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| 2005/12/9-11 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:40935 Activity:nil |
12/9 Someone posted this below. I read it for school but had forgotten it
until now. I think it's worth a repost on its own:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm
\- "if you liked the melian dialog" ...
you may also wish to read 1. the agricola [short]
2. the germania [short] 3. all of thucydides history of the pel
war [long] especially say the declaration against megara.
if you are really interested in the pel war, you can read
the D. Kagan series, but that is pretty tough going.
it begins with http://csua.org/u/e8j btw, D KAGAN is sort
of a crazy right wing loose canon. BTW, i'm not a normative
believer in might makes right. i list the mel dialog for aesthetic
reasons. for a framework about how to think about power and
the international system, see "theory of international politics"
by k.n. waltz. however "man the state and war" is really a
prerequisite to TIP ... both are very very good, but TIP is a little
hard to follow ... it is denser than you might think.
btw, the melian dialog has come up many times over the years
here. see /csua/lib/wall archive. --danh
\- "It was the business of a diplomat to cloak the interests of
this country in the language of universal justice."
--Minister Walewski to OBISMARCK |
| www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm Sixteenth Year of the War - The Melian Conference - Fate of Melos THE next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized t he suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the numb er of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbou ring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an expedition agai nst the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other island ers, and at first remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their terri tory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes , and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their territ ory with the above armament, before doing any harm to their land, sent e nvoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before the people, b ut bade them state the object of their mission to the magistrates and th e few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows: Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which woul d pass without refutation (for we know that this is the meaning of our b eing brought before the few), what if you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that before going any farther . And first tell us if this proposition of ours suits you. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this nego tiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to subm it, and in the contrary case, slavery. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, o r for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon th e facts that you see before you, we will give over; It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question in t his conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the discus sion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretence s- either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us- a nd make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did no t join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have do ne us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real s entiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the stro ng do what they canand the weak suffer what they must. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient- we speak as we are ob liged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest- that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privileg e of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass cur rent. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to m editate upon. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagon ist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here i n the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now goin g to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercis e that empire over you withouttrouble, and see you preserved for the goo d of us both. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule? Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suff ering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends inst ead of enemies, but allies of neither side. for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendsh ip will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power. Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have not hing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of t hem your own colonists, and some conquered rebels? As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the o ther, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rende ring it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling t he masters of the sea. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy whic h we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid makin g enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case from it that o ne day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make gre ater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it? Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but littl e alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking pre cautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most lik ely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your s ubjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before s ubmitting to your yoke. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal on e, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than y ou are. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit i s to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect. Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put thei r all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are rui ned; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are w eak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracl es, and other such inventions thatdelude men with hopes to their destruc tion. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficul ty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equ al. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, si nce we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in po wer will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaem... |
