csua.berkeley.edu/ElectronicVoting.html
Virtually all of the computer scientists who have studied the problem are in agreement that the current generation of electronic voting machin es are vulnerable to many kinds of attacks, the most dangerous of which can reverse the results of hundreds of elections simultaneously and yet be totally undetectable, in spite of pre-election testing and post-elect ion auditing. On the surface it would appear that a com puterized election is a routine distributed computation in which the ele ctronic ballots cast by voters are collected on voting machines, transpo rted to a central server, and the results tabulated by a simple database script. The security, privacy, reliability, verifiability, and legal requirements for electronic voting are profoundly subtle and complex, ma king it among the richest and most fascinating security problems known. The requirements, for example, are much stronger than those for electron ic commerce. The depth of the problem arises from the subtle interplay o f security, privacy, and verifiability requirements for elections that h ave no analog in other applications, and from the vital requirement that elections be secure against insider attacks (by programmers and electio n officials) in addition to secure against voter misconduct. David Jefferson has been conducting research at the intersection of c omputers, the Internet, and public elections for over a decade. He is Ch air of the California Secretary of State's Voting Systems Technical Asse ssment and Advisory Board, which provides technical advice on the securi ty, privacy, and reliability of voting systems. He has also served on th e Voting Systems and Procedures Panel, which makes certification recomme ndations to the Secretary of State. In the spring of 2003 he was a member of the California Secretary of Stat e's Task Force on Touchscreen Voting, whose report eventually led to the requirement for a voter-verified paper trail in California. org), a strong critique of the Internet voting system proposed by the Department of Defense, which led to cancellation of the $22 million SERVE program. He has been frequently quoted on election security issues in the national and California press , including an interview on the CBS TV program "60 Minutes". Between 1999 and 2001 he served as chair of the technical committee of th e California Secretary of State's Task Force on Internet Voting, whose r eport was the first major study of the subject ever published. He went o n to serve that year on the National Science Foundation-Internet Policy Institute panel on Internet voting, and testified to the National Commis sion on Federal Election Reform organized by presidents Carter and Ford. He has also consulted with numerous agencies and states on the subject of voting security, including the FEC and the Department of Defense. Jefferson is a computer scientist at Lawrence Livermor e National Laboratory where he does research in supercomputing and scala ble parallel simulation.
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