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| 5/28 |
| 2002/4/30 [Reference/History/WW2/Japan] UID:24638 Activity:insanely high |
4/29 Followup: Was bombing Hiroshima & Nagasaki terrorism, since we killed
civilians to undermine their support of Japanese gov't policy?
\_ yes, we circumvented their military, which is suppose to protect
their civilians, and attacked their civilians. So yes, terrorist
don't bother with our military so terrorist attack our civilians
by ignoring our military.
\_ The US lost 300,000 soldiers in WWII to free the world
you live in, so unless you had family who fought for
the allies in WWII your opinion is WORTHLESS.
\_ Dad and his brothers, 442nd RCT or Army Medical. -jon
\_ Do you even know anything about why Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were selected? They were primarily strategically important
military targets:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/abomb/mp05.htm
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/abomb/mp07.htm
In Nagasaki the target was the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works
and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works. Not exactly your
run of the mill civilian zen children's peace commune.
"bomb" was used in violation on international law banning attacks
on civilians (as if international law on this subject mattered
after the blitz and dresden):
Even the hague couldn't quite bring themselves to say that the
"bomb" was used in violation on international law banning
attacks on civilians (as if international law on this subject
mattered after the blitz and dresden):
http://www.dannen.com/decision/int-law.html#J
\_ The Japanese, because they are so strong willed, refused to
surrender and preferred to die fighting to the last woman and
child. Instead of fighting a war of attrition at the cost of
tens of thousand US casualties (if not hundreds),
and a probably similar cost to Japan, we nuked them.
What is so hard to understand about that. More people died
in conventional bombing on primarily civilian targets. Yes
both are horrible but such is nature of war. You kill people.
Frankly, I, like 99% of Americans at that time, had family
fighting in the war one way or another. If you ask
any one alive at the time was it the right decision, the
answer was unequivocally yes. Unfortunately, you have
the revisionists today who weren't alive at the time come
along and preach what a horrible atrocity it was -
complete bullshit.
\_ Another strategic reason for dropping the nuclear bombs on
Japan, the one that many people forget, was a simple
demonstration of the nuclear capability to the Soviets and rest
of the world. The world was already frightened by USSR's swift
conquest of the Eastern Europe. Their military machine seemed to
be unstoppable. Certain Soviet generals were even suggesting to
Stalin at the time to turn their tanks and take over the rest of
Europe. Not that Stalin was necessarily planning to do that but
dropping the nukes on Japan certainly added more weight to
the American military might in his eyes.
\_ I love how people who have absolutely no connection with
events of WWII can ramble and rant and rave about how horrible
it was to bomb Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Goddamned spoiled
coddled fuckwits who would probably shit in their pants if
they had to make a hard decision in their entire fucking lives.
Everyone's a fucking critic after the fact. --Jon |
| 5/28 |
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| www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/abomb/mp05.htm Chapter 6 Some of the most frequent queries concerning the atomic bombs are those dealing with the selection of the targets and the decision as to when the bombs would be used. The approximate date for the first use of the bomb was set in the fall of 1942 after the Army had taken over the direction of and responsibility for the atomic bomb project. At that time, under the scientific assumptions which turned out to be correct, the summer of 1945 was named as the most likely date when sufficient production would have been achieved to make it possible actually to construct and utilize an atomic bomb. It was essential before this time to develop the technique of constructing and detonating the bomb and to make an almost infinite number of scientific and engineering developments and tests. Between the fall of 1942 and June 1945, the estimated probabilities of success had risen from about 60% to above 90%; The test in New Mexico was held 6 days after sufficient material had become available for the first bomb. The Hiroshima bomb was ready awaiting suitable weather on July 31st, and the Nagasaki bomb was used as soon after the Hiroshima bomb as it was practicable to operate the second mission. The work on the actual selection of targets for the atomic bomb was begun in the spring of 1945. This was done in close cooperation with the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and his Headquarters. A number of experts in various fields assisted in the study. These included mathematicians, theoretical physicists, experts on the blast effects of bombs, weather consultants, and various other specialists. The desirability of visual bombing in order to insure the most effective use of the bomb. Importance of having one primary and two secondary targets for each mission, so that if weather conditions prohibited bombing the target there would be at least two alternates. Selection of targets to produce the greatest military effect on the Japanese people and thereby most effectively shorten the war. Since the atomic bomb was expected to produce its greatest amount of damage by primary blast effect, and next greatest by fires, the targets should contain a large percentage of closely-built frame buildings and other construction that would be most susceptible to damage by blast and fire. The maximum blast effect of the bomb was calculated to extend over an area of approximately 1 mile in radius; The selected targets should have a high military strategic value. The first target should be relatively untouched by previous bombing, in order that the effect of a single atomic bomb could be determined. The weather records showed that for five years there had never been two successive good visual bombing days over Tokyo, indicating what might be expected over other targets in the home islands. The worst month of the year for visual bombing was believed to be June, after which the weather should improve slightly during July and August and then become worse again during September. Since good bombing conditions would occur rarely, the most intense plans and preparations were necessary in order to secure accurate weather forecasts and to arrange for full utilization of whatever good weather might occur. It was also very desirable to start the raids before September. |
