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Investigation: Air France 296 By: Chris Kilroy In the first crash of a new 'Fly-By-Wire' aircraft, the Airbus A320-100 i mpacted trees while performing a fly-by at an airshow and burst into fla mes. The crew, and Air France maintenance officials, have all been sente nced to probation for manslaughter; Evi dence, including photographs, has now been exposed that an Airbus offici al at the scene switched the Digital Flight Data Recorder before the cou rt hearing. Since May 1998, it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was switched a fter the accident. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forensic Evidence an d Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the recorder presented to the Court is NOT the one taken from the aircraft after the accident.
The IPSC report: The Flight Data Recorder has been substituted! The Crash On Sunday June 26, 1988, the airclub at the airfield of Mulhouse-Habsheim in Alsace/France had organized with Air France a low approach of a bran d new Airbus A320 in landing configuration. Michel Asseline was the pilo t in command of F-GFKC, Pierre Mazire was his first officer, when the a ircraft overflew the airfield at 2 pm in wonderful sunny weather. Some s econds later the aircraft touched the tops of the trees behind the runwa y and crashed into a forest. The accident was filmed by a video amateur and has bee n shown dozens of times on TV.
The Black Boxes were taken undamaged from the aircraft 2 hours after the crash, but unfortunately they have been out of control of justice for 10 days, and since May 1998 it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was substituted during this period. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forens ic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the Blac k Boxes used in the trial to declare the pilot guilty are NOT the ones t aken from the aircraft. The aircraft was new, Airbus was waiting for commands, a lack of confiden ce in the highly computerized aircraft would have meant a commercial dis aster - not only for the manufacturer, but also for the French administr ation, which has a share in the European Airbus consortium. The Official Version The French minister of transportation (Louis Mermoz), the company (Air Fr ance) and the aircraft manufacturer (Airbus Industry) declared with prec ipitation shortly after the accident that the aircraft was beyond any do ubt. The final report (published 18 months after the accident) comes to the same conclusion, but the authenticity of the data on which the repor t has always been very doubtful, and since May 1998 it is proven by the report of the Lausanne IPSC that the Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) was sub stituted after the crash. For 10 years the media have not stopped report ing about the anomalies which have accompanied the technical investigati on of the accident from the beginning. The Captain's Version Captain Asseline flew the aircraft manually. He had been instructed by Ai r France to overfly the airfield at 100 ft above ground. When he increas ed throttle to level off at 100 ft, the engines did not respond. So afte r some seconds he got worried and thought there was something like a sho rt-circuit in the completely computerized throttle control. So he pulled the throttle back all the way and forth again. After the accident, Captain Asseline was very astonished when he saw on a n amateur video tape that the gear was only 30 ft above ground when the aircraft was passing over the runway. He affirms the altimeter of the Ai rbus A320 indicated 100 ft. Operational Engineering Bulletins No fewer than 52 provisional flight notices have been published by Airbus Industry between April 1988 and April 1989. Hardly any new aircraft typ e has manifested such a large number of malfunctions. An OEB (Operationa l Engineering Bulletin) is a temporary notice sent out by the manufactur er to the users of an aircraft. They form a list of anomalies or simply functional features which do not appear in the users' manual. This means that it was already known before the accident that the engines sometimes did not respond normally to the pilot's commands on the Airbus A320. However Air France did not inform their pilots about this anomaly. After the Habsheim accident, the engines have been modified (OEB 19/2, August 1988). It stated that the cur rent design for barometric altitude indication on the Airbus A320 did not comply with airworthiness. This could be a hint why the aircraft was as low as 30 ft (9 m) above the runway whereas Asseline affirms that the altimeter indicated 100 ft (30 m). These OEBs were sent to the company (Air France), but they had not been h anded to the pilots. In fact both the engines and the altimetric system have been modified after the crash, which indicates that they did not fu nction correctly at that time, but Airbus Industries was not held respon sible of anything by the French Court, the whole responsibility was give n to the pilots and to the organizers of the airshow. The Black Boxes The Black Boxes (the DFDR and the CVR), major pieces of evidence, have be en out of control of the investigating court at Mulhouse for 10 days. Th e CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) records the pilots' voices. The Digital F light Data Recorder (DFDR) records the flight parameters, for example th e altitude, speed, acceleration/deceleration, engine speed etc. Accordin g to the French Penal Procedure the police should have confiscated the b lack boxes immediately after the accident for further examination by ind ependent experts. Instead the black boxes have been illegitimately in po ssession of the DGAC (Direction Gnerale de l'Aviation Civile) from June 26 (the day of the accident) to July 6, when Germain Sengelin, investig ating magistrate at Mulhouse, had ordered their confiscation. The Black Boxes from which the official report has been made show a serie s of anomalies, which has led a lot of critical people since 1988 to cal l in question their authenticity: * The black boxes have been physically opened, the magnetic tape has be en cut. Normally you put the black boxes into a reading machine without opening them - the same way you read a cassette in a video recorder. That means that the DFDR would have stopped accidentally just before the impact. Th is might be expected in a collision with a mountain, but in Habsheim the recorders should have been able to operate until the aircraft disintegrated. Any crash which could be survived by all but 3 passengers should not have caused an abrupt stop in the DFDR recording. Due to these anomalies, and the fact that the Black Boxes were in the han ds of the DGAC, it has always been supposed, and is finally proven since May 1998, that the Flight Data Recorder confiscated on July 5 from the DGAC is NOT the one which was taken from the aircraft after the crash. The Engines: CFMI assesses CFMI The engines of the crashed aircraft have been examinated by the manufactu rer (CFMI/SNECMA) himself instead of independent experts. An Operational Bulletin (OEB 19/1) about Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitud e was sent out before the accident, in May 1988 (but Air France didn't p ass it to its Airbus A320 pilots) and was modified in August (OEB 19/2). Germain Sengelin Germain Sengelin, investigating magistrate at Mulhouse, was amazed that t he Black Boxes had been out of control of justice for 10 days. in fact, for s ome reason, it was not executed before Wednesday July 6 800 am: This is another anomaly. Norbert Jacquet Norbert Jacquet, an Air France pilot who spoke out in Asseline's support, was suspended from duty and had his licence withdrawn by Air France on the grounds of "mental instability". Meanwhile he has got five psychiatr ic certificates which unanimously state that he is completely sane and d oes not have any signs of mental trouble. One understands that co-pilot Pierre Mazire, who has continued to fly for Air France after the accide nt, cannot dare to express himself on the subject. The Forest When the aircraft hit the trees, its wings made an aisle in the forest - a valuable source of evidence. However the forest has been razed with pr ecipitation within 3 days after the accident. The ord...
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