Berkeley CSUA MOTD:Entry 52742
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2025/04/03 [General] UID:1000 Activity:popular
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2009/3/22-30 [Transportation/Car] UID:52742 Activity:nil
3/22    A good explaination of the toxic waste plan:
        http://tinyurl.com/cpsemy (Economist's View)
        \- it is not clear to me there isnt some possibility of
           the treasury buying a "lemon" portfolio. to put in in
           terms of the EV article, say the govt comes in to buy
           half the cars on the lot, but the lot owner has some small
           ability to guess which are the "lemon" cars and disproportionately
           dumps those on the govt. the scenario reasonable points out the
           purpoe of the intervention is to prop up the community with
           the car dealership, rather than the car dealership itself,
           but as we know the car dealership may have an abiliy to tilt the
           govt to make other decision in it's own favor. what was good
           for <company X> might be been OK for america, but they arent
           the same ... and in some short run cases, when taking about
           certain decionsmakers it's not clear their objective function and
           social welfare outcomes would even ahve the same sign.
           \- We have now learned the words LIBOR, MORAL HAZARD and CLAWBACK.
              Here is the next word: ADVERSE SELECTION.
              \- oh, in addition to the LEMON PROBLEM, i could also see
                 a BARBARIAN AT THE GATE type scenario ... remember where
                 the people seeking to LBO a firm could hire current management
                 to advise them [how is this even legal? james suroweiki
                 has a good discussion of this, some time in the last two
                 years, i believe]. i could see a cabal of bank executives
                 put together a special purpose hedgefund to cherry-pick+
                 asset strip their firms ... sure this would have some
                 upside to the tax payers while they would massively
                 benefitting from their leveraged play, but then when the
                 companies are left with post cherry-picking LEMONS, the
                 govt will have to go out and bail them out again
                 ... at which point these executives will no doubt get
                 golden parachutes and leave. as we can see from AIG
                 ... Libby and Greenberg earlier, being a 7/8/9-digit
                 CEO doesnt mean you cant do some mean you cant do
                 some moonlighting: http://tinyurl.com/cma28w --psb
2025/04/03 [General] UID:1000 Activity:popular
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2013/7/1-8/23 [Transportation/PublicTransit] UID:54700 Activity:nil
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	...
2012/7/29-9/24 [Transportation/Car, Transportation/Car/RoadHogs] UID:54446 Activity:nil
7/29    Is it really true that we subsidize auto driving to the tune of
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        http://tinyurl.com/cars-suck-ass
        \_ You might have missed the point.  Hiring a chauffeur to drive your
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2012/7/9-8/19 [Transportation/Car] UID:54433 Activity:nil
7/9     http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2012/07/nice-guys-finish-last.html
        A study at the Berkeley Marina intersection shows that people
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tinyurl.com/cpsemy -> economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2009/03/government-intervention-in-the-market-for-toxic-cars.html
Government Intervention in the Market for Toxic Cars Imagine a car lot that has 100 cars on it. Half of them will have engine troubles that total the cars - the engines blow up and the cars are then worthless - and this will happen just after purchase. Unfortunately, there is no way to tell prior to purchase which type of car you will get no matter how hard you try. Thus, half of the assets on the car dealer's "balance sheet" - the cars on its lot - are toxic, and lack of transparency makes it impossible to tell which ones are bad prior to purchase. If all the cars were in perfect shape, they would sell for $20,000 each. Thus, there are (50)*($20,000) = $1,000,000 in assets on the books according to one way of doing the accounting, but that doesn't necessarily represent the true value of the cars on the lot. The town where this dealership is located relies upon this business for jobs, it is essential, but, unfortunately, business has fallen off to nothing. Nobody is willing to risk losing $20,000 by purchasing a car that might die just after purchase, so the price has fallen. The expected value of a car is $10,000, but it's an all or nothing proposition, the car runs or it dies, and since people are risk averse nobody is wiling to pay the $10,000 expected value. If they can get anything more than $15,000 for each good car, they will make money on the deal (well, there would be overhead and other costs to cover, but let's abstract from minor details). But if cars end up selling for less than $15,000, they will take a loss. The problem with this option is knowing what price to offer for the cars. There is no market, and the firm's reservation price may be too high, ie paying the reservation price will eventually lead to a loss. In this example the percentage of bad cars is known, but the percentage of bad cars would also be unknown in a more realistic example, so there's no way to know how many good cars there are for sure, and what price they will sell for after the defective cars have been culled out of the herd. With the percentage unknown, there's no way to know for sure what the breakeven price will be. The only twist is that the price - the $7,500 in the example above, would be determined