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| 5/24 |
| 2006/7/5-7 [Politics/Foreign/Asia/China] UID:43575 Activity:kinda low |
7/5 NK stealing Chinese aid trains. How pathetic.
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/korea/articles/20060705.aspx
\_ "While everyone's attention was focused on North Korean missiles,
the real story is the North Korean economy. It continues to fall
apart, and more North Koreans are unhappy about that. Worse yet,
more North Koreans are finding out how badly they have been
screwed by their leaders."
This is a dangerous estimation of the current situation. North
Koreans are not some sort of democratic people who have been mis-
led by their duly elected officials; they're hostages of a
totalitarian regime that starves them and keeps them down through
malnutrition and force of arms. There is little chance of a popular
uprising in NK. The best you're likely to get is disaffection among
the generals and a coup.
\_ There have been food riots in the past, and a few
assassination attempts on the dear leader, but yeah, you're
basically right. It doesn't hurt that China is very
interested in propping the regime up.
\_ fuck you. Neither China nor South Korea is interested in
completely disintegration of N.Korea for one simple reason.
Neither China nor S.Korea knows what to do with millions of
half-starved refugees. There are already tens of thousands
of N.Koreans inside China illegally, and Chinese is not sure
what to do with them. US is 6000 miles away from N.Korea
of course won't suffer any consequences of its complete
disintegration. To say China is trying propping the regime
up is either one of those anti-China propaganda, or you are
just completely clueless on what the fuck is going on in
this part of the world.
\_ Well China propped it up in the first place (1950).
\_ nope. Korea was partitioned by US and USSR, buddy.
China was left in the dark in the Yelta Conference.
Again, you have no clue what is going on in this part
of the world.
\_ motdpoll: Who is more clueless? The guy who
thinks Yalta (1945) was in 1950, or the guy who
thinks China was involved in the Korean war?
Yalta in 1950 guy: ..
China in KW guy:
\_ China was fighting us by proxy in the
Korean war by providing the father of the
current Dear Leader with massive logistical
support.
\_ This is from a thirty-second google of "china
'korean war'":
http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/cn-korea.htm
I'll go with Yenta.
\_ Yes, China was involved in the Korean war,
they kept the US from unifying Korea
under the SK government. The "poll" was
just supposed to be a funny way of
pointing out what an idiot and blowhard
Chicom is.
\_ I think the motd is too clueless to
get this humor. -China in KW guy
\_ Uh, why "fuck you"? You've just confirmed that "China
is very interested in propping the regime up." -John
\_ there is a difference between prevent a regime from
completely disintergration versus propping it up.
Yes, China ships food and fuel to N.Korea every week.
But this is about the only leverage China has over
N.Korea. How much leverage does US have?
\_ So, you don't disagree with the fact, you just
don't like how I stated it? Well, screw you
too.
\_ Cheap shot: The PRC knows what to do with NK refugees--
keep them the hell away from other countries' consulates
lest they claim political asylum.
\_ Chinese is doing US, Japan, and other European nation
a huge favor in this regard. China could of just throw
its hand and say "hey, consulate is your soverign
territory, ain't my problem, so, you deal with these
North Koreans."
\_ This is nonsensical; US, Japan, and the Euro
nations have no problem with granting political
refugee status to North Koreans who ask for it.
To say that the PRC is doing these countries a
favor by sending police into consulates to remove
these refugees is like saying that the Sudanese
government is doing the rest of the world a favor
by murdering Darfur refugees.
\_ Not trying to argue with you, but apart from the alleged
explosives plot in '04, can you point me toward these other
assassination attempts?
\_ I'm having trouble finding them now. I read one where
an artillery group loaded a live shell at a parade and
took a shot at him.
\_ A "popular uprising" in the modern world requires outside
assistance for weapons, etc. I'm unaware of any attempts to
create or fund the non-existent popular uprising in NK, but a
coup might happen if some colonel gets greedy and I'm sure a
random NK colonel is going to be so much better for the world
than the random NK in charge now. It's hopeless.
