csua.org/u/fc8 -> nytimes.com/2006/03/27/international/europe/27memo.html?hp&ex=1143522000&en=1a8220fd45b2aca0&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Forum: The Transition in Iraq But behind closed doors, the president was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan.
Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors failed to find unconventional weapons, said a confidential memo about the meeting written by Mr Blair's top foreign policy adviser and reviewed by The New York Times. "Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," David Manning, Mr Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at the time, wrote in the memo that summarized the discussion between Mr Bush, Mr Blair and six of their top aides. "The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10 March," Mr Manning wrote, paraphrasing the president.
Colin L Powell was scheduled to appear before the United Nations to present the American evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world security by hiding unconventional weapons. Although the United States and Britain aggressively sought a second United Nations resolution against Iraq which they failed to obtain the president said repeatedly that he did not believe he needed it for an invasion. Stamped "extremely sensitive," the five-page memorandum, which was circulated among a handful of Mr Blair's most senior aides, had not been made public. Several highlights were first published in January in the book "Lawless World," which was written by a British lawyer and international law professor, Philippe Sands. In early February, Channel 4 in London first broadcast several excerpts from the memo. Since then, The New York Times has reviewed the five-page memo in its entirety. While the president's sentiments about invading Iraq were known at the time, the previously unreported material offers an unfiltered view of two leaders on the brink of war, yet supremely confident. The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr Bush predicted that it was "unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups." The memo also shows that the president and the prime minister acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq. Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned invasion, Mr Bush talked about several ways to provoke a confrontation, including a proposal to paint a United States surveillance plane in the colors of the United Nations in hopes of drawing fire, or assassinating Mr Hussein. Those proposals were first reported last month in the British press, but the memo does not make clear whether they reflected Mr Bush's extemporaneous suggestions, or were elements of the government's plan. Consistent Remarks Two senior British officials confirmed the authenticity of the memo, but declined to talk further about it, citing Britain's Official Secrets Act, which made it illegal to divulge classified information. But one of them said, "In all of this discussion during the run-up to the Iraq war, it is obvious that viewing a snapshot at a certain point in time gives only a partial view of the decision-making process." On Sunday, Frederick Jones, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said the president's public comments were consistent with his private remarks made to Mr Blair. "While the use of force was a last option, we recognized that it might be necessary and were planning accordingly," Mr Jones said. "The public record at the time, including numerous statements by the President, makes clear that the administration was continuing to pursue a diplomatic solution into 2003," he said. "Saddam Hussein was given every opportunity to comply, but he chose continued defiance, even after being given one final opportunity to comply or face serious consequences. The January 2003 memo is the latest in a series of secret memos produced by top aides to Mr Blair that summarize private discussions between the president and the prime minister. Another group of British memos, including the so-called Downing Street memo written in July 2002, showed that some senior British officials had been concerned that the United States was determined to invade Iraq, and that the "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" by the Bush administration to fit its desire to go to war.
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