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| 7/8 |
| 2005/8/11-12 [Politics/Domestic/911] UID:39102 Activity:nil |
8/11 The 9/11 Comissiong in Mortal Danger
http://corner.nationalreview.com/05_08_07_corner-archive.asp
Did DoD lawyers blow the chance to nab Atta?
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/aug_05/dod_lawyers.html
Was Berger after Able Danger documents? |
| 7/8 |
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| corner.nationalreview.com/05_08_07_corner-archive.asp Friday, August 12, 2005 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, CAN I PLEASE HAVE YOUR ATTENTION? I'VE JUST BEEN HA NDED AN URGENT AND HORRIFYING NEWS STORY. I NEED ALL OF YOU, TO STOP WHA T YOU'RE DOING AND LISTEN. AP: "There has been much furor over these ad campaigns, but I believe that t elevision advertisements are not the point, and should not be the focus of debate or discussion," Sen. But Schumer said he would ask Roberts about the constitutionality of a bortion clinic protesting at his confirmation hearing. How disingenuous they remain though: We regret that many people have misconstrued our recent advertisement ab out Mr Roberts record, said Nancy Keenan, president of NARAL Pro-Choic e America. John Podhoretz It behaved disgracefully and in a nakedly partisan fashion, with former o fficials of the Clinton administration attempting to use the platform to damage the president's reelection chances. Then, after months of ludicr ous conduct, out of nowhere came the brilliantly conceived and written r eport that set a new standard of eloquence and coherence for government documents, became a major bestseller and redeemed the commission's reput ation. confirming a ll the particulars of what will now forever be called the Able Danger di saster. The 9/11 Commission staff did hear about intelligence-gathering efforts that hit pay dirt on the whereabouts of Mohammed Atta -- in 1999 -- and deliberately chose to omit word of those efforts. Because to do so might upset the timeline the Commission had est ablished on Atta. Because the Mohammed Atta timeline establish ed by the Commission pointedly insisted Atta did not meet with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague. Because debunking the Atta-Iraq connection w as of vital importance to Democrats, who had become focused almost obses sively on the preposterous notion that there was no relation whatever be tween Al Qaeda and Iraq -- that Al Qaeda and Iraq might even have been e nemies. I was very skeptical of this Able Danger stuff about Atta, thought it was just sme way Rep. Thi s is clearly becoming the biggest story of the summer -- the fact that, as Andy McCarthy alluded to, the "intelligence wall" set up by 9/11 Comm issioner Jamie Gorelick when she was in the Justice Department did, in f act, cause the linchpin of the 9/11 attacks to evade capture by American law enforcement. So was the staff a) protecting the Atta timeline or b) Jamie Gorelick or c) the Clinton administration or d) itself, because it got hold of the i nformation relatively late and the staff was lazy? More important, what will co-chairmen Tom (pound his fist on the table) K ean and Lee (look sorrowful) Hamilton do and say in the next 36 hours ab out this calamity? You're increasing US troops -- increasing US troop strength in Iraq for the upcoming elections. What happens -- is it pos sible those troops will be asked to stay on longer if needed to help im prove security? And if I may, what happens if Iraq misses the deadline for drafting the new constitution? As to the constitution, one of the meetings we had this morning was with Zal, our ambassador in Baghdad. And he gave us a briefing as to the progress on the constitution. We have made it clear that we believe that constitution can be and should be agreed upon by August 15th. And so I'm operating on the assumption that it will be agr eed upon by August the 15th. And Zal said that, you know, obviously the re are some difficult issues -- federalism being one, role of religion. Hopefully the -- the drafters of the constitution understand our stron g belief that women ought to be treated equally in the Iraqi society. Although -- and he did sa y that there seems to be a spirit of cooperation and a deep desire for people to work closely together. As for the troops, no decision has been made yet on increasing troops or decreasing troops. I know there's a lot of speculation and rumors abou t that. We did, as you might recall, increase troops for the Iraqi elec tion and for the Afghanistan elections. It seemed to have helped create security, and I know the Secretary of Defense is analyzing that possib ility. I also know there's a lot of folks here in the United States that are, y ou know, wondering about troop withdrawals. They hear the stories about a loved one being lost to combat. It breaks my h eart to think about a family weeping over the loss of a loved one. I un derstand the anguish that some feel about the death that takes place. I also have heard the voices of those saying, pull out now, and I've tho ught about their cry, and their sincere desire to reduce the loss of li fe by pulling our troops out. Pulling the tro ops out would send a terrible signal to the enemy. Immediate withdrawal would say to the Zarqawis of the world, and the terrorists of the worl d, and the bombers who take innocent life around the world, you know, t he United States is weak; and all we've got to do is intimidate and the y'll leave. Our mission in Ir aq, as I said earlier, is to fight the terrorists, is to train the Iraq is. Oh, I know it's hard for some Americans to see that progress, but we are making progress. M ore and