Berkeley CSUA MOTD:Entry 48176
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2025/07/09 [General] UID:1000 Activity:popular
7/9     

2007/9/24-27 [Reference/Military] UID:48176 Activity:kinda low
9/24    Does there exist a thing as missile-to-missile intercepter?
        \_ What, do you mean like the Patriot?  Or do you mean a missile
           carried on a missile to take out a Patriot?
           \_ Sorry I didn't make it clear. I mean an air-to-air anti-
              missile missle. You know, like what they do in Robotech
              where they shoot out 32 missiles at a time and they counter
              with 32 other missiles in space.
           \_ Uh, that does not exist. ICBM's deploy flak, multiple reentry
              vehicles, and decoys, but not active countermeasures. Not very effective
              to try and hit a bullet with a bullet launched from a bullet,
              when they're already trying to hit a bullet with a bullet.
              \_ No, it's much more effective to confuse and outmaneuvre when you can.
                 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_defense
                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phalanx_CIWS
                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Missile_countermeasures
                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_defense
                 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phalanx_CIWS
2025/07/09 [General] UID:1000 Activity:popular
7/9     

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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_defense
edit Classified by type/range of missile intercepted The types/ranges are strategic, theater and tactical. Each entails unique requirements for intercept, and a defensive system capable of intercepting one missile type frequently cannot intercept others; Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system that defends the United States. Geographic range of strategic defense can be regional (Russian system) or national (US system). In this context the term "theater" means the entire localized region for military operations, typically a radius of several hundred kilometers. Defense range of theater defensive systems is usually on this order. three regions of their trajectory: boost phase, midcourse phase or terminal phase. Advantages: bright, hot rocket exhaust makes detection, discrimination and targeting easier. Disadvantages: difficult to geographically position interceptors to intercept missiles in boost phase, limited time period for intercept (typically about 180 seconds). The coast period through space before reentering the atmosphere can be several minutes, up to 20 minutes for an ICBM. Advantages: extended decision/intercept time, very large geographic defensive coverage, potentially continental. Disadvantages: requires large/heavy anti-ballistic missiles, sophisticated powerful radar often augmented by space-based sensors, must handle potential space-based decoys. Advantages: smaller/lighter anti-ballistic missile required, balloon decoys won't work, smaller, less sophisticated radar required. Disadvantages: very limited reaction time, possibly less than 30 seconds, less defended geographic coverage. edit Classified by intercept location relative to the atmosphere Missile defense can take place either inside (endoatmospheric) or outside (exoatmospheric) the earth's atmosphere. The trajectory of most ballistic missiles takes them inside and outside the earth's atmosphere, and they can be intercepted either place. There are advantages and disadvantages to either intercept technique. Advantages: physically smaller/lighter, easier to move and deploy, endoatmospheric intercept means balloon-type decoys won't work. Disadvantages: limited range and defended area, and limited decision and tracking time for the incoming warhead. Advantages: more decision and tracking time, larger defended area with fewer missiles. Disadvantages: larger/heavier missiles required, more difficult to transport and emplace than smaller missiles, must handle decoys. The technology mostly centered around detecting offensive launch events and tracking in-bound ballistic missiles, but with limited ability to actually defend against the missile. Nike Zeus, which using a nuclear warhead could intercept ICBMs However Nike Zeus had other limitations which prevented it being deployed. In any case, by the early 1960s the Nike Zeus was the first anti-ballistic missile to achieve hit-to-kill (physically colliding with the incoming warhead). A-35 anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow in 1966, which also defended nearby ICBM sites. That system has been upgraded several times and is still operational. In 1967, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated: "Let me emphasize -- and I cannot do so too strongly -- that our decision to go ahead with a limited ABM deployment in no way indicates that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is in any way less urgent or desirable." It was deactivated in 1976 after being operational for less than four months due to a changing political climate plus concern over limited effectiveness, low strategic value, and high operational cost. Missile Defense Agency, and allowing for deployment of interceptor vehicles beyond the single site allowed under the treaty. There are still technological hurdles to an effective defense against ballistic missile attack. Moreover, the warheads or payloads of ballistic missiles can be concealed by a number of different types of decoys. Sensors that track and target warheads aboard the kinetic kill vehicle may have trouble distinguishing the "real" warhead from the decoys, but several tests that have included decoys were successful. As of February 2007, the US missile defense system consists of 13 ground-based interceptors at Ft Greely in Alaska, plus two interceptors at Vandenberg AFB, California.
