en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marbury_case
John Marshall presided over the case, and used the case to legally establish the right of the judiciary--and in particular, the Supreme Court-- to overrule the actions of coequal branches of government and thus laid the basis for the current power of the Supreme Court.
Inauguration Day, including Marbury's, because they had not been officially delivered by day's end; some scholars have suggested that it was actually an attempt to reduce expenses by cutting judicial salaries.
James Madison as the new Secretary, and ordered him not to deliver the Marbury commission. At this point in the country's history, the Supreme Court had been very limited in its exercise of its powers. Chief Justice Marshall knew that if the Court decided for Marbury, Jefferson would almost certainly ignore the decision--a result that would further erode the court's authority.
Andrew Jackson refused to compel the state of Georgia to abide by the decision. He is famously, but apocryphally, reported to have said, "John Marshall has made his decision.
Article III of the Constitution, which governs the Federal courts. Marbury thus lies in the intersection between judicial review in the modern sense and the older theory that each branch of government is responsible (to the people) for keeping its own acts within the bounds of constitutionality.
Dred Scott v Sandford in 1857, more than half a century later. However, the Court treated the decision with deference: between 1804 and 1894, Marbury was cited in 49 separate opinions in the United States Supreme Court. Of these, 24 citations extend or reiterate Marbury's jurisdictional holding.
That decision arose under a statute of Parliament enabling the London College of Physicians to levy fines against anyone who violated their rules. The College accused a doctor of practice without their license and fined him accordingly. Coke found that their statutory powers violated "common right or reason" because "no person should be a judge in his own case." The idea that courts could declare statutes void waxed and then waned in England, but it was well known in the American colonies and in the bars of young states, where Coke's books were very influential. The doctrine was specifically enshrined in some state constitutions, and by 1803 it had been employed in both state courts and federal courts in actions dealing with state statutes.
o scholar to date has identified even one participant in the ratification fight who argued that the Constitution did not authorize judicial review of federal statutes.
It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It, therefore, belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred;
They noted that the concept of independent review exercised by federal courts had been effectively created by judicial gloss in Marbury. In fact, during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth almost as much debate in Congress revolved around the constitutionality in contrast to the substance of proposed legislation.
Cooper v Aaron, the Court essentially declared such debates irrelevant by asserting for itself sole authority to pass on the constitutionality of legislation. In Cooper, the Court reasoned that in swearing to uphold the "Constitution", public officials are referring to the Constitution as interpreted by federal courts, not by the public officials themselves. Thus Presidents today often sign legislation they believe to be unconstitutional. George W Bush, for example, declared his belief that the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill was unconstitutional but signed the law anyway.
III, S: 2 Clause 2 "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
edit Judiciary Act of 1789, S: 13 "The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts .
writ of mandamus directly in the Supreme Court, the Court needed to be able to exercise original jurisdiction over the case in order to have the power to hear it. However, the Constitution specifically enumerates in Art. III what types of cases the Supreme Court can hear under its original jurisdiction. The problem is that most legal scholars agree that Marbury's case doesn't fit under any of those types of cases. Marbury's argument is that in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandamus. This raises several issues that Marshall has to address: * Does Art. III of the Constitution create a "floor" for original jurisdiction, that Congress can add to, or does it create an exhaustive list that Congress can't modify at all? III's original jurisdiction is an exhaustive list, but Congress tries to modify it anyway, who wins that conflict, Congress or the Constitution? And, more importantly, who is supposed to decide who wins?
Marshall quickly answers the first two questions affirmatively. Marshall finds that the failure to deliver the commission was "violative of a vested legal right." In deciding whether Marbury has a remedy, Marshall states "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." One of the key legal principles established by Marbury is the notion that for every violation of a vested legal right, there must be a legal remedy. Marshall next describes two distinct types of Executive actions: political actions where the official can exercise discretion, and purely ministerial functions where the official is legally required to do something. Marshall finds that delivering the appointment to Marbury was a purely ministerial function required by law, and therefore the law provides him a remedy.
Marbury had argued that the Constitution was only intended to set a floor for original jurisdiction that Congress could add to. Marshall disagrees and holds that Congress does not have the power to modify the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Consequently, Marshall finds that the Constitution and the Judiciary Act conflict. This conflict raises the important question of what happens when an Act of Congress conflicts with the Constitution (in the eyes of the Supreme Court).
In support of this position Marshall looks to the nature of the written Constitution--there would be no point of having a written Constitution if the courts could just ignore it.
be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
edit Criticisms Some legal scholars have raised questions about the logic Marshall used in determining the Judiciary Act unconstitutional, and hence the legitimacy of judicial review. It is alleged that Marshall selectively quoted the Judiciary Act, interpr...
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