rd world BFE country here<
is never a serious position.
\_ Except in times of crisis and in hot-spots, I
tend to agree with you.
\_ She told them effectively the US would not accept
Iraq invading Kuwait, regardless of what the media
tries to portray. In fact, she has maintained and
repeated this position many times.,
\_ In fact, she has maintained all along that she did
not give "the green light" and that she was the
target of a "deliberate deception," but she
acknowledges that the majority of what was reported
about her meeting was true. In other words, she
neither objected nor gave express approval. Saddam
then read into that what he wanted. Let's not pretend
however that the US expressly told him not to do it.
\_ Is it our job to play red light/green light with
thugs? I don't recall seeing that written anywhere.
Maybe it's in one of the Federalist Papers I missed.
\_ We armed them, we trained them, and we supported
them when they were at war with Iran. They were
in effect our client state, and as such, yes,
we had an obligation to red light the invasion
if we were truly opposed to it. We weren't,
so we didn't.
\_ US didn't arm Iraq. The Soviets and French did.
The Chinese sold more arms to Iraq than the US.
http://projects.sipri.se/armstrade/Trnd_Ind_IRQ_Imps_73-02.pdf
\_ US bad, UN good, EU good, Israel bad, PLO good,
Arafat good, Sharon bad, Bush bad, Chirac good,
France good, China good, Britain bad, Russia
good. Clear now?
\_ Yawn.
\_ Exactly, Iraq arms came almost entirely from
China, France, and Russia. After all it was
an exocet missile launched from a Mirage that
hit the US naval vessel in 87. During the
Iran / Iraq war we should have provided more
military support to crush militant islam in
Iran. So the complaint should be we did not
do enough, as opposed to too much.
[MOTD reformatd]
\_ But we did tell them not to do it. So what's
the problem? And no they weren't a client state.
It was a business arrangement.
\_ They are/were however a client state of
France. And frankly, our assistance during
the Iran / Iraq was completely justified,
given the threat of militant Islam which
has manifested current events.
\_ And here's the crux: When did we tell them
that? I'd love to see that url.
\_ You're aware this pre-dated the current
concept of 'the web' and urls, right? So
the odds of getting an accurate and direct
quote from that time is near zero. When you
find the url that proves it either way,
please come back and let us know. In the
mean time, those of us old enough to recall
the events will just have to get by with
our aged and withering memories.
\_ Graduated in '92. Are my memories not
fresh enough for you? 'Cause I do not
recall Bush telling Saddam not to do it
when Iraq massed troops on the border.
\_ 92? Sorry. You were still under the
thumb of the Berkeley PC establishment.
Maybe next time.
By comparison, even now many still don't understand the logic
behind the 2nd Gulf War.
\_ It wasn't a second war. It was the completion of the first
which should've come years before GWB2 got into office.
\_ http://www.thememoryhole.org/mil/bushsr-iraq.htm
Basically Bush Sr didn't want to get us into the situation
that we are in now: having to occupy and rule an Arab
nation against international opinion.
\_ Couldn't say it better than GWB himself:
link:tinyurl.com/amxh
(RealPlayer file) |
| 6/1 |
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| www.thememoryhole.org/mil/bushsr-iraq.htm Excerpt from "Why We Didn't Remove Saddam" by George Bush Sr. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome. I've been told that the same passage appears on page 489 of Bush and Scowcroft's book, A World Transformed (Alfred A. True to the guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's threat to the region) we stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose. We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome. We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from our demands. The former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted him to send one of his generals. Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission; As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified. We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies in the region. Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in Madrid. The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of precedent we should lay down for the future. From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms, we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be aggressors. Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. |