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phalanx_CIWS
The system automatically searches, detects, tracks, engages and confirms kills using its computer-controlled radar system. Because it is self-contained, Phalanx is ideal for support ships which lack integrated targeting systems and generally have limited sensors. The entire unit weighs between 5500 kg and 6100 kg(12,400 or 13,500 lb). Phalanx CIWS firing Phalanx CIWS firing Also known as the "Goal Keeper" System, Phalanx has been developed through a number of different configurations. The basic style is the Block 0 The Block 1 (1988) offers various improvements in radar, ammunition, rate of fire, increasing engagement elevation to +70 degrees, and computing. These improvements were intended to increase the system's capability against emerging Soviet supersonic anti-ship missiles. Block 1A introduced a new computer system to counter more maneuverable targets. Rolling Airframe Missile system to increase RAM engagement range and accuracy. The Block 1B also allows for human intervention to identify and target threats. The US and Canada are in the process of upgrading all their Phalanx systems to the Block 1B configuration. edit How the CIWS Works The CIWS is designed to be the last line of defense against anti-ship missiles. Due to its design criteria its effective range is very short relative to the range of modern SAMs, from 1 to 5 nautical miles (9 km). The gun mount moves at a very high speed and with great precision. The system takes minimal inputs from the ship making it capable of functioning despite potential damage to the ship. A technician checks over the RADAR transmitter and microwave assemblies of a Phalanx CIWS, most likely a Block 0 The search radar can be seen at the top with the vertical, orange-peel shaped, tracking radar below it. A technician checks over the RADAR transmitter and microwave assemblies of a Phalanx CIWS, most likely a Block 0 The search radar can be seen at the top with the vertical, orange-peel shaped, tracking radar below it. edit Radar Subsystems The CIWS has two radars that work together to engage targets. The first radar is the search radar, located inside the radome on the weapon control group (top of the white painted portion). The search subsystem provides bearing, range, velocity, heading, and altitude information of potential targets to the CIWS computer. This information is analyzed to determine whether the detected object should be engaged by the CIWS system. Once the computer identifies a valid target (see details below), the mount moves to face the target and then hands the target over to the track radar. The track radar is an "orange peel"-style radar that is more precise, but can only view a much smaller area. The track radar observes the target until the computer determines that the probability of a successful hit is maximized and then, depending on the operator conditions, the system will either fire automatically or will recommend fire to the operator. While firing, the system tracks outgoing rounds and 'walks' them onto the target. US Navy sailors load tungsten ammunition (white sabot at right) and off-load dummy ammunition (left). US Navy sailors load tungsten ammunition (white sabot at right) and off-load dummy ammunition (left). The Block 0 CIWS mounts (hydraulic driven) fired at a rate of 3,000 rounds per minute and they could only hold 989 rounds in the magazine drum. The Block 1 CIWS mounts (hydraulic) also fired at 3,000 rounds per minute with an extended magazine drum holding 1550 rounds. The Block 1A and newer (pneumatic driven) CIWS mounts fire at a rate of 4,500 rounds per minute and also had the larger 1550 round magazine. The velocity of the rounds once fired is approximately 3,600 feet (1,100 m) per second (1100 m/s). The kinetic projectiles are designed to pierce and explode an incoming missile's warhead. Use of otherwise more effective high explosive shells would risk destroying the missile airframe while allowing the warhead to continue a ballistic trajectory into the ship. One of the systems takes the rounds out of the magazine drum and takes them to the gun. The second conveyor system takes either the empty shells or non-fired rounds and routes them back to the opposite end of the drum. The CIWS has only the data it collects in real time from the radars to decide if the target is a threat and to engage it. A contact has to meet multiple criteria for it to be considered a target; A sailor sits in front of a CIWS Local Control Panel (LCP) during a general quarters drill. A sailor sits in front of a CIWS Local Control Panel (LCP) during a general quarters drill. The CIWS search radar will see contacts that are out-bound and discard them. The CIWS will only engage a target if it is approaching the ship. If a contact is not heading directly at the ship, the CIWS looks at its heading in relation to the ship and its velocity. It then decides if the contact can perform a maneuver to still hit the ship. The CIWS has the ability to engage targets that travel in a wide range of speeds; if a target exceeds this velocity, the CIWS will not engage it. It also has a minimum target velocity, meaning any contact going below that velocity will not be engaged by the CIWS. The operator also has the option to adjust the minimum and maximum limits within the limits of the system. What is described above are the basics of how the CIWS works. There are many other subsystems that run in the background to ensure proper operation, such as environmental control, transmitter, mount movement control, power control and distribution and so on. It takes 6 to 8 months to train a technician to maintain, operate, and repair the CIWS. A night time test firing of the Phalanx Mark 15 Close In Weapons System (CIWS). A night time test firing of the Phalanx Mark 15 Close In Weapons System (CIWS). The Phalanx system has never been credited with shooting down any enemy missiles or aircraft. chaff, the Phalanx system on Jarrett, operating in the automatic target-acquisition mode, fixed upon Missouri's chaff and fired a burst of rounds (not destroying the incoming missile). From this burst, four rounds hit Missouri which was two to three miles (5 km) from Jarrett at the time. Rolling Airframe Missile, which has greater range and higher hit probability. The RAM system uses an automated and self-sufficient radar fire control similar to that of Phalanx. Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System The US Army's version of the Navy's CIWS Phalanx anti-missile system is called the "Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System" (LPWS). It is a type of "C-RAM" (counter-rockets, artillery and mortars) defensive weapon. These rounds explode on impact with the target, or upon tracer burnout. With a reliability of between 95 and 99 percent the odds of live rounds falling on "friendlies" is minimal.
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Missile_countermeasures
Anti-ballistic missiles Pages in category "Missile countermeasures" There are 6 pages in this section of this category.