| WIKI | FAQ | Tech FAQ | |
 http://csua.com/feed/ | |
| ||||||
| 5/27 |
| 2005/12/15-16 [Politics/Domestic/President/Clinton, Politics/Domestic/President/Bush] UID:41032 Activity:high |
12/15 Yeah, Congress has the same access to intelligence as the President...
Except for the fact that they don't.
http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm
\_ Why would you expect them to have the same access? The
intelligence agencies are part of the executive branch, which
has a responsibility at very least to restrict access to primary
material which may identify the source of that material. I can
understand arguing about whether the President restricts access
to intelligence too much or too little, but asserting that
Congress should have exactly the same level of access as the
President seems misguided.
\_ I wouldn't "expect them to have the same access". But that's
exactly what the president has used recently to defend his war.
He said that they had the same information on Iraq that he did
for their debate on authorizing war in some highly misguided
effort to create some large scale mea culpa. It's what he's
hinged every speech this week on. He's a liar.
\_ Did he hinge that on congress *always* having the same access
or having the same access before the war?
\_ "One of the blessings of our free society is
that we can debate these issues openly, even in a
time of war. Most of the debate has been a credit
to our democracy, but some have launched irresponsible
charges. They say that we act because of oil, that
we act in Iraq because of Israel, or because we
misled the American people. Some of the most
irresponsible comments about manipulating intelligence
have come from politicians who saw the same
intelligence we saw, and then voted to authorize
the use of force against Saddam Hussein. These
charges are pure politics."
\_ Right, so we're talking about pre-war intelligence
there, not current intelligence.
\_ I don't see what you're getting at. Do you?
\_ Which we know was not distributed equally before
the war.
\_ We do?
\_ Of course. We know now, therfore we must have
known before.
\_ Not to mention that Bush is personally
knowledgeable of everything known and done
by people in the executive branch.
\_ He may not be knowlegable, but, whether
he likes it or not, he is responsible.
it's his fucking administration.
\_ No no no it's Clinton's fault somehow.
\_ No, I agree completely. Bush should
be held accountable for the actions
of his administration. However, I am
a little confused. I thought here
we're taking him to task for claiming
Congress had the same access to
intelligence. So is he at fault for
making a claim when he didn't know
the facts, making a claim when he
should have known otherwise, or making
a claim when he did know otherwise.
And how do we decide which one that is
from the available information?
\_ No no no it's Clinton's fault somehow.
\_ Ah, the old "is he a liar, or is
he just incompetent" question. I
posit it REALLY DOESN'T MATTER.
And How do we decide? We tell
Congress (who is the only party
with the ability, not to mention
the DUTY to do so) to find out.
\_ You mean we shouldn't just hang
him first? I'm pretty sure
we're going to hang him first
and determine the facts later.
\_ He's not a carjacker, son.
He's the president, and the
only body qualified to
investigate is sitting on
their hands. In such an
event, saying "wait for
the facts" is unpatriotic.
\_ Wow. Maybe the truth *is*
out there! Have you been
talking to jblack about
the black helicopters
circling overhead? You
think that's part of the
Congressional plot to
sit on the impeachment too?
\_ Yes we do. The PDB for example, is not
shared with Congress. Are you really this
ignorant or are you playing faux naif?
The President knows he has access to
information that Congress does not have,
too, so he just lying his ass off now.
\_ You know, I'm pretty sure Bush isn't
telling the Congress what he's getting
the wife and family for Christmas too.
So the question is not whether Bush knows
something the Congress doesn't, it's
1. whether Bush knows something material
that the Congress doesn't, and 2. whether
Bush knows that the Congress doesn't
have access to that material information.
In the case of the daily briefing that
you specifically mentioned, you will
have to show that the relevant bits in
the briefing do not eventually reach
the Congress.
\_ http://tinyurl.com/94otb
\_ So you have one website quoting
another website plus some
conjecture. Wow. You have me
totally convinced now. Do you
information reguarding black
helicopters that are equally
helicopters that is equally
persuasive?
\_ http://csua.org/u/eco
Second paragraph. Look this is
shooting fish in a barrel.