\_ A lone colonel is not going to be enough to install himself
as generalissimo. If there's a coup, a military junta a la
Burma is much more likely. |
| 5/24 |
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| www.strategypage.com/qnd/korea/articles/20060705.aspx Geography Forget the Missiles, This is Even More Bizarre July 5, 2006: While everyone's attention was focused on North Korean missiles, the real story is the North Korean economy. It continues to fall apart, and more North Koreans are unhappy about that. Worse yet, more North Koreans are finding out how badly they have been screwed by their leaders. Meanwhile, North Korean officials engage in even more bizarre behavior. For example, food and fuel supplies sent to North Korea have been halted, not to force North Korea to stop missile tests or participate in peace talks, but to return the Chinese trains the aid was carried in on. In the last few weeks, the North Koreans have just kept the trains, sending the Chinese crews back across the border. North Korea just ignores Chinese demands that the trains be returned, and insists that the trains are part of the aid program. It's no secret that North Korean railroad stock is falling apart, after decades of poor maintenance and not much new equipment. Stealing Chinese trains is a typical loony-tune North Korean solution to the problem. If the North Koreans appear to make no sense, that's because they don't. Put simply, when their unworkable economic policies don't work, the North Koreans just conjure up new, and equally unworkable, plans. The Chinese have tried to talk the North Koreans out of these pointless fantasies, and for their trouble they have their trains stolen. The South Koreans believe that if they just keep the North Korean leaders from doing anything too destructive (especially to South Korea), eventually the tragicomic house of cards up north will just collapse. Not much of a plan, but so far, no one's come up with anything better. July 4, 2006: North Korea finally fired its Taepodong 2, but after about 40 seconds, the missile exploded, apparently because of an engine failure. The only other test of the Taepodong 2, in 1998, was a success, with the missile passing over Japan. In addition to the Taepodong 2, North Korea apparently launched eight or more shorter range SCUD type missiles into the Sea of Japan. These were probably older missiles nearing the end of their useful lives. North Korea has taken the basic Russian SCUD missile (which was developed, with the help of captured German scientists, from the German World War II V-2 ballistic missile) and improved it as the longer range (1,300 kilometers) Nodong missile. The basic SCUD design was also enhanced to produce longer range (up to 600 kilometers) SCUDs. All of these have been sold to foreign buyers like Yemen, Iran and Pakistan. June 28, 2006: China has openly urged North Korea to halt preparations for "missile tests," and return to negotiations regarding economic aid and the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Previously, China had refrained from public criticism of the North Koreans. |
| www.kimsoft.com/korea/cn-korea.htm China's Decision to Enter the Korean War Reappraisal and New Documentation Michael M Sheng, Professor of History, Southwest Missouri State University Korea and World Affairs, Vol. Notes Introduction In June 1950, a few months after the announcement of the Beijing-Moscow alliance, the Korean crisis erupted. Early in October, shortly after the South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, the CCP made a final decision to enter the Korean War to fight the American-led international forces. What were the CCP's motives and objectives in taking part in the Korean conflict ? What kind of role did the newly-establ ished Sino-Soviet alliance play in Beijing's decision to cross the Yalu River? These questions have been asked and answered by many, who, with different convictions and the materials accessible to them at the time, provided widely different interpretations. Against the "red scare" of the 1950s, it was believed that the Chinese invasion of Korea was an integral step in the Communist worldwide expansion directed by the Kremlin, and Beijing's action was lunatic and irrational. Allen Whiting's classic work, China Crosses the Yalu, examines the CCP's ac tion under new light, and argues that Beijing's decision was not unprovoked and naked aggression, but "rationally motivated." In the 1960s, the US experience in Vietnam made many view Washington's postwar foreign policy more critically. Some scholars tend to argue that because of the "strained alliance between Moscow and Beijing," the Chinese were tryin g hard to avoid direct confrontation with the US Only when China's security was under direct threat, was Beijing forced to take action. Even after their "preemptive limited attack" on the UN force in early November, "the Chinese Peop le's Volunteers" (CPV) disengaged themselves from further confrontation. This indicated, these scholars argue, that Beijing was cautious, and "its objective was apparently not a decisive effort to destroy the UN forces in Korea." In othe r words, had Washington decided to negotiate and maintain the 38th parallel divide, the bloodshed could have been stopped there and then. Promising to offer a unique "Chinese perspective," two Chinese authors, writing in English and in the United States, also conclude that Beijing's decision was of "primarily security concern," and Beijing's "lean-to-one-side" policy was made only after Washington's rejection of CCP friendly overtures. However, they themselves reveal much information which strongly suggests that