by an auction among many dealers with the government accepting the lowest bid (which could be $7,500 in this example since that is the price the firm is willing to accept). As you can see by thinking this through, there are questions about what price such an auction would reveal. One danger in this plan is that if you overpay for the cars, eg give $7,500 when the breakeven price was, say, actually $5,000, then you have given the owner of the car lot $250,000 more than the cars were actually worth (this will be the loss to taxpayers). The dealer may need this money to stay solvent and stay in business, but, nevertheless, it is a windfall. There are a lot of uncertainties here, and lots of ways to lose money. Suppose that the demand curve intersects the vertical line in the graph (at Q=100) at a price of $4,000. Then in order to sell 100 cars, the government must subsidize buyers by $3,500 so that the $4,000 offer is raised to the $7,500 the firm is willing to accept (notice that the buyer willing to pay $6,000 gets a $2,000 windfall, so, except at the margin, this plan gives surplus to people purchasing the assets - as with the first plan, this shifts the demand curve out until it intersects at the kink in the supply curve). cars1 However, once again, the government will not know if it is getting this right or not. Suppose it offers a $1,000 subsidy thinking that is generous enough. In this example, that won't bridge the gap between the highest offer of $6,000, and the reservation price of $7,500. Thus, the subsidy would be too small to restart the market and the plan would fail. So the answer is to make the subsidy large enough to encourage buyers, but the problem is that if it is too large, the government will be giving money away unnecessarily. If there's a large gap between what people are willing to pay and what dealers are willing to accept(the gap between $6,000 and $7,500 in the example), this would be problematic politically since it would require subsidies that are unacceptably large. That's one way to do this - as a giveaway - but another way is through a no recourse loan (what is being called a partnership). Suppose that the government gives (up to) a $3,500 loan to a private sector buyer to purchase the car for $7,500. If it's a good car and the value rises above $7,500, say to $15,000, then government will get paid back (with interest) since the asset can be sold profitably (another option is for the government to demand a share of this profit through warrants or other means). But if it's a bad car, the price falls to zero and the loan is forgiven - it does not need to be repaid. So the private sector agents only have to put up a fraction of the price to control the asset, and their losses are limited to the amount they put up while the gains are potentially large. If many of the loans are not repaid, or if the subsidy is too large, it could lose a lot of money, but it could also make money too. Another option is for the government to simply take over the car dealership. The dealership is essential to the economy of the town, without it people will struggle, and the government - for that reason - might consider temporarily taking over the dealership to prevent failure. In doing so, it would make an evaluation of the company's assets, pay off the people who loaned the business money up to this amount, which may require having them take a haircut, ie accept some percentage of what they are owed on the bad loans they made, and the owner would simply be wiped out (which is a benefit since the business is insolvent and this allows the owner to escape the loans that cannot be paid through liquidation). After taking over, the government would stress test the cars it now owns, put the bad ones in the junk pile, and sell the rest back to the public. So long as it didn't pay the creditors too much when it took over, ie the haircut is sufficiently large, it ought to make money on the deal. The Point But, and I want to stress this, the point of these plans is not to make money, the point is to keep the economy of the town going, to keep people employed. If people place a large value on security, then even if the government takes a loss on paper, it may not be an economic loss. That is, we must put a value on the jobs that are saved and the security it brings (simply imagine that the utility function has risk as one of its arguments - by lowering the risk of job loss and the associated household disruption, you have made the agent better off, and this must be counted against any loss from any of the programs above). There is value in economic stability and security over and above whatever the government makes (or loses) on the actual financial transactions, and this must be factored into the evaluation of the policy. Link to comment | March 22, 2009 at 01:07 PM Winslow R says... Mark wrote :" So the private sector agents only have to put put up a fraction of the price to control the asset, and their losses are limited to the amount they put up while the gains are potentially large." Link to comment | March 22, 2009 at 01:22 PM Structure says... Thanks for taking the time to run through this in a way non-experts, like myself, can understand. I'm still voting to nationalize, but at least now I can see some logic to their plan... Link to comment | March 22, 2009 at 01:31 PM Winslow R says... Mark wrote " But, and I want to stress this, the point of these plans is not to make money, the point is to keep the economy of the town going, to keep people employed." The point of these plans are to replace the shadow banking system with a new system with the same players, with the same access to privatized profits and socialized losses. It just allows taxpayers to take the loss and investors to take profits. Link to comment | March 22, 2009 at 01:31 PM Winslow gets it wrong says... Keeping people employed and creating new jobs are different. The example doe...