\_ OK, by abandoning your first
website I assume you agree
that your first reference is
silly. Great. We're making
progress. Now let's look
at this one. On 9/5/02,
Graham & Co demanded to
see the National Intelligence
Estimate. 3 weeks later
(I assume that's 9/26/02),
Tenet produced one. One
10/10/02, Congress voted
to approve the use of force.
What's your point again?
\_ There is overwhelming
evidence that you are
wrong. I am just posting
it as fast as I can
google it:
http://csua.org/u/ecp
\_ To quote your reference,
"The report does not
cite examples of
intelligence Bush
reviewed that differed
from what Congress saw.
If such information is
available, it would not
be accessible to the
report's authors."
That Bush had
information unavailable
to Congress is a given.
The question is whether
the information was
material, and you
have yet shown nothing
to substantiate that
claim.
\_ You are trying to
use the fact that
the White House
classifies any
information that
proves that it is
lying as evidence
in *favor* of their
claim? Bizarre.
\_ At least you are
admitting that Bush
lied about this.
Now we are getting
somewhere.
\_ I think I agreed
half a page up
that Bush must
know something
the Congress
doesn't. The
question is
whether it's
material, and so
far claims of
"overwhelming
evidence" have
been under-
whelming. All
you have shown
are unreferenced
claims and
innuendoes.
\_ Did you even bother to
read the second paragraph
in the above cite?
"However, this
declassified version was
more like a marketing
brochure: 20 pages in
length, slickly produced
with splashy grahics and
maps, and with none of
the caveats contained in
the original...The
intelligence material
Congress had was what the
administration was willing
to give them, namely a
promotional piece whose
lies of omission outweighed\
what was included."
\_ [Sorry, broke up your
post to respond to
your points separately.
Hope you don't mind.]
The full classified
version was available
to House and Senate
intelligence committee
members.
\_ Right, but that
is not Bush's claim.
He claims "all 100
Democratic members
of Congress" had
He claims "more than
100 Democrats"
in Congress had
access to the same
material he did.
http://csua.org/u/ecq
\_ Boy, do you even
read your own
references?
1. Your quote
is completely
misleading and
*invented*.
Please use
quotations
correctly.
2. I assume
you mean "more
than 100 Democrats
in the House and
Senate". OBTW,
*that* is a
correct and non-
misleading quote.
3. Next
paragraph from
that quote, the
article article
specifically
mentioned the
daily briefing,
but it's not
clear if relevant
info from that
made it into
reports in other
forms, and the
National Intel
Estimate, which
even the artcile
agreed were
available to
the Congress
before the vote.
4. Given that
you have proven
to be dishonest
by inventing
quotes on the fly,
why should I even
waste my time with
you? Please addr
point 4 before
more arguments.
5. I see that
you've now gone
back to "fix"
your quote. Again
why should I waste
my time with some-
one shown to be
dishonest and
without honor?
\_ Blow it out
your ass. I
was trying
to quickly
summarize my
points. I did
not sub-
stantially
change any
meaning
(Congressmen
for members of
The House and
Senate). Why
should I waste
my time with
a crybaby?
\_ Right. You
made up a
quote (and
there is a
substantive
difference
between
"all 100"
and "more
than 100"),
got caught.
You went
back to fix
it without
admitting
responsi-
bility, and
got caught
again. Now
you're
indignant.
Do you have
*any* honor?
That was a typo that I corrected _/
before you even finished with
your counter to it. Your argument
on the facts has failed, so you
have resorted to ad hominem, I
understand. Another nail in the
coffin of your claims that the
Congress had all the same intel
as the White House:
http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm
\_ This is getting *so* tiresome.
I agreed a page up that Bush has
info the Congress doesn't. Now
show that this info is material.
You still have nothing. How about
a quote from Feinstein's website?
Have you learned how to quote now?
Something like "Bush knew X, but
this was not known to the Congress
at the time. If this were known,
the vote might have been
different." That would show that
the info was material. You picked
the Feinstein site. Don't you
have *anything*?
\_ The "material" bit is your
trip, not mine. I don't know
if it would have changed enough
votes to stop the war or not.
But I do know Bush lied when
he claimed that Congress had
access to the same info (on
Iraq, to be pedantic) as he did.