| csua.org/u/e8j -> www.amazon.com/gp/product/0801495563/qid=1134150328/sr=8-4/ref=pd_bbs_4/102-6017240-0588946?n=507846&s=books&v=glance Books Product Details * Paperback * Publisher: Cornell University Press; Reprint edition (March, 1989) * Language: English * ISBN: 0801495563 * Product Dimensions: 91 x 61 x 11 inches * Shipping Weight: 14 pounds. See all m y reviews It is difficult for me to describe the genius that lies behind Kagan's ma gisterial four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War. But the reason that you want thi s to be THE book you read about the Peloponnesian War is as follows: Kagan provides the single most compelling synthesis of the reasons the wa r took place together with a beautifully measured study of the participa nt's motivations. There follows a startlin gly lucid summary of the major points of view as published by other hist orians. At the conclusion you slap yourself on the knee and find yourself invariably saying, "Well, of COURSE, it's OBVIOUS". But, in point of fact, it isn't obvious at all - but Kagan makes it SEEM obvious. And for that he required, and exhibits, a truly astounding unde rstanding of human nature. I have seen it written that Kagan lapses into un-translated Latin, Greek and German. I went back to my copies to see if I could find examples of this - and was unable to find more than a handful (if one doesn't count the footnotes - and even there foreign languages are scarce). Kagan's principal thesis in this, the first of the four books, is that th e Peloponnesian war was NOT, contrary to Thucydides' opinion, inevitable , but was in fact avoidable up to the last moment. This thesis is develo ped with tremendous force of logic. My suggestion is that you have the Landmark Thucydides to hand - it has seemingly THOUSANDS of maps. But I also recommend the "Ba rrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World" -- a MUST for any person wi th a classical bent. I am not sure one needs to have read Thucydides - a s some have suggested. After all, Kagan's object is to write THE compreh ensive history of that event. But this clearly is a university level tex t I read the Landmark Thucydides first - though I am not sure I benefit ed from it. Kagan's understanding of this ancient conflict prepared him very nicely f or an extraordinary book, "On the Origins of War and the Preservations o f Peace." If ever there was a MUST READ book for our times, it is that o ne. In this book, Kagan develops a thesis on the origins of war and prov ides a trenchant recipe for the avoidance of war. Kagan has a truly inspired ability to draw factually apposite parallels between different periods, and in this account, as r ival nations spiral towards a cataclysmic conflict, one can't help think ing of pre-WW1 Europe and/or the post-WW2 Cold War. If the Sparta-Athens relationship was truly bipolar, however, peace might have prevailed: th e real trigger, or at least catalyst, to war was the provocation of the intermeddling third party, Corinth. Kagan not only relates the Thucydidi an chronology, he also interposes his own corrections and clarifications and, in the process, brings this tragic war to life for the modern read er. Unqualified Endorsement, April 2, 2004 Reviewer: If you have any interest in ancient history, do yourself a favor and read all four volumes of Kagan's four volume treatise on the Peloponessian W ar. His writing style gracefully combines detailed historical analysis with his own ideas on what the historical record leaves for our speculation. Having a copy of Thucydides handy will only add to the ex perience. Kagan's one volume version is good, but reading the four volum e series takes it to a level that any serious fan of ancient history wil l enjoy. See all my re views This book, and the other three in the series, are for serious readers onl y But presumably you know that, if you're reading this. it wouldn't hurt to read Xenophon' s Hellenica as well, not to mention all the extant plays of Aristophanes . Oh, and maybe a history or two on the Greco-Persian Wars. If you can do/have done all that, then these four volumes are a rare trea t I think Kagan is very clever. He writes sober, judicious history, but he does it in a very amiable, companionable way. You get the sense that one of your favorite professors from your college days has dropped by t o tell you a little story, one of those "little stories" that expands an d expands until you lose track of time and place, drawn into his web. I think Kagan wrote these books that way deliberately, with an eye toward a wider audience than the usual scholarly tome. Perhaps that engenders s ome snickering or sneering among the academic types. He certainly provides an exhaustive overview of the scholarship written up to the time these volumes were written, and he's always very clear to describe where he st ands in contrast to other scholars. How those scholars view him, and wha t scholarship has concluded since the publication of these books, remain unknown to me. My days of digging through scholarly journals and publications to find anything an d everything on a given topic are long behind me. These books are of the highest value strictly for their sheer entertainment value. If they are also of the highest sch loraly caliber, then so much the better. But to tell you the truth, I wo uldn't care if Kagan was a baldfaced liar. One ought to be familiar wit h the basic events of fifth century Greece before reading this book, and Kagan does tend to drop into Latin, Greek and German without bothering to translate for the reader. I would also recommend having an atlas of t he region, or at least one good map. Kagan's references to events someti mes presupposes a high degree of classical literacy, so I would not reco mmend this to a beginner. On the other hand, he is very inclusive of the major historians and heavily footnotes them, which enables the reader t o get a very good idea of what to read if he/she finds one topic of inte rest that needs expanding. Also, a basic knowledge of Greek wouldn't hur t the reader, but it is not necessary. Other books to read to prepare fo r this weighty volume might be the original texts in question (Thucydide s, Plutarch's Lives, etc) might be in order. Finally, Michael Grant's "T he Classical Greeks" is a far less detailed narrative on the century tha t is excellent for beginners. would make Thucydides proud, October 29, 1999 Reviewer: I am reviewing all 4 volumes in the series. Overall, an exceptionally tho rough and well researched work. The author's love of the subject matter is clearly evident. There is an assumption of reader familiarity with th e subject, and I would read the Landmark Thucydides and Plutarch's Lives (on the Athenians) befor tackling these books. The first volume suffers from a lack of maps, which the other books rectify, and I thought that more information at the end on the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War wa s needed. These criticisms however do not distract from my admiration of a monumental effort. I recommend these books to anyone interested in an cient Greece, or military/political history. Suggestion Box Your comments can help make our site better for everyone. If you've found something incorrect, broken, or frustrating on this page, let us know s o that we can improve it. Please note that we are unable to respond dire ctly to suggestions made via this form. |