more Iraqi units are becoming more and more capable of fighting off the terrorists. And remember, and that's a country where 85 milli on Iraqis went to the polls. And our mission is to help them have a military that's capable of defeating tho se who would like to dash their ambitions to be free. Withdrawing before the mission is complete would send a signal to those who wonder about the United States' commitment to spreading freedom. Yo u see, I believe and know that we're at war, and we're at war against a hateful ideology. And the way to defeat that ideology in the long-term is to spread a hopeful ideology, one that says to young girls, you can succeed in your society, and you should have a chance to do so; one th at says to moms and dads, you can raise your child in a peaceful world without intimidation; and one that says to people from all walks of lif e, you have a right to express yourself in the public square. It's the spread of liberty that is laying the foundation of peace, and i s very important for our citizens -- no matter what side of the politic al aisle you're on -- to understand that the mission is a vital mission and it's one that will be -- that we obviously couldn't complete if -- if we -- if we didn't fulfill our goals, which was to help the Iraqis. Q Just to make clear, you're referring to Mrs Sheehan here, I think? THE PRESIDENT: I'm referring to any grieving mother or father, no matter what their political views may be. Part of my duty as the President is to meet with those who've lost a loved one. And so, you know, listen, I sympathize with Mrs Sheehan. And I am -- she has every right in the world to say what s he believes. I've heard her position from others, which is, get out of Iraq now. And it would be -- it would be a mistake for the security of this country and the ability to lay the f oundations for peace in the long-run, if we were to do so. But no, Steve, I've met with a lot of families, and I have done my best to bring comfort to the families and honor to the loved one, and get di fferent opinions when you meet with moms and dads and sons and daughter s and wives and husbands of those who have fallen. One opinion I've com e away with universally is that, you know, we should do everything we c an to honor the fallen. And one way to honor the fallen is to lay the f oundation for peace. There will be a lot more to say in the coming days about the startling re velations that some of the 9/11 hijackers including Mohammed Atta we re actually identified as potential terrorists as early as 1999 by a DoD intelligence project called Able Danger, but, in those days of the wall that prevented intelligence agents from comparing notes with criminal i nvestigators, law enforcement was not told; and that the 9/11 Commis sion was told about Able Danger and the early identification of Atta but decided it wasnt worthy of any mention in its 567-page that devotes exa ctly two pages (78-80) to the wall describing it as just one of those un fortunate misunderstandings. letter... |
| www.gsnmagazine.com/aug_05/dod_lawyers.html In September 2000, one year before the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/1 1, a US Army military intelligence program, known as Able Danger, id entified a terrorist cell based in Brooklyn, NY, one of whose members wa s 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta, and recommended to their military super iors that the FBI be called in to take out that cell, according to Rep . Curt Weldon, a longtime Republican congressman from Pennsylvania who i s currently vice chairman of both the House Homeland Security and House Armed Services Committees. The recommendation to bring down that New York City cell -- in which two other Al Qaeda terrorists were also active -- was not pursued during the weeks leading up to the 2000 presidential election, said Weldon. Thats because Mohammed Atta possessed a green card at the time and Defense Department lawyers did not want to recommend that the FBI go after someo ne holding a green card, Weldon told his House colleagues last June 27 d uring a little-noticed speech, known as a special order, which he deli vered on the House floor. Details of the origins and efforts of Able Danger were corroborated in a telephone interview by GSN with a former defense intelligence officer wh o said he worked closely with that program. That intelligence officer, w ho spoke to GSN while sitting in Rep. Weldons Capitol Hill office, requ ested anonymity for fear that his current efforts to help re-start a sim ilar intelligence-gathering operation might be hampered if his identity becomes known. The intelligence officer recalled carrying documents to the offices of Ab le Danger, which was being run by the Special Operations Command, headqu artered in Tampa, FL. The documents included a photo of Mohammed Atta su pplied by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and described Attas relationship with Osama bin Laden. The officer was very disappoin ted when lawyers working for Special Ops decided that anyone holding a g reen card had to be granted essentially the same legal protections as an y US citizen. Thus, the information Able Danger had amassed about the only terrorist cell they had located inside the United States could not be shared with the FBI, the lawyers concluded. We were directed to take those 3M yellow stickers and place them over th e faces of Atta and the other terrorists and pretend they didnt exist, the intelligence officer told GSN. So now, Mr Speaker, Weldon said on the House floor last J une, for the first time I can tell our colleagues that one of our agenc ies not only identified the New York cell of