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tinyurl.com/cma28w -> www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_16/b3929044_mz011.htm
Y&R: Short On Sizzle, And Losing Steam NEWS: ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY AIG: Get Ready For Starr Wars The fight over a secretive entity that wields enormous influence over AIG is just starting There's probably never been anything like this in US corporate history: a titanic legal struggle pitting the interests of corporate governance and public shareholders against those of a private company and the rights of its owners. Now, as the Securities & Exchange Commission and New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer probe deeper into AIG's accounting practices, a bizarre power struggle is emerging. Spitzer wants broad access to the records of SICO, arguing that its operations were so intertwined with those of AIG that they were all but indistinguishable. And although Greenberg moved to negotiate some access to disputed SICO documents on Apr. Spitzer is marching into battle under the banner of protecting public shareholders; Greenberg is likely to defend his interests on the grounds that SICO is a private company. LATE NIGHT HOUSECLEANING Greenberg, who was forced out of AIG as CEO and chairman on Mar 14 and Mar 28, respectively, set the stage for a showdown with regulators on Mar 25 when his lawyers removed 80 boxes of SICO documents in the middle of the night from Bermuda offices shared by AIG and SICO. Greenberg's lawyer, David Boies, later defended the move as an attempt to "protect" the documents from destruction. But the housecleaning prompted a furious Spitzer to threaten AIG with obstruction of justice charges -- a threat Greenberg's resignation as chairman and a pledge of company cooperation have stopped for now. Yet days later, Greenberg led a move to oust current AIG executives from the SICO board without notifying regulators, further enraging Spitzer. "I guess he figures, 'What do I have left at this point? I'm going to fight,"' a source close to the probe says of Greenberg. Overnight what had functioned as a sort of public-private hybrid was now openly split. Already chairman of SICO, Greenberg appears to be trying to consolidate his control over the privately held entity. On the other side, AIG's board is striving to modernize and transform the insurer into an upstanding member of its industry. One source close to the company says the AIG board will challenge any efforts by Greenberg to walk away with control of SICO assets. Ultimately board members believe the arrangement between SICO and AIG was designed to benefit AIG over the long term, not a select group of owners. As the dust settles, a legal minefield is coming into view. Here's a look at the wrangling ahead: Though Greenberg is now negotiating with investigators and AIG over access to the 80 boxes under dispute, questions still remain. The most pressing: How much jurisdiction does Spitzer's office or the SEC have over privately held SICO? A source in Spitzer's office argues that under the state's tough securities law, "we have to prove that they were doing business in New York and that their actions could represent a fraud." Spitzer could up the ante by again threatening obstruction of justice charges or targeting AIG's senior management, some of whom also served as SICO directors. Most legal experts believe Spitzer can claim oversight, because of the many links between the companies and because SICO has a New York presence. But former federal prosecutor Philip H Hilder, for one, argues that jurisdiction is open to debate. Says Hilder: "The company is going to claim there's an independent relationship and hide behind that." As the tangle of interlocking companies gets sorted out, the stakes are enormous for Greenberg. Retaining control of SICO would give him incredible power. He could influence decisions simply by threatening to sell AIG shares or get an ally appointed to the board. But like the board, some AIG shareholders are irked that Greenberg might walk away with control of the 12% AIG stake. Says one institutional investor: "It doesn't seem right that it would revert to Greenberg and the privileged few." Ultimately, resolution of the dispute will depend on unwinding the complex, decades-old document trail linking SICO to AIG. If Greenberg continues to play it tough, his strategy could backfire. At the moment, nobody is quite sure how the drama surrounding SICO will unfold. As Greenberg contemplates his next move, it's clear that the 79-year-old insurance icon isn't going away anytime soon. Just as troubling for Greenberg, neither is Eliot Spitzer.