Mao's outlook of "proletarian internationalism," rather than simple concern over China's bord er security, played a significant role in his taking a confrontational stance in dealing with the Korean crisis. Also there is evidence used in their article which proves that Beijing and Moscow closely collaborated from the very beginning to the end. Richard Whelan argues that the American sacrifice in Korea effectively drew a line to stop the Communist expansion directed by Moscow, as the title of his book suggests. Curiously, while complaining about the unfair treatment the "forgo tten Korean veterans" received, Whelan laments that "tragically, the Korean War failed to teach the United States the vital lessons - about Asian nationalism as distinct from international Communism... that might have spared the natio n the fiasco of Vietnam." However, having made his point, Whelan appears not interested in proving the "Chinese nationalism" as "distinct from international Communism." In contrast to the conventional belief that North Korea was Soviet-sponsored and distant from Beijing, Bruce Comings effectively argues that Pyongyang was more closely connected with and influenced by the Chinese than the Russians. Since the North Koreans had made an enormous contribution to the CCP's liberation of the entire mainland, Beijing thought it only reasonable for the Chinese to give reciprocal assistance to their comrades in Korea whenever needed. Cumings believes that this reciprocity was the first motive for Beijing's intervention, while China's concern over its border security and a hostile Far East situation, with a revived Japan, was the second. The third of Beijing's motives, according to Cuming s, was to supplant decisively the Soviet influence in North Korea. To him, Beijing and Moscow were more rivals than comrades. Based on these newly released CCP materials, this paper will argue that from his bi-polarized postwar world vision Mao perceived direct Sino-American confrontation to be inevitable, and the Chinese participation in the conflict advantageous to what he called the "revolutionary front" of the world. Mao was also of the convic tion that the Americans could be defeated militarily, and only with a serious military setback could Washington be forced to negotiate or withdraw from Korea. This rationale precipitated Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War, and the CCFs initial military objective was no less than a total victory over the US-led international forces in Korea. In accordance with the spirit of the newly-signed Sino-So viet military alliance, Mao and Stalin closely collaborated in dealing with the Korean crisis from the beginning to the end. Beijing's aggressive revolutionary attitude was matched by the American mood for "rolling back," and Washington's concern for US "credibility" in the postwar world. Therefore, a Sino-American collision appeared inevitable in 1950. This "inevitability" stemmed from the mutual hostility of both sides involved. It goes without saying that Beijing's decision to invade Korea was a kind of "reaction" toward US intervention in Korea and the Taiwan Straits. However, to attribu te Washington's action as a determining factor for Beijing's reaction is to repeat an old pattern in western sinology: "western impact and Chinese reaction," which has been challenged by some scholars. In any bilateral confrontation, the action of the A side constitutes the background for the action of the B side, which in turn becomes the background for the A side's "reaction." With such a historical train of "reactions," it is less product ive to determine who provoked who than to explore why and how they acted in the way they chose. Since the American perspective has been studied substantially, this paper will focus on the Chinese perspective. How did Beijing view the s ituation after Washington had decided to intervene ? Why did the CCP choose a course of action to confront the Americans militarily? Mao's Perception of "Inevitability" and the CCP's Preparedness Almost as soon as the Americans intervened in Korea and the Seventh Fleet entered the Taiwan Straits at the end of June, 1950, the CCFs long-standing suspicion ofand hostility toward the US turned into bellicosity. The Communists wereconvin ced that direct armed struggle with the Americans had become inevita ble. On June 6, Mao was not in a mood to fight the Americans directly. He told the Party plenum that: "The world front of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union is stronger than it was last year... and the liberation movements against imperialist oppression are developing broadly... Although the danger of war from the imperialist camp is still there, so is the possibility of the third world war. The forces which can check the danger of war are increasing rapidl y.. Based on such an optimistic estimation of the world situation, Mao emphasized China's economic reconstruction and the liberation of Taiwan and Tibet as the Party's urgent tasks. However, Mao's bi-polarized o utlook of the postwar world order lay the very foundation for Beijing's particular reaction, of its own choosing, toward the Korean crisis. Only three days after Washington decided to intervene in Korea, Beijing shifted its military focus from the Taiwan Straits to Korea. On June 30, the CCP Military Committee informed Xiao Jinguang, commander-i n-chief of the CCP navy, that the timing for liberating Taiwan be postponed, and the preparation for encountering the US in Korea took the first priority. On July 7, Zhou chaired a meeting of the CCP Military Committee, which decided to form the Northeast Defense Army (NDA) immedia... |