Mohammed Atta and two of th e terrorists, but actually made a recommendation to bring the FBI in to take out that cell. Weldon has developed a reputation for making bold pronouncements and, occ asionally, ruffling the feathers of some of his colleagues. His recent n on-fiction book, Countdown to Terror, which draws on information from an Iranian expatriate source Weldon has dubbed Ali, has drawn criticis m from the CIA, others in the intelligence community and some congressio nal colleagues. A longtime champion of firefighters and first responders, Weldon has a pa rticular interest in this subject because he has been openly and activel y pushing since 1999 for the establishment of an integrated government-w ide center that could consolidate, analyze and act upon intelligence gat hered by dozens of US agencies, armed services and departments. For years, the CIA resisted the congressmans recommendation, Weldon told GSN in a telephone interview on August 1, claiming that his plan to int egrate dozens of discrete and classified intelligence streams was both u nworkable and unnecessary. Weldon had dubbed his proposed organization t he National Operations and Analysis Hub, nicknamed NOAH, because the ce nter was intended to protect our nation from the flood of threats, he explained. Sixteen months after 9/11, such a data fusion center, named the Terrori sm Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was indeed established by the Bush A dministration. At the urging of the 9/11 Commission, the TTIC has s ince been restructured and renamed the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). Weldon is pleased that steps have been taken to unify the nations intell igence gathering and analysis capabilities, now headed by a newly establ ished Director of National Intelligence, Joseph Negroponte, but Weldon r emains concerned that the stovepipe mentalities that plagued the intel ligence community in the past continue to inhibit true information shari ng between intelligence agencies. He is also extremely frustrated by the fact that so little official atten tion seems to have been paid to the intelligence failure related to the Mohammed Atta cell in Brooklyn. Weldon contends that few in the Bush Adm inistration seem interested in investigating that missed opportunity. system in 1999 and 2000, whic h the military had already developed as a prototype, and if we had follo wed the lead of the military entity that identified the Al Qaeda cell of Mohammed Atta, then perhaps, Mr Speaker, 9/11 would never have occurre d, Weldon said during his special order remarks. According to Weldon, staff members of the 9/11 Commission were briefed on the capabilities of the Able Danger intelligence unit within the Specia l Operations Command, which had been set up by General Pete Schoomaker, who headed Special Ops at the time, on the orders of General Hugh Shelto n, then the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Staffers at the 9/11 Commission staffers were also told about the specific recommendation to break up the Mohammed Atta cell. However, those commission staff members apparently did not choose to brief the commissions members on these se nsitive matters. Weldon said he was told specifically by commission members, Tim Roemer, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana; that they had never been briefed on the Able Dange r unit within Special Ops or on the units evidence of a terrorist cell in Brooklyn. For whatever bizarre reasons, he didnt pass on the information. The State Department, where Zelikow now works as a counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, said he was traveling and unavailable for co mment. Why did the 9/11 Commission not investigate this entire situation? Why did the 9/11 Commission not ask the question a bout the militarys recommendation against the Mohammed Atta cell? Weldon is also disappointed with himself for not pushing harder against t he intelligence bureaucracy that he saw as resisting his proposal to set up a more integrated intelligence-gathering operation. But he saves som e of his greatest ire for the lawyers within the Department of Defense - - he is not sure if they were working within the Special Operations Comm and or higher up the organizational chart, within the Office of the Secr etary of Defense -- for their unwillingness to allow Able Danger to send to the FBI its evidence and its recommendation for immediate action. Obviously, if we had taken out that cell, 9/11 would not have occurred a nd, certainly, taking out those three principal players in that cell wou ld have severely crippled, if not totally stopped, the operation that ki lled 3,000 people in America, said Weldon. Shining a spotlight on this intelligence gaffe has not been easy. Russ Ca so, Weldons chief of staff, explained to GSN the steps his boss has tak en to shed light on the situation. Pete Hoekstra (R-MI), the chairman of the House Pe rmanent Select Committee on Intelligence, about conversations he has had with several members of the Able Danger intelligence unit. Weldon has u rged Hoekstra to investigate the reasons why Able Dangers revelations w ere not shared with the FBI. Hoekstra looked into the matter at the Pent agon, but after several days of fruitless inquiries, was unable to find anyone at the Defense Department who seemed to know anything about Able Danger or would acknowledge the intelligence unit had ever existed, expl ained Caso in a telephone interview with GSN. Unwilling to let the matter drop, Weldon arranged for a face-to-face meet ing in late July between Hoekstra, himself and the former intelligence o fficer who had worked with Able Danger,... |