| www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/abomb/mp07.htm Chapter 8 Hiroshima Hiroshima was the primary target of the first atomic bomb mission. The weather was good, and the crew and equipment functioned perfectly. In every detail, the attack was carried out exactly as planned, and the bomb performed exactly as expected. The bomb exploded over Hiroshima at 8:15 on the morning of August 6, 1945. About an hour previously, the Japanese early warning radar net had detected the approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. The alert had been given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima. The planes approached the coast at a very high altitude. The normal radio broadcast warning was given to the people that it might be advisable to go to shelter if B-29's were actually sighted, but no raid was expected beyond some sort of reconnaissance. He tried to use another telephone line to reestablish his program, but it too had failed. About twenty minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small railway stops within ten miles of the city there came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these reports were transmitted to the Headquarters of the Japanese General Staff. Military headquarters repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in Hiroshima. The complete silence from that city puzzled the men at Headquarters; A young officer of the Japanese General Staff was instructed to fly immediately to Hiroshima, to land, survey the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was generally felt at Headquarters that nothing serious had taken place, that it was all a terrible rumor starting from a few sparks of truth. The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest. After flying for about three hours, while still nearly 100 miles from Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the bomb. In the bright afternoon, the remains of Hiroshima were burning. Their plane soon reached the city, around which they circled in disbelief. A great scar on the land, still burning, and covered by a heavy cloud of smoke, was all that was left of a great city. They landed south of the city, and the staff officer immediately began to organize relief measures, after reporting to Tokyo. Tokyo's first knowledge of what had really caused the disaster came from the White House public announcement in Washington sixteen hours after Hiroshima had been hit by the atomic bomb. Nagasaki Nagasaki had never been subjected to large scale bombing prior to the explosion of the atomic bomb there. On August 1st, 1945, however, a number of high explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few of these bombs hit in the shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city. Several of the bombs hit the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works and six bombs landed at the Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, with three direct hits on buildings there. While the damage from these few bombs were relatively small, it created considerable concern in Nagasaki and a number of people, principally school children, were evacuated to rural areas for safety, thus reducing the population in the city at the time of the atomic attack. When only two B-29 superfortresses were sighted at 10:53 the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given. A few moments later, at 11:00 o'clock, the observation B-29 dropped instruments attached to three parachutes and at 11:02 the other plane released the atomic bomb. The bomb exploded high over the industrial valley of Nagasaki, almost midway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works, in the south, and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works), in the north, the two principal targets of the city. Despite its extreme importance, the first bombing mission on Hiroshima had been almost routine. His narrative runs as follows: "The night of our take-off was one of tropical rain squalls, and flashes of lightning stabbed into the darkness with disconcerting regularity. The weather forecast told us of storms all the way from the Marianas to the Empire. Our rendezvous was to be off the southeast coast of Kyushu, some 1500 miles away. There we were to join with our two companion observation B-29's that took off a few minutes behind us. Skillful piloting and expert navigation brought us to the rendezvous without incident. The second, however, failed to arrive, having apparently been thrown off its course by storms during the night. We waited 30 minutes and then proceeded without the second plane toward the target area. We were prepared to drop the second atomic bomb on Japan. But fate was against us, for the target was completely obscured by smoke and haze. Three times we attempted bombing runs, but without success. Then with anti-aircraft fire bursting around us and with a number of enemy fighters coming up after us, we headed for our secondary target, Nagasaki. Out of this column of smoke there boiled a great swirling mushroom of gray smoke, luminous with red, flashing flame, that reached to 40,000 feet in less than 8 minutes. Below through the clouds we could see the pall of black smoke ringed with fire that covered what had been the industrial area of Nagasaki. |
