wid.ap.org/transcripts/ashcroft_index.html
Provided by the commission: Link to Gorelick Memo mentioned by Ashcroft Thank you. It is with great sorrow that I join this Commission today in reflection on September 11, 2001. Even today, 31 months after the attacks, I struggle to learn the lessons of that day without being overwhelmed by the losses of that day. I feel sorrow for the loss of life, sorrow for the loss of promise, sorrow for the lost innocence of a nation forever scarred. My sorrow for the victims of September 11 is equaled only by my rage at their killer. Usama Bin Laden is to blame for my angerI blame his hatred for our values, his perversion of a faith, his idolatry of death.
September 11 revealed not just our enemys capacity for murder but our fellow Americans thirst for justice. The men and women of the Department of Justice have embraced the cause of our time: the protection of the lives and liberties of Americans. Working within the Constitution, we fight any battle and shoulder any burden - no matter personal or political cost - to prevent additional terrorist attacks. And for the time being, al Qaedas slaughter has ceased on American soil. And we have suffered no small amount of criticism for our tough tactics. We accept this criticism for what it is: the price we are privileged to pay for our liberty. Had I known a terrorist attack on the United States was imminent in 2001, I would have unloaded our full arsenal of weaponry against it - despite the inevitable criticism. The Justice Departments warriors, our agents, and our prosecutors would have been unleashed. Every tough tactic we have deployed since the attacks would have been deployed before the attacks. But the simple fact of September 11 is this: we did not know an attack was coming because for nearly a decade our government had blinded itself to its enemies.
The old national intelligence system in place on September 11 was destined to fail. Your responsibility is to examine the root causes of September 11 and to help the United States prevent another terrorist attack. I have sworn to tell the whole truth, and I intend to fulfill this obligation. Today I will testify to four central issues which have not been developed fully in the Commissions work and deserve your attention. First, this Commission has debated the nature of the covert action authorities directed at Usama Bin Laden prior to 2001. In February 2001, shortly after becoming Attorney General, I reviewed these authorities. Let me be clear: My thorough review revealed no covert action program to kill Bin Laden. There was a covert-action program to capture Bin Laden for criminal prosecution. But even this program was crippled by a snarled web of requirements, restrictions and regulations that prevented decisive action by our men and women in the field. When they most needed clear, understandable guidance, our agents and operatives were given the language of lawyers. Even if they could have penetrated Bin Ladens training camps, they would have needed a battery of attorneys to approve the capture. With unclear guidance, our covert action teams risk of injury may have exceeded the risk to Osama Bin Laden. On March 7, 2001, I met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. I recommended that the covert-action authorities be clarified and be expanded to allow for decisive, lethal action;
Rice agreed and gave Director Tenet responsibility for drafting, clarifying, and expanding the new authorities. My second point today goes to the heart of this Commissions duty to uncover the fact: The single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents. In 1995, the Justice Department embraced flawed legal reasoning, imposing a series of restrictions on the FBI that went beyond what the law required. The 1995 Guidelines and the procedures developed around them imposed draconian barriers to communications between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. The wall effectively excluded prosecutors from intelligence investigations. The wall left intelligence agents afraid to talk with criminal prosecutors or agents. In 1995, the Justice Department designed a system destined to fail.
The memorandum ordered FBI Director Louis Freeh and others, quote: We believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will more clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation.
It is clear from the review that actions taken in the Millennium Period should not be the operating model for the United States government. In March 2000, the review warns the prior Administration of a substantial al Qaeda network and affiliated foreign terrorist presence within the United States, capable of supporting additional terrorist attacks here. Furthermore, fully seventeen months before the September 11 attacks, the review recommends disrupting the al Qaeda network and terrorist presence here using immigration violations, minor criminal infractions, and tougher visa and border controls.
Among the many vulnerabilities in homeland defenses identified, the Justice Departments surveillance and FISA operations were specifically criticized for their glaring weaknesses. It is clear from the review that actions taken in the Millennium Period should not be the operating model for the United States government. In March 2000, the review warns the prior Administration of a substantial al-Qaida network and affiliated foreign terrorist presence within the United States, capable of supporting additional terrorist attacks here. Furthermore, fully 17 months before the September 11 attacks, the review recommends disrupting the al-Qaida network and terrorist presence here using immigration violations, minor criminal infractions, and tougher visa and border controls. These are the same aggressive, often criticized law enforcement tactics we have unleashed for 31 months to stop another al-Qaida attack. These are the same tough tactics we deployed to catch Ali al-Marri, who was sent here by al-Qaida on September 10, 2001, to facilitate a second wave of terrorist attacks on Americans. Despite the warnings and the clear vulnerabilities identified by the NSC in 2000, no new disruption strategy to attack the al-Qaida network within the United States was deployed. It was ignored in the Departments five-year counterterrorism strategy.
It was not among the 30 items upon which my predecessor briefed me during the transition. It was not advocated as a disruption strategy to me during the summer threat period by the NSC staff which wrote the review more than a year earlier. I certainly cannot say why the blueprint for security was not followed in 2000. I do know from my personal experience that those who take the kind of tough measures called for in the plan will feel the heat.
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