\_ I take it that this means you
*can't* find a reference
that Congress is missing
material information. If
you don't limit yourself
to material information, then
the statement is silly. Of
course Bush knows stuff the
Congress does not. I mean,
did Bush tell the Congreess
when or with whom he lost
his virginity? So you are
limiting the info to info
on Iraq. Isn't that a
material test? Should Bush
tell Congress what his fav.
Bagdhad restaurant is? If
he didn't, would you hang
him for lying? You keep
saying you know Bush lied.
How? On what? You made a
specific claim. Now please
make specific charges. Some-
thing like "Bush knew X, but
Congress didn't or didn't in
time".
\_ Reread the Washington
Post article. Basically
anything that contradicted
the case that the WH
was trying to make was
withheld. There is
literally hundreds of
pages of it (far too
much to try and post
here). One example
noted in the WaPo article:
"For example, the NIE view that
Hussein would not use weapons of mass
destruction against the United States
or turn them over to terrorists unless
backed into a corner was cleared for
public use only a day before the
Senate vote."
\_ To address your quote
specifically, note
that NIE info was not
available for "public
use". Meaning the
info was available to
the Congress, but the
Congressman was not
allowed to release
it to the public. Now
how does that prove
your point? Re the
rest of the article,
it was either the
Congress did not have
enough time to review
the NIE (from your
earlier time line I
would guess the
Congress had 2 weeks),
or there must have
been *something*
missing. What
something? Specific
charges please. I'll
keep trying to help
you. Something like
"Bush knew X, but the
Congress didn't or
didn't in time." When
you have X, then you
have something. Until
then, your claim is
worthless.
\_ Bush didn't say "something material"
he said Congress had the same
information we did. We know the PDB
had information on Iraq. Q.E.D.
\_ Now you're being silly. Yes, I
am certain Bush isn't telling
the Congress what he's getting
the family for Christmas. I bet
he didn't even tell the Congress
when and with whom he lost his
virginity! Impeach the bum. How
are those black helicopters coming?
\_ You are grasping at straws here
and I think you know it. We
are talking about Iraq here,
not Christmas lists.
\_ Hey, you're the one who said
"Bush didn't say 'something
material'". I was just
follwing your when I started
on Christmas lists and
virginity. Now show me
that the daily briefing
information didn't eventually
reach Congress.
\_ Believe it or not, I do
not have the security
clearance to track this
kind of thing. Your blind
faith in the White House
is kind of touching.
\_ No, not blind faith in
the white house at all.
If I am guilty, I am
guilty of blind faith
that you could not
possibly prove what you
are trying to claim.
\_ I think you are
saying the opposite
of what you intend.
\_ You know, you're
right. Mea culpa. |
| 5/27 |
|
| feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm This responds to your request for a discussion of Congress and its role as a consumer of national intelligence, and for a listing and a descrip tion of some of the US Intelligence Community's principal intelligenc e products, including an identification of those which the executive br anch routinely shares with Congress, and those which it does not. Limitations on Congressional Access to Certain National Intelligence By virtue of his constitutional role as commander-and-in-chief and head of the executive branch, the President has access to all national intel ligence collected, analyzed and produced by the Intelligence Community. They, unlike Members of Congress, also have the authority to more extensively task the Intelligence Commu nity, and its extensive cadre of analysts, for follow-up information. A s a result, the President and his most senior advisors arguably are bet ter positioned to assess the quality of the Community's intelligence mo re accurately than is Congress. Their foreign policy responsibilities oft en require active, sustained, and often personal interaction, with seni or officials of many of the same countries targeted for intelligence co llection by the Intelligence Community. Thus the President and his seni or advisors are uniquely positioned to glean additional information and impressions - information that, like certain sensitive intelligence in formation, is generally unavailable to Congress - that can provide them with an important additional perspective with which to judge the quali ty of intelligence. Authorities Governing Executive Branch Control Over National Intelligenc e The President is able to control dissemination of intelligence informati on to Congress because the Intelligence Community is part of the execut ive branch. It was created by law and executive order principally to se rve that branch of government in the execution of its responsibilities. The impact of the newly enacted, and unqualified directive, is dependent, as is generall y the case, upon how aggressively Congress asserts it statutory preroga tive. Despite conflicting legal authorities governing congressional access to national intelligence, the US Judicial Branch has not addressed the i ssue, since no case involving an executive-legislative branch dispute o ver access to intelligence has reached the US courts. By contrast, Congr ess, through its congressional intelligence oversight committees, has a sserted in principle a legal authority for unrestricted access to intel ligence information. The Committees, historically, have