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| 5/25 |
| 2006/9/12-14 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:44353 Activity:high |
9/12 http://csua.org/u/gvh (Kristol, Lowry via Wash Post) "There is now no good argument for not sending more troops." There's a very good argument: We don't have more troops to send. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/world/middleeast/12anbar.html Discussing force levels, Lt. Col. Ronald Gridley, the XO with Regimental Combat Team 7, a Marine unit that is charged with securing a large swath of [Anbar] province, said then that his regiment had recommended that additional troops be allocated ... "What we recommend and what we get is going to be two different things," Colonel Gridley said. \_ Maybe next time you could provide the full quote for Colonel Gridley and also not mishmash unrelated articles together. Your NYT article and misquote of Gridley is not support for your contention that "we don't have more troops to send". It may be true (or not) that we don't have more troops but your links don't cover that. Anyway, I thought we're supposed to want to bring them all home right now, not send more because sending more is just going to piss off the local population and cause the insurgency to grow. Here's another choice quote from the NYT link: Without the deployment of an additional division, "there is nothing MNF-W can do to influence the motivation of the Sunni to wage an insurgency," the report states, according to a military officer familiar with it. MNF-W stands for Multinational Force-West, the formal name of the Marine command. Which is anothter way of saying they don't have enough marines there to kill enough Sunnis to break their will to fight. That's what you are advocating? More dead Sunni? \_ I think if they really got to work, they could probably kill enough Sunni with their current troop levels. \_ I don't think that was a misquote. That was lifted verbatim. Nevertheless, here is the remainder of what he said: \_ Yeah, if all of a sudden being Sunni and without a weapon meant you were a legitimate target. \_ Whaddya mean "all of a sudden"? http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13974639 \_ "In our perfect world, we could use some more infantrymen to be able to patrol the streets and partner with the Iraqi Army." Fact: This LTC wants more boots on the ground to help secure Anbar. Opinion: I don't think this is something you see in every war. Fact: This LTC recommended more boots on the ground to help secure Anbar. You also assume I advocate killing more Sunni, when the only assertion I make is that we don't have more troops to send. As far as that goes, I don't mind being shown that I'm wrong about that assertion, and to what degree. I do concede that the 2nd URL doesn't offer conclusive proof to the assertion. about that, and to what degree. \_ The frontline guys always recommend more troops, weapons, food, higher pay, hotter women, and more time on leave. That's been going on since the first army formed. As far as availability of fresh troops goes, I made no statement in either direction. Only that your claim is not backed by your links. I really don't know and don't want to do your fact check for you. Anyway, what the guy was saying is they need more troops so they can crush the Sunni rebels. That means killing more of them, faster. If you want more troops in Iraq to end the insurgency then you *are* advocating more Sunni deaths. Are you opposed to bringing them home and forcing the Iraqi government to get their act together and sort it out for themselves? \_ Okay, where did I say I want more troops in Iraq? Okay, where did I say that I didn't think you made a statement pro or con about troop availability? Read both my posts. \_ I read your posts. What is the point of saying there are no more troops to send if you don't want more troops sent? I'm sure there is a huge shortage of moon rocks in Iraq but you're not posting that we need to send more of those. \_ I quoted Kristol and Lowry's very definitive statement and then I said: uh, actually, there's a big problem with that. that's the point. \_ You quoted them then added your own spin, that we don't have troops to send, then provided a link to an article that didn't prove your contention. If you're going to claim something your follow up link should back your claim. \_ Basically, these two numbnuts are repeating what Murtha said two years ago: If you want to crush the insurgency, send more troops. Don't do it half-assed. As far as Dubya is concerned, we are still going with the plan of "maintain GOP majorities" via "they stand up, we stand down ... any change in strategy can wait until after November ... since we can't win in Iraq if we don't have GOP majorities in Congress ...", IMO. -op \_ Crushing insurgencies requires killing people. Why do you want more dead Iraqis? |
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| csua.org/u/gvh -> www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/11/AR2006091100879.html Hitchens Remembers Ari Fleischer's Reign of Terror Reinforce Baghdad By William Kristol and Rich Lowry Tuesday, September 12, 2006; Supporters of the war, like us, have in the past differed over tactics. But at this urgent pass, there can be no doubt that we need to stop the downward slide in Iraq by securing Baghdad. There is no mystery as to what can make the crucial difference in the battle of Baghdad: American troops. A few thousand US troops have already been transferred to Baghdad from elsewhere in Iraq. Where more US troops have been deployed, the situation has gotten better. Those neighborhoods intensively patrolled by Americans are safer and more secure. But it is by no means clear that overall troop numbers in Baghdad are enough to do the job. And it is clear that stripping troops from other fronts risks progress elsewhere in the country. US soldiers run toward their armored vehicles after inspecting the site of a car bomb explosion in Baghdad last week. US soldiers run toward their armored vehicles after inspecting the site of a car bomb explosion in Baghdad last week. The bottom line is this: More US troops in