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Ex-US Arms Hunter Kay Says No Stockpiles in Iraq Drudge Report 1-23-04 Reuters Posted on 01/23/2004 12:01:47 PM PST by MamaLucci Ex-US Arms Hunter Kay Says No Stockpiles in Iraq Add Top Stories - Reuters to My Yahoo! WASHINGTON Reuters - David Kay, who stepped down as leader of the United States hunt for weapons of mass destruction, said on Friday he does not believe there were any large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq I dont think they existed, Kay told Reuters in a telephone interview. What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last 1991 Gulf War news - web sites and I dont think there was a large-scale production program in the 90s, he said. Kay said he believes most of what is going to be found in the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has been found and that the hunt will become more difficult once America turns over governing the country to the Iraqis. The United States went to war against Baghdad last year citing a threat from Iraqs weapons of mass destruction. WMDEADENDERS Navigation: use the links below to view more comments.
Post Reply Private Reply To 1 View Replies To: MamaLucci The United States went to war against Baghdad last year citing a threat from Iraqs weapons of mass destruction. Correction: The United States went to war against Saddam Husseins regime last year citing his refusal to abide by a host of United Nations resolutions, including Resolution 1441 which demanded he account for his weapons programs. A nascent program and plans for WMDs were found, as were missiles that exceeded the range permitted under the restrictions Saddam Hussein agreed to when his government was spared during the 1991 Gulf War.
TONY SNOW, FOX NEWS: Joining us to determine what the Kay report does and does not say is David Kay, the CIA special adviser on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs and head of the Iraqi Survey Group. DAVID KAY, CHIEF IRAQ WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Happy to be with you, Tony. SNOW: Lets take a quick look at some of the headlines from this week characterizing your report. KAY: Well, we certainly found that have not yet found illicit arms. In fact, Im sort of amazed at what was powerful information about both their intent and their actual activities that were not known and were hidden from United States inspectors seems not to have made it to the press. This is information that, had it been available last year, would have been headline news. SNOW: One of the things that you found, for instance, is the Mukhabarat, the secret service, in fact had a vigorous weapons program of its own. KAY: Well, we have found right now and were still finding them over two dozen laboratories that were hidden in the Iraqi intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, were not declared to the United States, had prohibited equipment, and carried on activities that should have been declared. Now, at the minimum, they kept alive Iraqs capability to produce both biological and chemical weapons. An Iraqi scientist in 1993 hid in his own refrigerator reference strains for active strains, actually wouldve were still active when we found them Botulinum toxin, one of the most toxic elements known. After a couple of days, he turned them back because he said they were too dangerous;
We now have three cases in which scientists have come forward with equipment, technology, diagrams, documents and, in this case, actual weapons material, reference strains and Botulinum toxin, that they were told to hide and that the United States didnt find. SNOW: You believe that there are similar strains perhaps throughout Iraq right now? KAY: Were actively searching for at least one more cache of weapons of strains that we know exists.
It contains anthrax, and thats one reason were actively interested in getting it. SNOW: Now, you also talk about new research on biological capable agents, such as Brucella, Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, Ricin and Naflotoxin ph. KAY: Thats exactly right, and thats the things Im surprised no one has paid attention to. The new strains theyre working on, including Congo-Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, are something that should have been reported to the United States In fact, all of the work should have been reported. And this continued right up to 2003 in these four cases, unreported, undiscovered. When youre analyzing how much information was kept from the United States, how would you characterize it? The most significant, of course, is in the missile area, where were talking about activity on four different fronts that would have provided missiles capable of exceeding the United States limit of 150 kilometers. The State Department is now calling this discovery in fact the discovery of a weapon of mass destruction. It is absolutely the essential element that only time and a little growth media would have produced large amounts of Botulinum toxin. SNOW: And you also had a number of scientists coming forward and telling you that there were plans afoot that, if they were given the orders to create chemical or biological weapons, there was a certain timetable in which they would be able to produce them. Weve had very senior scientists and this is actually a good news story. People dont realize how many Iraqis we now have cooperating with us. Thats one reason for my optimism that well get to the bottom of the program. But it would have taken them from weeks to months to restart mustard production, and for months to the maximum estimate is two years on VX production. SNOW: Now, a lot of these scientists you talk about one scientist being assassinated the same day he talked to your people. And thats why I guess I have great admiration for those who are talking to us.
KAY: Well, you know, we could take everyone out of the country, but realize in Iraq youre talking about extended families. We are taking steps to try to protect them, but were never perfect at that. KAY: Weve identified 130 ammunition storage points of significant size, some larger than 50 square kilometers. These are sites that contain, the best estimate is, between 600,000 and 650,000 tons of arms. Thats about one-third of the entire ammunitions stockpile of the much-larger United States military. SNOW: So thats pretty astonishing for a country of that size and population. For example, we spent 10 days on a very large one about three weeks ago, operating in temperatures that range from 130 that was a low day to 150. KAY: Well, the Iraqis have told us, and we learned in 1991, that they have the habit of storing their chemical munitions right in a mix with these standard conventional armaments. So you really have to examine each one, and thats why were going there looking at them. SNOW: There were claims before the war by Secretary of State Colin Powell that Iraq had weaponized and ready-to-use chemical weapons. We have not only Secretary Powell, we have Iraqi generals telling us that they had them.
KAY: Based on information leads, we have no reason to believe that we will not find more. SNOW: Let me ask you about the veracity of the people who are coming forward. Have they given you information thats paid off, or are you getting a lot of crank information from people? I need to separate out what they really know personally from what someone has told them, and then go find the sub-sources who told them that. SNOW: Senator Carl Levin said the other day that there was no evidence that Iraq had restarted its nuclear weapons program. KAY: Well, I think in the nuclear area theres evidence that they were putting small amounts of money and starting rudimentary experiments. On the basis of what weve examined, I think there is evidence that they were interested in restarting their nuclear program, but it was at a very early stage, based on what we have currently found. SNOW: You also had heard that Saddam Hussein had gotten frustrated with the United States weapons inspectors and was simply ready to go ahead, regardless of their presence on his soil. KAY: His senior head of the arms industry has told us that in 2000 he believed that Saddam had simply gotten fed up with the United States restrictions and was ready, in the face of th...
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