interpreted the law as allowing room to decide how, rather than whether, they will hav e access to intelligence information, provided that such access is cons istent with the protection of sources and methods. In practice, however , Congress has not sought all national intelligence information. When they have ci ted such compelling need for access, the committees generally have reac h an accommodation with the executive branch usually, but not always. Perhaps, in part, because of these differing legal views, the executive and legislative branches apparently have not agreed to a set of formal written rules that would govern the sharing and handling of national in telligence. Included in the last category is the President's Daily Brief (PDB), a written intelligence product which is briefed daily to the President, and which consists of six to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering a broad array of topics. As more individu als are briefed about sources, it is contended, the greater is the risk that this information will be disclosed, inadvertently or otherwise. S uch leaks could jeopardize current or future access to possibly valuabl e intelligence, and endanger the lives of intelligence sources providin g the information. Executive branch officials similarly point to security-related concerns in explaining why Congress is not routinely provided intelligence metho ds, particularly collection methods. As in the case of source protectio n, officials argue that effective intelligence collection demands that the methods - human and technical -- used to collect the intelligence b e protected by limiting the number of individuals witting of those meth ods. Officials, in part, also cite security concerns in withholding raw intel ligence. Because raw intelligence sometimes is derived from a single so urce, the source is arguably more vulnerable to identification and ulti mate exposure. Even when intelligence is collected from multiple source s, as is sometimes the case when signals and imagery intelligence colle ction efforts are employed, knowledge of those collection methods can s ometimes be determined from the underlying raw intelligence. They cite two additional reasons for restricting congressional access to raw intelligence. First, they contend that it would be "dangerous" if a Member of Congress were to gain access to, and possibly make policy d ecisions based upon, raw, unevaluated intelligence that has not been pl aced in context. Second, they argue that as a practical matter Congress lacks the physical capacity to securely store the volume of raw intell igence the Intelligence Community generates. They assert that it would be inapp ropriate to provide these products to Congress because they are tailore d to the specific needs of individual policymakers, and often include i nformation about the policymaker's contacts with foreign counterparts, as well as the reactions of those counterparts. Intelligence Community analysts, for example, have rarely if e ver have had access to such information. To the limited extent that the y have, their access has been based largely upon their need to know the information for the purposes of conducting analysis. For example, while investigating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cover t action operations in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the intelligence committ ees requested and were provided the identities of certain intelligence sources. The committees also sought and obtained access to certain raw intelligence. On other occasions, committee members have requested and obtained raw intelligence in order to verify certain Intelligence Commu nity judgements contained in various National Intelligence Estimates (N IE). In 2002, for example, President Bush rejected a request by the Congressional Joint Inquiry investigating th e September 11^th terrorist attacks to review the August 6, 2001, PDB, which contained an article titled Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US . But after two special congressional investigative committees headed by former Sen. Otis Pike launched investigations of the Intelligence Community in the mid-1970s, the executive branch p ermitted the Community to increase the volume of intelligence informati on it provided to Congress. But even then , if the intelligence analyst determines that such information is parti cularly sensitive, he may choose to brief only the chairmen and ranking members of the two intelligence committees, or in lieu of the committe e leadership, the committees' majority and minority staff directors. NIEs are considered to be "estimative" intelligence products, i n that they present what intelligence analysts estimate (not predict) m ay be the course of future events. Coordination of NIEs involves not on ly trying to resolve any interagency differences, but also assigning co nfidence levels to the key judgments and rigorously evaluating the sour cing for them. Each NIE is reviewed and approved for dissemination by t he National Intelligence Board (NIB), which is comprised of the DNI and other senior Intelligence Community leaders within the Intelligence Co mmunity. Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) are research papers 20-30-page s or more in length that provide a detailed data logic trail on key nat ional security issues. They differ from NIEs in that they are less "est imative." National Intelligence Officers are expected to coordinate ICA s with other Community analysts, noting any disagreements in analytic j udgements. Thus, ICAs are Community-coordinated, and are disseminated o nly after NIC Chairman approval. Intelligence Co... |