Iraq would improve our chances of winning a decisive battle at a decisive moment. This means the ability to succeed in Iraq is, to some significant degree, within our control. The president should therefore order a substantial surge in overall troop levels in Iraq, with the additional forces focused on securing Baghdad. There is now no good argument for not sending more troops. The administration often says that it doesn't want to foster Iraqi dependency. This is a legitimate concern, but it is a second-order and long-term one. Iraq is a young democracy and a weak state facing a vicious insurgency and sectarian violence. The Iraqis are going to be dependent on us for some time. We can worry about weaning Iraq from reliance on our forces after the security crisis in Baghdad has passed. The administration emphasizes that there needs to be a political, not simply a military, solution to Iraq. It serves to empower extremists who are aligned with our enemies. So long as we don't succeed in controlling the violence, it will make any political settlement far more difficult. Indeed, the violence perpetrated by the Shiite militias is directly related to politics. It is part of a power play by the likes of Moqtada al-Sadr to marginalize moderate figures such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Sistani's recent statement of disgust with Iraqi politics suggests that Sadr's gambit may be working. Sending more American troops at this juncture would not be a simple-minded and clumsy substitution of military force for political finesse. It would be an attempt to influence Iraq's political situation in our favor. The administration's military strategy has long been based on getting the Iraqis to do the "holding" in the counterinsurgency strategy of "clear, hold and build." But the experience of the past three years is that the Iraqis aren't yet up to it, at least not in hotly contested areas such as Baghdad. The administration deserves credit for the strides it has made in training the Iraqi army. But for now we have to do much of the holding ourselves for it to be effective. If American troops hand neighborhoods over to Iraqis, they are likely to soon deteriorate again -- in the same dynamic we have repeatedly seen of trouble spots being brought under control by American troops only to slide back again when the Americans leave. One reason to prefer having Iraqis hold secured areas is that indigenous forces, in theory, don't risk creating the kind of nationalist reaction that can be prompted by a foreign occupying army -- ie, us. But in the current environment of sectarian bloodletting, all signs are that American troops are more trusted and more welcome than Iraqis. Many Sunnis -- confronted by Shiite militias -- now accept our troop presence, and moderate Shiite leaders want us to stay. In fact, the chief fear of Iraqis in Baghdad neighborhoods patrolled by Americans is apparently that we will leave, not that we will remain. Harvard Law School's William Stuntz recently made the core point powerfully: "The territory over which we fight is among the most strategically important in the world. Victory will place the most dangerous regime on the planet, Iran's fascist theocracy, in serious peril. Defeat will leave that same regime inestimably strengthened. If there is any significant possibility that the presence of more American soldiers on the ground would raise the odds of success, not putting those soldiers on the ground is a crime." Administration spokesmen have jettisoned talk of "staying the course" in Iraq in favor of "adapting to win." If those words are to have meaning, the administration can't simply stay the course on current troop levels. Sending them would be a courageous act of presidential leadership appropriate to the crisis we face. RSS Feed Post a Comment Comments: (Limit 5,000 characters) Post Comments that include profanity or personal attacks or other inappropriate comments or material will be removed from the site. Additionally, entries that are unsigned or contain "signatures" by someone other than the actual author will be removed. Finally, we will take steps to block users who violate any of our posting standards, terms of use or privacy policies or any other policies governing this site. |
| www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/world/middleeast/12anbar.html Marine Report Sees Grim Outlook in West Iraq Max Becherer/Polaris, for The New York Times A herd of sheep was led past Iraqi soldiers in Abu Hazziem in Anbar Province in July. The Sunni-dominated province is a stronghold of insurgents. Iraq is grim and will continue to deteriorate unless the region receives a major infusion of aid and a division is sent to reinforce the American troops operating there, according to the senior Marine intelligence officer in Iraq. Peter Devlin at the Marine headquarters in Anbar Province, has been sent to senior military officials in Iraq and at the Pentagon. While the American military is focused on trying to secure Baghdad and prevent the sectarian strife there from escalating into a civil war, the assessment points to the difficulties in Anbar, a vast Sunni-dominated area of western Iraq where the insurgency is particularly strong. The province includes such restive towns as Ramadi, Haditha and Hit. Marine commanders have been mounting a campaign to secure the province in the face of a virulent insurgency. But they have had to cope with seriously short-handed Iraqi Army units and a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad that has tended to view the area as a low priority for government spending and programs. Elements of the assessment were reported Monday in The Washington Post. Military officials familiar with the document disclosed additional material and provided several quotations from the assessment. One factor that has hampered the American counterinsurgency effort has been the limited number of American troops. As a general rule, a substantial number of troops are required in a counterinsurgency campaign to protect the population from attacks and intimidation by insurgent groups. There are about 30,000 marines, soldiers, airmen and sailors in