en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War_of_Independence
Mouvement National Al grien, MNA) whose main supporters were Algerian workers in France. The FLN and MNA fought against each other in France and Algeria for nearly t he full duration of the conflict.
Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the "re storation of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, with in the framework of the principles of Islam."
National Assembly: "One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republi c The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have b een French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French Between the m and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession."
communists, who had made no move to cooperate in the uprising at the start, later tried to infiltrat e the FLN, but FLN leaders publicly repudiated the support of the party.
AUMA also threw the full weight of its prestige behin d the FLN. Bendjelloul and the prointegrationist moderates had already a bandoned their efforts to mediate between the French and the rebels.
ALN, the military wing of the FLN, subsequently wiped out the MNA guerrilla operation, and Messali Hadj's movement lost what little influence it had had in Algeria.
The FLN also established a strong organization in France to o ppose the MNA Merciless "caf wars," resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths, were waged in France between the two rebel groups throughout the years o f the War of Independence. On the political front, the FLN worked to persuade and to coerce the Algerian masses to support the aims of the independence movement. FLN-or iented labor unions, professional associations, and students' and women' s organizations were organized to rally diverse segments of the populati on.
Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from Martinique who became the FLN' s leading political theorist, provided a sophisticated intellectual just ification for the use of violence in achieving national liberation.
v igilante units, whose unauthorized activities were conducted with the pa ssive cooperation of police authorities, carried out ratonnades (literal ly, rat-hunts; synonymous with Arab-killings) against suspected FLN memb ers of the Muslim community. The colons demanded the proclamation of a s tate of emergency, the proscription of all groups advocating separation from France, and the imposition of capital punishment for politically mo tivated crimes. By 1955 effective political action groups within the colon community succ eeded in intimidating the governors general sent by Paris to resolve the conflict.
Constantine regi on, however, decided a drastic escalation was needed. The killing by the FLN and its supporters of 123 people, including old women and babies, s hocked Soustelle into calling for more repressive measures against the r ebels. The government claimed it killed 1,273 guerrillas in retaliation; according to the FLN, 12,000 Muslims perished in an orgy of bloodlettin g by the armed forces and police, as well as colon gangs. After Philippe ville, Soustelle declared sterner measures and an all-out war began. In 1956 demonstrations of French colonists forced the French government to abolish an idea of reform.
pieds-noirs, as hindering the work of his administrati on, and he undertook to rule Algeria by decree. He favored stepping up F rench military operations and granted the army exceptional police powers a concession of dubious legality under French law to deal with the mounting political violence. At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new ad ministrative structure that would give Algeria a degree of autonomy and a decentralized government. Although remaining an integral part of Franc e, Algeria was to be divided into five districts, each of which would ha ve a territorial assembly elected from a single slate of candidates.
In August/September 1956, the internal leadership of the FLN met to organ ize a formal policy-making body to synchronize the movement's political and military activities.
National Council of the Algerian Revolution ( Conseil National de la Rvolution Algrienne, CNRA), within which the fi ve-man Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (Comit de Coordination et d'Excution, CCE) formed the executive. The externals, including Ben Bella, knew the conference was taking place but by chance or design on the part of the internals were unable to attend. Meanwhile, in October 1956 Lacoste had the FLN external political leaders who were in Algeria at the time arrested and imprisoned for the duratio n of the war. This action caused the remaining rebel leaders to harden t heir stance.
Gamal Nasser's ma terial and political assistance to the FLN, which some French analysts b elieved was the most important element in sustaining continued rebel act ivity in Algeria.
During 1957 support for the FLN weakened as the breach between the intern als and externals widened. To halt the drift, the FLN expanded its execu tive committee to include Abbas, as well as imprisoned political leaders such as Ben Bella.
Albert Camus, being born in Algeria, tried unsucc essfully to persuade both sides to at least leave civilians alone. FLN c onsidered him a fool, most pieds-noirs considered him a traitor.
More than 30,000 were organized along conventional lines in external units that were stat ioned in Moroccan and Tunisian sanctuaries near the Algerian border, whe re they served primarily to divert some French manpower from the main th eaters of guerrilla activity to guard against infiltration.
estimates o f the numbers of internals range from 6,000 to more than 25,000, with th ousands of part-time irregulars. During 1956 and 1957, the ALN successfully applied hit-and-run tactics ac cording to the classic canons of guerrilla warfare. Specializing in ambu shes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French fi repower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments , police posts, and colon farms, mines, and factories, as well as transp ortation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken of f, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside. Kidnapp ing was commonplace, as were the ritual murder and mutilation of capture d French military, colons of both genders and every age, suspected colla borators, and traitors. At first, the revolutionary forces targeted only Muslim officials of the colonial regime; later, they coerced or killed even those civilians who simply refused to support them.
Although successful in engendering an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries' coercive tactic s suggested that they had not as yet inspired the bulk of the Muslim peo ple to revolt against French colonial rule.
In these places, the ALN established a simple but effective although frequently temporary military administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit manpower. Muslims all over the country also initia ted underground social, judicial, and civil organizations, gradually bui lding their own state. The loss of competent field commanders both on the battlefield and throug h defections and political purges created difficulties for the FLN. More over, power struggles in the early years of the war split leadership in the wilayat, particularly in the Aurs. Some officers created their own fiefdoms, using units under their command to settle old scores and engag e in private wars against military rivals within the ALN. Although ident ified and exploited by French intelligence, factionalism did not materia lly impair the overall effectiveness of ALN military operations. To increase international and domestic French attention to their struggle , the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cities and to call a nati onwide general strike.
The ALN carried out an average of 800 sho otings and bombings per month through the spring of 1957, resulting in m any civilian casualties and inviting a crushing response from the author ities. The 1957 general strike, timed to coincide with the UN debate on Algeria, was imposed on Muslim workers and businesses.
Jacq ues Massu, who wa...
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