| tinyurl.com/94otb -> www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/007055.php next (November 18, 2005 -- 12:49 PM EDT) Some of the White House jabs against their critics these days are so fatu ous and simple-minded that it's hard not to step back every so often and wonder if they're even serious. And, heck, here 's this quote from Bill Clinton saying that Saddam was "a threat". But we haven't invaded Iran, though I guess perhaps I sh ouldn't speak too soon. For better or worse there was a vast consensus within the American politi cal establishment that Saddam Hussein was a threat to American interests and that he must at least be maintaining some stocks of chemical weapon s It is even true that in 1998 the Congress passed and the president si gned the Iraq Liberation Act, which put the US on record as supporting ' regime change' in Iraq, though we should not forget that this law was in tentionally foisted on the president at a moment of maximum political we akness by most of the same connivers that brought us the real war four y ears later. You could easily substitute "WMDs" for "a threat" in the sentences above. Do we have to invade right now be fore we even get a chance to see if the suspicions which are the premise of our invasion are even accurate? Various people of different political stripes said 'no' to one or more of these questions. It's almost comica l when you take a moment to think about it. President Bush has spent mos t of his presidency swinging around the cudgel that he has the character and the strength to defend the country when his political opponents don 't. Now suddenly we learn that all the Democrats he's run against for fo ur years as not tough enough to defend the country actually supported al l of these decisions and would have done everything the same way had the y been in power. What we have here w ith President Bush and his key advisors is something more complicated an d deep-rooted than garden variety lying. the whole practice of evaluating all information going into the war not for its truth value, but for whether it promoted or hindered the admini stration's goal of being free to go to war. The President could have be en given every bit of intelligence information available, and he and/or Cheney would have reached the same decision because they would have di scarded, discounted, or disregarded most of it. Information that was Us eful to that goal was put in one box, Not Useful put in another. Entire categories of information were assigned to the Not Useful box because their source was deemed an opponent of US military action, or assumed to have some other motive. Garden variety lying is knowing it's Y and saying it's X -- Lyndon Johnso n at the Gulf of Tonkin. This is a much deeper indifference to factual i nformation in itself. People ask me sometimes whether I think the president thought Saddam did have big stockpiles of WMD or whether he knew Saddam didn't and lied abo ut it. This even lead s to a sort of inverted conspiracy theorizing when people ask, "If he kn ew there was no WMD, why didn't they at least try to plant some to avoid the catastrophic embarrassment which ensued after the war." The real answer, I think, is as banal as it is devastating: I don't think they ever gave it much thought -- not in the sense of trying to get to the heart of the matter. Whether his client i s innocent or not is sort of beside the point. This is why there was the bum's rush for the inspections process. I'm sur e they figured there were some chemical weapons to be found somewhere. B ut why take the chance that there weren't, or more likely, why take the chance there wouldn't be enough? Thinking through these points would be and someday will be an important, critical conversation for this country to have. Because it is a toxic ap proach to governance which has suffused this administration. It will als o be important to understand and come to terms with how various other pa rties and players set the ground work for, facilitated and enabled what happened over the last few years. But bad actors can't accomplish bad acts on this scale on t heir own in a nation of 300,000,000 people. At the moment, though, we ca n't even get those debate started because simply discussing the heart of the issue -- that the administration recklessly and dishonestly gamed t he country into war -- triggers a new hurricane of lies, distortions and attempts to confuse. |
| csua.org/u/eco -> www.downingstreetmemo.com/realitycheck.html#congress But we went to the UN President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and their supporters frequently poin t to the timing of the DSM and other leaked documents and say, "but we w ent to the UN after that, which proves we wanted a peaceful solution." First, we should note that for Blair, going to the UN was an imperative. As a party to the International Criminal Court, the UK needed a legal ju stification for invasion, and regime change was not adequate, as is indi cated by several of the leaked UK documents. However, both Blair and Bus h needed the imprimatur of a UN resolution to build public support. Peter Ricketts' memo to Jack Straw on March 22, 2002 states, the U N strategy was twofold: "either Saddam against all the odds allows Inspe ctors to operate freely, in which case we can further hobble his WMD pro grammes, or he blocks/hinders, and we are on stronger ground for switchi ng to other methods." But the plan backfired--Saddam did let the inspect ors back in, but after