en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Little_Bighorn
James Calhoun /- Strength Believed to be 949 lodges (probably 900 - 1,800 warriors) 31 officers, 566 troopers, 15 armed civilians, 35-40 scouts Casualties Believed to be at least 36 killed, 168 wounded (according to Sitting Bull);
Surprised and, according to some accounts, astonished by the unusually large numbers of Indians faced in the battle, Crook was forced to stop and regroup. Unaware of Crook's battle, Gibbon and Terry proceeded, joining forces in late June near the mouth of the Rosebud River.
June 25, Custer's scouts reported to him they could see signs of the Indian village roughly 15 miles in the distance. Custer's initial plan was a surprise attack on the village the following morning on June 26, but a report came to him that several hostile Indians had discovered the trail left by his troops. Assuming their presence had been exposed, Custer decided to attack the village without further delay.
Mitch Bouyer saying, "General, I have been with these Indians for 30 years, and this is the largest village I have ever heard of." Custer's overriding concern was that the Indians would break up and scatter in different directions.
Fort Abraham Lincoln to reassemble the regiment for the campaign. Approximately 20 percent of the troopers had been enlisted in the prior seven months (139 of an enlisted roll of 718), were only marginally trained, and had no combat or frontier experience.
Prussia, just as many of the veteran troopers had been prior to their enlistments. Archaeological evidence also suggests that many of these troopers were malnourished and in poor physical condition.
Of the 44 officers and 718 troopers then assigned to the 7th Cavalry (including a second lieutenant detached from the 20th Infantry and serving in L Troop), 13 officers (including the regimental commander, Col.
Samuel D Sturgis, who was on detached duty) and 152 troopers did not accompany the 7th during the campaign. Among those left behind at Fort Abraham Lincoln was the regimental band.
Frederick Benteen, and was made up of Troops D, H and K, with five officers and 110 men. Custer ordered Benteen to scout nearby valleys and attack any body of Indians he encountered.
Benteen himself described his mission to his wife in a letter days after the action, "General Custer divided the 7th Cavalry into three Battalions -- about 15 miles from an Indian village, the whereabout of which he did not know exactly.
Thomas McDougall, this sizable force had two officers, 127 troopers and seven civilian packers. Each of the first three detachments was to seek out the Indian encampments, attack them, and hold them in place until the other two detachments arrived to support.
The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, were to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle."
Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today Reno Creek around 3:00 pm and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and not running away." Sending a message to Custer, but hearing nothing in return, Reno advanced rapidly northward, stating that he drove the enemy "with ease."
In a skirmish line, every fourth trooper handled the horses for the troopers taking firing positions, thus immediately reducing a fighting force by 25 percent. The troopers on the skirmish line were positioned five to ten yards apart, with officers to their rear and troopers with horses behind the officers. After about 20 minutes of long distance firing, Reno's battalion had taken only one casualty but the odds against him had become more obvious (Reno estimated five to one) and Custer had not reinforced him.
Here the Indians pinned Reno and his men down, and he was then forced to make a disorderly retreat across the river to reach the high ground of the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was confused and immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters.
fording of the river, with another officer and 13-18 men missing. Most of these men were left behind in the timber, although many eventually rejoined the detachment.
Atop the bluffs, known today as Reno Hill, Reno's shaken troops soon linked up with the detachment of Captain Benteen, arriving from the south. bring pacs" ("pacs" refering to ammunition, meaning that by this time Custer was most likely aware of the large numbers of Indians they were having to face). Benteen's coincidental arrival on the bluffs was just in time to save Reno's men from possible annihilation. Their detachments were then reinforced by McDougall and the pack train.
rifle pits using whatever implements they had among them, including knives. Despite hearing heavy gunfire from the north, including distinct volleys at 4:20 pm, Benteen concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded and hard-pressed battalion, rather than continuing on toward Custer. Benteen's apparent reluctance to reach Custer prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders.
Thomas Weir and Company D moved out against orders to make contact with Custer. They advanced a mile, to what is today Weir Ridge, and could see in the distance Indian warriors on horseback shooting at objects on the ground. By this time, roughly 5:25 pm, Custer's battle had concluded, and what Weir witnessed was most likely warriors shooting at dead bodies on the Custer battlefield. The other companies eventually followed by assigned battalions, first Benteen, then Reno, and finally the pack train. Growing Indian attacks around Weir Ridge forced all seven companies to return to the bluff before the pack train, with the ammunition, had moved even a quarter mile. There, they remained pinned down for another day, but the Indians were unable to breach this tightly held position.
edit Custer's fight Interpretations of Custer's fight are conjecture, since none of his men survived and Indian accounts are conflicting. The gunfire heard on the bluffs by Reno and Benteen's men was from Custer's fight. His force of roughly 210 men was engaged by the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne approximately 35 miles (6 km) to the north. Having isolated Reno's force and driven them away from the encampment, the bulk of the warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" remains a subject of debate. One possibility is that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north, and climbed up the bluffs, reaching the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. From this point on the other side of the river, he could see Reno charging the village.
Lieutenant Colonel Custer on horseback and his U S Army troops make their last charge at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Lieutenant Colonel Custer on horseback and his U S Army troops make their last charge at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river.
coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. Indian accounts (dismissed by traditional historians, though given more credence today) report that Custer first attempted to ford the river at this northern end of the camp. Gunfire from Indian sharpshooters, however, drove Custer and his men back.
Some historians claim this scenario might explain Custer's purpose for Reno's attack, indicating he may have intended to coordinate a "hammer-and-anvil" tactic, with Reno holding the Indians at bay at the southern end of the camp, while Custer drove them against Reno's line from the north. Other historians have noted that if Custer did attempt to cross river near Medicine Tail Coulee, he may have been inspired by the belief that it was the north end of the Indian camp, when in fact it was only the middle. Many historians, however, claim that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered, it was too late to break back ...
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