www.tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2007/oct/30/one_reason_for_intelligence_failures
bio More than six years since the terrorist attacks on 9-11 the intelligence community continues to employ a substandard analytical practice that virtually guarantees shoddy and inaccurate analysis. An analyst within the CIA (or DIA or INR) who writes an article for the Presidential Daily Brief or other community wide daily intelligence brief is not currently required to coordinate with analysts outside of their organization. The failure to coordinate and obtain the clearance of other analysts prevents policymakers from getting the best analysis and information available. Perhaps this helps explain the mess we encountered with the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. Sorry to sound like an old guy, but I need to explain what I mean in talking about "coordination". section break When I was an analyst I was required to coordinate any article I wrote for the National Intelligence Daily and the Presidential Daily Brief with my counterparts at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). If I wrote about the threat of Cuban backed terrorism from Nicaragua, I first had to share what I wrote with the analysts at CIA who worked on Nicaragua, Cuba, or terrorism. That meant I took my draft to three different offices (remember, this was before email). My bosses wanted to make sure that the CIA spoke with one voice. They did not want Larry Johnson's personal views being shared with the President. My supervisors demanded that the information in my intelligence articles was accurate and reflected everything we knew about the current state of intelligence. This part of the coordination process covered only inside the CIA. Once we had an agreed upon CIA version, I was then required to send the draft to the Honduran analyst at INR and the analyst at DIA who covered Honduras. They did not agree with how I worded a paragraph or with a particular conclusion. Either I accepted their changes or we escalated the dispute to a branch chief. If the INR or DIA analyst was not satisfied with our proposed fixes they were allowed to write a "dissent". For example, I could say "Iraq is trying to buy uranium yellowcake from Niger". While INR would write, "No, Iraq is not trying to buy uranium yellowcake from Niger and cannot process the yellowcake currently in its possession". This ensures the policymaker will understand there may be a dispute about particular matters. If there is not dispute then they have a reasonable expectation that they are reading a consensus view of the intelligence community. More often than not I accepted the changes proposed by my counterparts. Sometimes these gals thought of something I had not considered and helped dramatically improve the quality of the article and the analysis. Despite the rough and tumble and frustration inherent in this process, the end result was a piece of good analysis that reflected the collective judgment of the analysts who were the substantive experts on the topic at hand. That is not the case today and has not been the case for at least 8 years. I still have not been able to determine who instituted this change-was it Woolsey, Deustch, or Tenet? Analysts at CIA, DIA, and INR are now free to write articles that are disseminated throughout the intelligence community without having to coordinate with each other and get clearance on their pieces. The Director of National Intelligence simply needs to tell the intelligence community to get off of its lazy ass and ensure that every article that is circulated outside of an intelligence agency-especially the PDB-should be fully coordinated and cleared by the relevant analysts of CIA, DIA, INR, and FBI.
Mike7Woodson said: It seems you are pushing for a process that mandates cohesion and may tend to deter cherry picking since dissents are included in a final article / report making it to the president. On the other hand, the widespread distribution seems to increase cross-awareness among the many sections, increasing the likelihood that important facts will percolate to the top. The process you described with dissents also resembles an appeals court decision process. Do you see any advantages to analysts' articles being "disseminated throughout the intelligence community"? Their analyses are not tantamount to raw, collected intelligence facts, true? The example of the Yellow Cake uranium rests on which facts make it to analysts, not just which analysts' views make it into the final intelligence product.
intelligence analysis does address several factors relevant here: Do you see any advantages to analysts' articles being "disseminated throughout the intelligence community"? Their analyses are not tantamount to raw, collected intelligence facts, true? I don't know if the report was a raw spot report or a coordinated document. My impression, not knowing the exact process, is that a reality check did not come from an analyst, probably at DoE intelligence, that aluminum would not be the preferred material. The question should have been asked: "Could Saddam have gotten maraging steel tubes"? As it was, someone did apparently suggest the real application was in light rocket casings. So, some questions: Was the original note about the aluminum tubes disseminated as a spot report to the policy level? If it was coordinated, it is worth having a cleared Congressional staffer look at the actual report and where it was coordinated. Apparently, there was a dissent (Army National Ground Intelligence Center, IIRC) that they fitted a Soviet-style light rocket. Were the tubes and the yellowcake mentioned in the same report? There are other indications of centrifuge cascade construction, such as a large power generating facility nearby. I haven't heard anything discussed openly about these and other relevant indicators. It is a very real point, Mike, that many analyst reports are not really read unless the analyst does someting (eg, a phone call that you really need to read this, or the analyst has a working relationship with at least a staffer for the policymaker that needs the information. I'm still working on the article including dissemination and estimates. OTOH, I knew, without looking it up, that aluminum wasn't the preferred material, and there has to be a large power source near anything that does centrifuge cascade separation, and I'm really not a nuclear specialist. Was, perhaps, a trade analyst with no technical background looking at the report? As a stray comment, the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), which probably had a relevant note in several sections, is now classified. I have an earlier, unclassified version somewhere in storage, but maybe I can find a copy online.
dar said: "Perhaps this helps explain the mess we encountered with the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq." The history of the run up to invading Iraq shows that Bush wasn't interested in anyones "intelligence" but his own. You don't have to be a blind conservative not to see it, just an ignorant one to deny it.
dalloway said: Why is more thorough analysis not being done? To him, "intelligence" is something to "massage" so that it backs up what he already wants to do. He's not at all interested in rigorous analysis of intelligence and of course all Shrub wants to do is ride his bike and talk with his mouth full. These insane, lethal clowns aren't a government -- they're the Marx Brothers on acid.
It would be worthwhile to find out who was responsible for the change, and what reasons were given for it. "If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail."
mcboo said: Maybe I'm an old guy too Larry but I have to tell you that the process you described sound very reasonable to me and leads me to ask - do they no longer do this? This really seems like one of those "common sense" situations. Then again that's a quality that's proven to be remarkably lacking in anyone associated with this administration and the agencies working with it on it's watch. I know we've had some atrocious intelligence failures within the last decade (in particular under this administration's watch) and ...
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