visiting over 100 sites multiple times they found no WMD They did find some conventional missiles that exceeded set rest rictions on range--still no threat to the US or UK--and they were prompt ly destroyed. With the basis for war evaporating with each passing day, Bush went back to the UN to try for a second resolution that would have declared Iraq i n "material breach" of resolution 1441, thus rubber stamping his invasio n plan. From the beginning, it was seen by the US and UK as a means to justfiy war, not prevent it. The DSM clearly in dicates the policy of invasion was set long before the US went to the UN (and before Bush sought approval from Congress for the use of force aga inst Iraq). The other leaked UK memos show a British Cabinet scrambling to find a legal basis for a war their Prime Minister had already committ ed them to. When the UN ceased to offer any further benefit to the war a genda, the US and UK moved on--to Baghdad. Congress had access to the same intel as Bush and they approved the invasion On October 10, 2002, Congress voted to approve the use of force against I raq. The President has indicated on several occasions that members of Co ngress had access to the same intelligence his administration had, and m ade their choice on the basis of this information. What is less known is the fact that what Congress was given bore little resemblance to the de tailed reports the Bush administration was reading. book, recounts a Sept 5, 2002 meeting he a nd Senators Durbin and Levin had with then CIA director George Tenet and his staff. Though the administration had long before decided on invasio n, to the senators' amazement no National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq had yet been produced. Graham, Durbin and Levin demanded to see one, an d three weeks later Tenet produced a 90-page document rife with caveats and qualifications (though these were buried in footnotes) about what we knew--or didn't know--about WMD in Iraq. That report was classified, and as such was available only to those on th e House and Senate intelligence committees. Graham pressed for it to be declassified, and got what he asked for on Oct 4--less than a week befor e Congress was to vote on the use of force. However, this declassified v ersion was more like a marketing brochure: 20 pages in length, slickly p roduced with splashy grahics and maps, and with none of the caveats cont ained in the original. Graham described it later as "a vivid and terrify ing case for war." This 20-page, unqualified summary was presented to our senators and repre sentatives as the best information on Iraq's WMDs, and it was provided t o them one week before the vote on the use of force. The intelligence ma terial Congress had was what the administration was willing to give them , namely a promotional piece whose lies of omission outweighed what was included. The issue of why we went to war is moot We can all agree that a stable Iraq is the most desirable outcome, but th is is a separate issue from the question of why we went to war and how t he case for war was made. There is ample evidencein the DSM and elsewherethat the administration misrepresented the nature and extent of the threat posed by Saddams Ira q, that the case for war was built on this misrepresentation, and as a c onsequence many tens of thousands of people (Americans, Iraqis and other s) have lost their lives. Every time someone is killed or injured as a result of the ongoing violence in Iraq, it becomes morenot lessimporta nt that we understand why and how we went to war. We were misled, and t he people who misled us must be held accountable for their deception. Information that is now publicly available, such as the DSM, makes it at least possible that a crime may have been committed by the Bush administ ration. To say that the issue of why we invaded Iraq is irrelevant beca use its in the past is akin to saying that the specifics of Watergate b ecame irrelevant when Richard Nixon resigned. The information in the DSM is not news Much of the information contained in the DSM has been reported elsewhere, so in that sense it is perhaps not a smoking gun in itself. This, ho wever, does not diminish the importance of what the memo reveals. com the DSM and other leaked documents paint a damning portrait of an admini stration artificially pumping up its case for war while at the same time disingenuously asserting its desire to avoid it. The DSM is also highly credible, as it is the official record of the Prime Minister's meeting and not the more easily dismissed recollection of a former White House o fficial. What makes the DSM so vital from a news perspective is: The source short of a similar document on the US side, there isnt a much more credible source than the British Prime Minister and his senior s taff. The timing the fact that the meeting in question took place in July 20 02 illustrates just how early on Bush had made up his mind to remove Sa ddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of WMD and terr orism. The nutshell in a few sentences, the memo summarizes all of the key components of Bushs deception: that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States, that the US was willing to work with the UN on a d iplomatic solution, that war was a last resort, but if undertaken that the lega l basis for it was sound, and that the aftermath of an invasion, if necessary, would be managed responsibly. In the wake of belated media coverage of the DSM, mainstream media outlet s balked at the suggestion that they missed the story. Editorial pages w ere