tinyurl.com/d3s3q -> www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/11/06/the_realist_persuasion/?page=full
The Boston Globe The realist persuasion When it comes to war and peace, foreign policy ''realists'' from Metternichto Kissinger have been seen as cold-blooded, calculating, and amoral. But there's another realist tradition - a distinctively American one - and it'stime to revive it. By Andrew J Bacevich | November 6, 2005 BRENT SCOWCROFT, the ever-loyal and self-effacing national security advis er to President George H W Bush, made news late last month in the page s of The New Yorker, venting his profound disenchantment with the foreig n policies of his old boss's son, President George W Bush. The charge commonly lodged against realists like Scowcroft is that they disregard moral issues altogether. As a consequen ce, realism has long since acquired unsavory connotations, not only amon g liberals keen to alleviate the world's ills but also among neoconserva tives keen to liberate the oppressed. Critics on the left accuse realist s of being cramped, callous, and cynical. Those on the right see realism as little more than a pretext for isolationism. In fact, when it comes to moral issues, realism has gotten a bum rap. As the events of the post-Cold War era have reminded us, idealism-whether t he left liberal variant that emphasizes humanitarian interventionism or the neoconservative version that urges using American power to promote A merican values-provides no escape from the moral pitfalls of statecraft. Good intentions detached from prudential considerations can easily lead t o enormous mischief, both practical and moral. In Somalia, efforts to fe ed the starving culminated with besieged US forces gunning down women an d children. In Kosovo, protecting ethnic Albanians meant collaborating w ith terrorists and bombing downtown Belgrade. In Iraq, a high-minded cru sade to eradicate evil and spread freedom everywhere has yielded torture and prisoner abuse, thousands of noncombatant casualties, and something akin to chaos. Given this do-gooder record of achievement, realism just might deserve a second look. There is, to be sure, a self-consciously amoral Old World strain of reali sm, a line running from Metternich to Bismarck in the 19th century and b rought to these shores by Henry Kissinger. But there also exists a disti nctively American realist tradition that does not disdain moral consider ations. This homegrown variant, the handiwork of prominent 20th-century public intellectuals such as the historian Charles Beard, the diplomat G eorge Kennan, the journalist Walter Lippmann, and the theologian Reinhol d Niebuhr, provides a basis for seriously engaging the moral issues pose d by international politics. For Americans desirous of extricating the United States from the moral sw amp into which the Bush administration has wandered, this largely forgot ten American realist tradition that Scowcroft (and others) are trying to resurrect just might provide a useful map. To begin with, realists see politic s as a never-ending competition for power. The president of the United S tates may be the Most Powerful Man in the World, but he can no more chan ge the nature of politics than he can eradicate original sin. As a resul t, realists view ''world peace'' as a chimera. The statesman's obligation is to avoid cataclysm and to place lim its on the brutality to which humankind is prone. Not surprisingly, the realist prizes stability, recognizing that the alte rnative is likely to be chaos. This does not provide an excuse for inact ion and passivity in the face of distant evils. Rather it counsels modes ty of purpose and an acute sensitivity to the prospect of unintended con sequences. For realists, the notion that globalization (according to Bil l Clinton, channeling the neoliberal New York Times columnist Tom Friedm an) will produce global harmony or that American assertiveness (accordin g to George W Bush, channeling Bill Kristol, editor of the neoconservat ive Weekly Standard) will ''transform'' the Greater Middle East is pure folly. As a consequence, they understand that ''American exceptionalism'' is a snare. Among the principal combatants in that contest were three genuinel y odious criminal enterprises: the Third Reich, the Soviet Union, and Ma o's China. The United States came out on top because it allied itself wi th Stalin against Hitler and subsequently made common cause with Mao aga inst Stalin's successors. To pretend, as George W Bush does, that the United States differs from a ll other powers in history-that it acts apart from calculations of power and self-interest-gives Americans an excuse to avoid thinking seriously about the forces actually motivating US behavior. The role of oil in shaping US policy offers a case in point. To say that President Bush invaded Iraq for oil is to engage in a vast ov ersimplification. But absent the widely shared conviction that cheap gas is integral to the American Way of Life, the United States would never have stumbled into the Middle Eastern labyrinth in the first place, with the costs of the ongoing Iraqi quagmire merely representing the latest installment on a bill that will continue to grow. According to realists, a morally serious nation would address the actual as opposed to the ima gined sources of our predicament. Senior official s in Washington were no less certain than members of the Soviet Politbur o that they had unlocked history's secrets and could both divine and det ermine its future course. President Bush declares with equal fervor in his 2002 Nationa l Security Strategy that there exists ''a single sustainable model for n ational success'' and that the entire world is destined to embrace democ ratic capitalism. The point is not to equate the two views, but to note the extraordinary p resumption that underlies each. A realist would counsel against being qu ite so dogmatic in forecasting history's purpose. Just possibly-based on the record of the past couple millennia-surprises lie somewhere ahead. These realists appreciate that ''greatness'' is transitory. The history of Europe from 1914 to 1945 testifies to the ease with which a few arrogant and short-sighted statesmen can fritter away advantages acc umulated over centuries, with horrific consequences. Determined to husband power, realists cultivate a lively awareness of wha t power-especially military power-can and cannot do. But realists advocate using force as a last resort-h ence, the dismay with which they view the Bush doctrine of preventive wa r To the extent war can be purposeful, realists see its utility as almost e ntirely negative. Politically, it can redu ce, quell, eliminate, or intimidate. But to wage war in order to spread democracy, as President Bush says the United States is doing in Iraq, ma kes about as much sense as starting a forest fire to build a village: It only gets you so far, and the costs tend to be exorbitant. This means ensuring that a na tion's commitments don't outstrip its resources. Were he alive today, Lippmann would surely see the present administration as hellbent on bankruptcy. President Bush declared an open-ended war on terror without bothering to mobilize the nation or even to expand the s ize of the armed forces. The consequence: red ink, growing indebtedness to the rest of th e world, a badly overstretched military, and assurances that all will co me out well in the end. When policies go awry-as Mr Bush's Iraqi adventure surely has-realists r esist the tendency to look for scapegoats. In the midst of ''Plamegate,' ' the inclination is to blame the Iraq debacle on White House officials whose alleged lies enabled the president to put one over on an unsuspect ing people. Realists are not so willing to let the citizens of a democracy off the ho ok. In his ''Devil Theory of War,'' propounded in the late 1930s, Charle s Beard derided the commonly held view attributing the American penchant for war to the machinations of some conspiracy or cabal. Blaming everything on Bush won't prevent a recurrence of Bush's mistakes. A realist might suggest that Americans looking for someone to hold accountable begin by looking in the mirror. Andrew J Bacevich is a professor of international relations at Boston...
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