csua.org/u/osg -> www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090810_hypothesizing_iran_russia_u_s_triangle
chants of "Death to Russia," uncommon in Iran since the 1979 revolution, triggered our discussion. It caused us to rethink Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visit to Russia just four days after Iran's disputed June 12 presidential election, with large-scale demonstrations occurring in Tehran. At the time, we ascribed Ahmadinejad's trip as an attempt to signal his lack of concern at the postelection unrest. But why did a pro-Rafsanjani crowd chant "Death to Russia?" What had the Russians done to trigger the bitter reaction from the anti-Ahmadinejad faction? Was the Iranian president's trip as innocent as it first looked? A Net Assessment Re-examined At STRATFOR, we proceed with what we call a "net assessment," a broad model intended to explain the behavior of all players in a game.
deliverable weapon, although a test explosion within a few years was a distinct possibility. Again, rhetoric aside, this led Iran to a cautious foreign policy designed to avoid triggering hostility.
Russia was the most likely supporter of Iran, but Moscow would avoid becoming overly involved out of fears of the US reaction, of uniting a fractious Europe with the United States and of being drawn into a literally explosive situation. The Russians, we felt, would fish in troubled waters, but would not change the regional calculus. This view -- in short, that Iran was contained -- remained our view for about three years. It served us well in predicting, for example, that neither the United States nor Israel would strike Iran, and that the Russians would not transfer strategically significant weapons to Iran. A net assessment is a hypothesis that must be continually tested against intelligence, however. The "Death to Russia" chant could not be ignored, nor could Ahmadinejad's trip to Moscow. As we probed deeper, we found that Iran was swirling with rumors concerning Moscow's relationship with both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran today is a hothouse for growing rumors, and all our searches ended in dead ends. But then, if Ahmadinejad and Khamenei were engaging the Russians in this atmosphere, we would expect rumors and dead ends. Interestingly, the rumors were consistent that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei wanted a closer relationship to Russia, but diverged on the Russian response. Some said the Russians already had assisted the Iranians by providing intelligence ranging from Israeli networks in Lebanon to details of US and British plans to destabilize Iran through a "Green Revolution" like the color revolutions that had ripped through the former Soviet Union (FSU). Equally interesting were our Russian sources' responses. Normally, they are happy to talk, if only to try to mislead us. Normally, our sources would happily speculate -- but on this subject, there was no speculation. This indicated that those who didn't know didn't want to touch the subject, and that those who did know were keeping secrets. None of this proved anything, but taken together, it caused us to put our net assessment for Iran on hold. All of the foregoing must be considered in the context of the current geopolitical system. And that is a matter of understanding what is in plain sight.
US President Barack Obama's attempt to divide Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Putin did not bear fruit. The Russians were far more interested in whether Obama would change the FSU policy of former US President George W Bush. At the very least, the Russians wanted the Americans to stop supporting Ukraine's and Georgia's pro-Western tendencies. But not only did Obama stick with the Bush policy, he dispatched US Vice President Joe Biden to visit Ukraine and Georgia to drive home the continuity.
Biden's statements were completely consistent with the decision to send him to Georgia and Ukraine, so the Obama administration's attempts to back away from the statement were not convincing. The only conclusion the Russians could draw was that the United States regards them as a geopolitical cripple of little consequence. If the Russians allow the Americans to poach in what Moscow regards as its sphere of influence without responding, the Russian position throughout the FSU would begin to unravel -- the precise outcome the Americans hope for.
Increased tensions in Georgia are indeed significant, however, since the Russians have decisive power in that arena -- and can act if they wish against the country, one Biden just visited to express American support. But even a Russian move against Georgia would not be decisive. The Americans have stated that Russia is not a country to be taken seriously, and that Washington will therefore continue to disregard Russian interests in the FSU.
The Russians must respond, or by default, they would be accepting the American analysis of the situation -- and by extension, so would the rest of the world. When we look at the geopolitical chessboard, there are two places where the Russians could really hurt the Americans. If Moscow could leverage Germany out of the Western alliance, this would be a geopolitical shift of the first order. Moscow has leverage with Berlin, as the Germans depend on Russian natural gas, and the two have recently been working on linking their economies even further. Moreover, the Germans are as uneasy with Obama as they were with Bush.
strategic shift in Germany's position is simply not likely in any time frame that matters to the Russians at this juncture -- though the leaders of the two countries are meeting once again this week in Sochi, Russia, their second meeting in as many months.
point where the Russians could hurt the Americans is in Iran. An Iran with a strong relationship to Russia is a very different matter. Not only would sanctions be rendered completely meaningless, but Iran could pose profound strategic problems for the United States, potentially closing off airstrike options on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Strait of Hormuz: Iran's Real Nuclear Option The real nuclear option for Iran does not involve nuclear weapons. It would involve mining the Strait of Hormuz and the narrow navigational channels that make up the Persian Gulf. During the 1980s, when Iran and Iraq were at war, both sides attacked oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. If the Iranians were to successfully mine these waters, the disruption to 40 percent of the world's oil flow would be immediate and dramatic. The nastiest part of the equation would be that in mine warfare, it is very hard to know when all the mines have been cleared. It is the risk, not the explosions, which causes insurance companies to withdraw insurance on vastly expensive tankers and their loads. Just how many mines Iran might lay before being detected and bringing an American military response could vary by a great deal, but there is certainly the chance that Iran could lay a significant number of mines, including more modern influence mines that can take longer to clear. The estimates and calculations of minesweepers -- much less of the insurers -- would depend on a number of factors not available to us here. But there is the possibility that the strait could be effectively closed to supertankers for a considerable period. it is not difficult to imagine this aborting the global recovery. Tehran, too, would be greatly affected by the economic fallout (while Iran is a net exporter of crude, it is a net importer of gasoline), and the mining would drive the Europeans and Americans together. The economic and military consequences of this would be severe. But it is this threat that has given pause to American and Israeli military planners gaming out scenarios to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. There are thousands of small watercraft along Iran's coast, and Iran's response to such raids might well be to use these vessels to strew mines in the Persian Gulf -- or for swarming and perhaps even suicide attacks. Notably, any decision to attack Iran's nuclear facilities would have to be preceded by (among other things) an attempt to neutralize Iran's mine-laying capability -- along with its many anti-ship missile batteries -- in the Persian Gulf. The sequence is fixed, since the moment th...
|
http://csua.com/feed/