filled with claims that "everyone knew" the administration had made up its mind to go to war, even in the summer of 2002. If that was the ca se, one has to ask why no reporter ever challenged the President on the many occasions between July 2002 and the start of the invasion when he c laimed not to have come to a decision on war. The US media was at least uncritical and at worst overtly supportive of t he invasion; Americans knew the case for war was thin from the outset, but suppo rted the invasion anyway, and confirmed this by reelecting Bush in 2004. Let us assume for the moment that Americans had the benefit of a truly fa ir and balanced news media from which to gather information and form an opinion on the necessity of war. The DSM makes it clear that there were some things that the public did not know and could not have known (eg , the National Security Councils unwillingness to work with the UN). T here were other things too that were presented by the administration in such a distorted way as to render them useless to even the most engaged American citizen in forming an opinion on the necessity of war. The non-existent connection between Saddam and al Qaida, for example, was cited so many times by the administration that at the height of prewar hysteria, well over half of Americans polled believed Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attacks when in fact Iraq had nothing to do with them. Simi larly, claims about Iraqs WMD capability featured regular invocations o f mushroom clouds when there was in fact no evidence on which to base such claims--particularly in the area of nuclear weapons... |
| csua.org/u/ecp -> seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002686649_iraqdig16.html Print view Iraq Notebook Congress didn't see intelligence, report says WASHINGTON A new congressional report made public Thursday concluded th at President Bush and his inner circle had access to more intelligence a nd reviewed more sensitive material than what was shared with members of Congress when they gave Bush authority to wage war against Iraq. Democrats said the 14-page report contradicted Bush's contention that law makers had seen all the evidence before US troops invaded in March 200 3, stating that the president and a small number of advisers "have acces s to a far greater volume of intelligence and to more sensitive intellig ence information." The report does not cite examples of intelligence Bush reviewed that diff ered from what Congress saw. If such information is available, it would not be accessible to the report's authors. The Bush administration has r outinely denied Congress access to documents, arguing it would have a ch illing affect on deliberations. The report, however, concludes that the Bush administration has been more restrictive than its predecessors in s haring intelligence. The White House disputed both charges, noting that Congress often works d irectly with US intelligence agencies and is privy to an enormous amou nt of classified information. "In 2004 alone, intelligence agencies prov ided over 1,000 personal briefings and more than 4,000 intelligence prod ucts to the Congress," an administration official said. The report, done by the Congressional Research Service at the request of Sen. "Some of the most irresponsible comments about manipulating intelligence have come from politicians who saw the same intelligence I saw and then voted to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein," he said in a speech this week. Maria Cantwell, in Iraq to observe that country's histo ric elections, said her day began Thursday with an explosion outside the building where she was staying in Baghdad. advertising Cantwell said she was impressed by the conduct of the election, adding th at Americans and Iraqis alike are upbeat and hope the process will be a key step toward democracy. "I am concerned whether government here can stand on its own and take ove r more of the responsibility that the United States is bearing now and t hat 2006 is a year of transition," she said. Cantwell said she noticed a significant increase in security since her la st visit to Iraq in August 2003. Lawmakers have been wearing full flak j ackets and helmets since their arrival and expected to wear them through out the three-day visit, she said. Cantwell, who voted in favor of the resolution authorizing the war in 200 2 and has supported all measures to fund it, last month voted in favor o f a Democratic amendment calling for a gradual withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. Debra Harrison, 47, of Trenton, NJ, was arrested Thursday on charges she was part of a conspiracy to s teer Iraqi reconstruction contracts to a businessman in exchange for mon ey and gifts, including a Cadillac SUV. She is the second Army Reserve o fficer facing charges of conspiracy, money laundering and weapons violat ions while assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority office in Hil lah that awarded reconstruction contracts. Italy reduces force : Italian Defense Minister Antonio Martino said Thurs day the country will pull 300 more troops out of Iraq in January, contin uing a gradual withdrawal begun earlier this year. The reduction would b ring Italian troop levels in Iraq to 2,600. |