Anbar, a region that borders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and is roughly the size of Louisiana. American forces can generally maneuver where they want and are fighting to regain control of Ramadi, the provincial capital, neighborhood by neighborhood. But there are areas of the province where the Americans have not established a persistent presence, the assessment says. Without the deployment of an additional division, there is nothing MNF-W can do to influence the motivation of the Sunni to wage an insurgency, the report states, according to a military officer familiar with it. MNF-W stands for Multinational Force-West, the formal name of the Marine command. The limited number of troops, however, is just one problem in countering the insurgency there, the report says. The assessment describes Anbar as a region marked by violence and criminality. Except for a few relatively bright spots, like the towns of Falluja and Qaim, the region generally lacks functional governments and a respect for the rule of law. Nor does its Sunni population appear to represent an important constituency for the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. Although there is economic growth in relatively secure areas, much of it can be attributed to the American-supported reconstruction effort. The level of economic activity in the province is just a fraction of what it was before 2003, the assessment says. Feeling marginalized in the new Iraq, the Sunnis in Anbar have generally lost faith in the new Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. The Sunnis greatest fears have been realized, the report says. The Sunnis suspicion of the government makes the task of forging a political reconciliation more difficult, and has also complicated one policy option that some critics of Bush administrations strategy have proposed as an alternative means of stabilizing Iraq: dividing the country into Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni enclaves. Such a plan would not be welcomed by Sunnis, since they would not trust the central government to share proceeds from oil sales, the assessment says. As the situation has deteriorated, insurgent attacks have increased. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia as an integral part of the social fabric of Anbar. The organization, which is predominantly made up of fighters who are native Iraqis, is flush with cash, much of it earned from black market or criminal activity. As an intelligence assessment, the report is intended to analyze trends, not make policy recommendations. A spokesman for the Marine command declined to comment on the assessment. Many of the points in the analysis were also presented to Gen. How effective is your employee performance review system? Advertisements ABC7 Eyewitness News The only news in High definition in So. com Get the Motorola Q Smartphone exclusively from Verizon Wireless! |
| www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13974639 EL PASO, Texas - Four US soldiers accused of murdering suspected insurgents during a raid in Iraq said they were under orders to "kill all military age males," according to sworn statements obtained by The Associated Press. The soldiers first took some of the men into custody because they were using two women and a toddler as human shields. They shot three of the men after the women and child were safe and say the men attacked them. "The ROE (rule of engagement) was to kill all military age males on Objective Murray," Staff Sgt. Raymond L Girouard told investigators, referring to the target by its code name. That target, an island on a canal in the northern Salhuddin province, was believed to be an al-Qaida training camp. The soldiers said officers in their chain of command gave them the order and explained that special forces had tried before to target the island and had come under fire from insurgents. Juston R Graber are charged with murder and other offenses in the shooting deaths of three of the men during the May 9 raid. Girouard, Hunsaker and Clagett are also charged with obstruction of justice for allegedly threatening to kill another soldier if he told authorities what happened. Leonel Lemus, told Army investigators they were ordered to attack an island in northern Salahuddin province on May 9 and kill anti-Iraqi fighters with ties to al-Qaida. They have been jailed in Kuwait since their June arrests. Michael Waddington, Hunsaker's civilian lawyer, said his client followed orders and killed the detainees in self-defense after he and Clagett were attacked. "They did (their job) honorably, they did it admirably," said Paul Bergrin, Clagett's civilian attorney. "If they did want to kill these men, they could have and been within the rules of engagement." Officers from their unit initially cleared the soldiers of wrongdoing. Charges were filed when witnesses changed their testimony after repeated interviews with Army investigators, Bergrin said. Military declines to comment Reached by e-mail in Iraq, Girouard's Army lawyer, Capt. Theodore Miller, declined to comment because the investigation was continuing. An Army prosecutor, also deployed to Iraq, did not respond to an e-mail request for comment. Army spokesman Sheldon Smith asked that a request for comment be e-mailed to him in Virginia. Military officials have released few details of the case. Judge grants delay in Iraq rape-murder case But statements from Girouard, Hunsaker and Clagett describe a tense early morning scene, with soldiers immediately opening fire on buildings. Girouard told investigators he expected he and his comrades would immediately be attacked when they landed on the island. Intelligence officials had warned that at least 20 al-Qaida operatives were hiding there. But it was only once the men moved to the northern half of the island that they found anyone, Girouard said. He said he and others shot and killed a man they spied in a window in one building and then rushed into a house where they found three other men hiding behind two women. A fifth man, holding a 2-year-old girl in front of him, later came out of another building, Girouard and Hunsaker told investigators. |