www.d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_warfare.htm
Trust Fourth Generation Warfare March 23, 2005 It has been said that "fourth generation warfare" (4GW) includes all form s of conflict where the other side refuses to stand up and fight fair. Smart commanders throughout history, however, have tried to deceive, tr ick, and confuse their opponents. The answer begins by examining how 4GW literature uses the term, "generat ion." Specifically, it refers to the world since the mid-17th Century, w hen firearms began to dominate the battlefield and when nation-states be gan to exercise a legal monopoly on the use of armed force.
We appear to be returning to the situation that characterizes most of human experience, where both states and non-s tates wage war. In 4GW, at least one side is something other than a mil itary force organized and operating under the control of a national gove rnment, and one that also transcends national boundaries.
Th e word "generations," though, is just an analogy to help gain new insigh ts, and it is wise not to push it too far. One way to tell that 4GW is truly new is that we don't even have a name f or its participantstypically dismissing them as "terrorists," "extremis ts," or "thugs." Name calling, though, is not often an effective substitute for strategy. If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three distinct generations Third generation warfare was conceptually develop ed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918 Is it not about time for the fourth generation to appear?
But one can sympathize with our politica l and military leaders, because 4GW is a strange form of warfare, one wh ere military force plays a much smaller (though still critical) role tha n in earlier generations, supporting initiatives that are more political , diplomatic, and economic. As important as finding and destroying the actual combatants, for example , is drying up the bases of popular support that allow them to recruit f or, plan, and execute their attacks. Perhaps most odd of all, being see n as too successful militarily may create a backlash, making the opponen t's other elements of 4GW more effective.
first paper on the subject captured some of this s trangeness when they predicted: The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing p oint. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definabl e battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'milit ary' may disappear. However it develops, fourth generation warfare is real war. The aim of it s participants, as in all generations, is to impose change on its oppone nts. For a variety of reasons, sketched below and covered in detail in t he papers on this site, most of the techniques that will be used in 4GW played peripheral roles in earlier generations of warfare and undoubtedl y predate history itself. White Russian General Kornilov, 1917 We can't expect to get anywhere unless we resort to terrorism. Lenin, 1918 "Terrorism" (defined as seemingly gratuitous violence against civilians o r non-combatants) has been a part of all generations of war. Until recen tly, in fact, most wars killed many more civilians than military and not all of this was accidental - recall the Rape of Nanking, the London Bli tz, and the firebombing of Dresden. As 4GW blurs any distinction betwee n "military" and "civilian," we can expect more activities that the gene ral population will regard as terrorism. In other words, there may be m ore terrorism in 4GW, but it is not unique to nor defined by these attac ks. members of native forces will suddenly become innocent peasant worke rs when it suits their fancy and convenience. These highly irre gular practices have enabled groups that are weak, militarily, to defeat larger, stronger forces, and they have deep roots in the history of war . The word "guerilla" itself, for example, dates back nearly 200 years t o Napoleon's occupation of Spain. Until recently, however, such "special" operations more often harassed th an decided"sideshows" (as T E Lawrence once termed them) in wars foug ht mainly along 1st, 2nd, or 3rd generation lines. Examples could includ e operations by colonial militias and guerillas during the Revolutionary War, Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry raids, partisans during WWII, and the tactics practiced in the early stages of most "national liberation" wars in the 20th Century, including Vietnam. In all of these, conventi onal forces delivered the culminating blows.
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