| csua.org/u/ecq -> www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/11/AR2005111101832.html More Analysis Asterisks Dot White House's Iraq Argument By Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writers Saturday, November 12, 2005; Page A01 President Bush and his national security adviser have answered critics of the Iraq war in recent days with a two-pronged argument: that Congress saw the same intelligence the administration did before the war, and tha t independent commissions have determined that the administration did no t misrepresent the intelligence. Proxmir e used to give an award each month acknowledging examples of government waste. The administration's overarching point is true: Intelligence agencies ove rwhelmingly believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction , and very few members of Congress from either party were skeptical abou t this belief before the war began in 2003. Indeed, top lawmakers in bot h parties were emphatic and certain in their public statements. But Bush and his aides had access to much more voluminous intelligence in formation than did lawmakers, who were dependent on the administration t o provide the material. And the commissions cited by officials, though c oncluding that the administration did not pressure intelligence analysts to change their conclusions, were not authorized to determine whether t he administration exaggerated or distorted those conclusions. National security adviser Stephen J Hadley, briefing reporters Thursday, countered "the notion that somehow this administration manipulated the intelligence." He said that "those people who have looked at that issue, some committees on the Hill in Congress, and also the Silberman-Robb Co mmission, have concluded it did not happen." But the only committee investigating the matter in Congress, the Senate S elect Committee on Intelligence, has not yet done its inquiry into wheth er officials mischaracterized intelligence by omitting caveats and disse nting opinions. And Judge Laurence H Silberman, chairman of Bush's comm ission on weapons of mass destruction, said in releasing his report on M arch 31, 2005: "Our executive order did not direct us to deal with the u se of intelligence by policymakers, and all of us were agreed that that was not part of our inquiry." Bush, in Pennsylvania yesterday, was more precise, but he still implied t hat it had been proved that the administration did not manipulate intell igence, saying that those who suggest the administration "manipulated th e intelligence" are "fully aware that a bipartisan Senate investigation found no evidence of political pressure to change the intelligence commu nity's judgments." In the same speech, Bush asserted that "more than 100 Democrats in the Ho use and the Senate, who had access to the same intelligence, voted to su pport removing Saddam Hussein from power." Giving a preview of Bush's sp eech, Hadley had said that "we all looked at the same intelligence." But Bush does not share his most sensitive intelligence, such as the Pres ident's Daily Brief, with lawmakers. Also, the National Intelligence Est imate summarizing the intelligence community's views about the threat fr om Iraq was given to Congress just days before the vote to authorize the use of force in that country. In addition, there were doubts within the intelligence community not incl uded in the NIE. And even the doubts expressed in the NIE could not be u sed publicly by members of Congress because the classified information h ad not been cleared for release. For example, the NIE view that Hussein would not use weapons of mass destruction against the United States or t urn them over to terrorists unless backed into a corner was cleared for public use only a day before the Senate vote. Congress was entit led to view the 92-page National Intelligence Estimate about Iraq before the October 2002 vote. But, as The Washington Post reported last year, no more than six senators and a handful of House members read beyond the five-page executive summary. Even within the Bush administration, not everybody consistently viewed Ir aq as what Hadley called "an enormous threat." In a news conference in F ebruary 2001 in Egypt, then-Secretary of State Colin L Powell said of t he economic sanctions against Hussein's Iraq: "Frankly, they have worked . He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapon s of mass destruction." Bush, in his speech Friday, said that "it is deeply irresponsible to rewr ite the history of how that war began." But in trying to set the record straight, he asserted: "When I made the decision to remove Saddam Hussei n from power, Congress approved it with strong bipartisan support." The October 2002 joint resolution authorized the use of force in Iraq, bu t it did not directly mention the removal of Hussein from power. The resolution voiced support for diplomatic efforts to enforce "all rele vant Security Council resolutions," and for using the armed forces to en force the resolutions and defend "against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." "Congress, in 1998, authorized, in fact, the use of force based on that intelligence," he said. "And, as yo u know, the Clinton administration took some action." But the 1998 legislation gave the president authority "to support efforts to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein" by providing assistance to Iraq i opposition groups, including arms, humanitarian aid and broadcasting f acilities. President Bill Clinton ordered four days of bombing of Iraqi weapons faci lities in 1998, under the 1991 resolution authorizing military force in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Describing that event in an inter view with CBS News yesterday, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: "We went to war in 1998 because of concerns about his weapons of mass de struction." |