| www.dannen.com/decision/int-law.html#J Senate on March 14, 1902 excerpts ARTICLE XXII The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. ARTICLE XXIII Besides the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially prohibited: a. To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury; ARTICLE XXV The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited. ARTICLE XXVI The Commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities. ARTICLE XXVII In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes. The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants. Senate on March 10, 1908 excerpts ARTICLE XXII The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. ARTICLE XXIII In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: To employ poison or poisoned weapons; To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion; To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; ARTICLE XXV The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited. ARTICLE XXVI The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities. ARTICLE XXVII In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided that they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicated the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand. Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, The Hague, February 1923 RULES OF AERIAL WARFARE The Hague, February 1923 Although drafted as the basis for an international treaty, the enactment of which was supported by the United States, these rules were never formally adopted excerpts ARTICLE XXII Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited. ARTICLE XXIII Aerial bombardment for the purpose of enforcing compliance with requisitions in kind or payment of contributions in money is prohibited. ARTICLE XXIV Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent. Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the following objectives: military forces; The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so situated, that they cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment. In the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger thus posed to the civilian population. A belligerent state is liable to pay compensation for injuries to person or to property caused by violation by any of its officers or forces of the provisions of this article. ARTICLE XXV In bombardment by aircraft, all necessary steps must be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospital ships, hospitals and other places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided such buildings, objects, or places are not at the time used for military purposes. Such buildings, objects, and places must by day be indicated by marks visible to aircraft. The use of marks to indicate other buildings, objects, or places than those specified above is to be deemed an act of perfidy. The marks used as aforesaid shall be in the case of buildings protected under the Geneva Convention the red cross on a white background, and in the case of other protected buildings a large rectangular panel divided diagonally into two pointed triangular portions, one black and the other white. A belligerent who desires to secure by night the protection for the hospitals and other privileged buildings above mentioned must take the necessary measures to render the special signs referred to sufficiently visible. Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From the Air in Case of War, League of Nations, September 30, 1938 PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AGAINST BOMBING FROM THE AIR IN CASE OF WAR Unanimous resolution of the League of Nations Assembly, September 30, 1938. The Assembly, Considering that on numerous occasions public opinion has expressed through the most authoritative channels its horror of the bombing of civilian populations; Considering that this practice, for which there is no military necessity and which, as experience shows, only causes needless suffering, is condemned under the recognised principles of international law; Considering further that, though this principle ought to be respected by all States and does not require further reaffirmation, it urgently needs to be made the subject of regulations specially adapted to air warfare and taking account of the lessons of experience; Considering that the solution of this problem, which is of concern to all States, whether Members of the League of Nations or not, calls for technical investigation and thorough consideration; Considering that the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments is to meet in the near future and that it is for the Bureau to consider practical means of undertaking the necessary work under conditions most likely to lead to as general an agreement as possible: I. Recognizes the following principles as a necessary basis for any subsequent regulations: 1) The intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal; Also takes the opportunity to reaffirm that the use of chemical or bacterial methods in the conduct of war is contrary to international law, as recalled more particularly in the resolution of the General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments of July 23rd 1932, and the resolution of the Council of May 14th, 1938. Roosevelt on Aerial Bombardment of Civilian Populations, September 1, 1939 The President of the United States to the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and His Britannic Majesty, September 1, 1939 The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centers of population during the course of the hostilities which have raged in various quarters of the earth during the past few years, which has resulted in the maiming and in the death of thousands of defenseless men, women, and children, has sickened the hearts of every civilized man and woman, and has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity. If resort is had to this form of inhuman barbarism during the period of... |