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| 5/24 |
| 2005/6/14-15 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:38114 Activity:kinda low |
6/13 "Ministers were warned in July 2002 that Britain was committed to
taking part in an American-led invasion of Iraq and they had no
choice but to find a way of making it legal...The briefing paper,
for participants at a meeting of Blair's inner circle, said that
since regime change was illegal it was 'necessary to create the
conditions' which would make it legal."
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1650822,00.html
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/20050613/downing_street_ii.php
Sigh...Three guesses on how much coverage *this* will get in the
states. At least Blair is probably gonna get booted...
\_ FYI, I was confused by this article originally. I believe the
mentioned briefing paper refers to the /same meeting/ as the one
for the Downing Street memo. The memo just contains minutes for
that meeting.
The newly leaked material is a "UK eyes only" briefing paper for
that meeting.
that meeting. Also, here's the direct URL to the paper:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1648758,00.html
Note that the "victory condition" is given in point (2) ... I
think some of you are still fuzzy on what this is.
This part is true, the first sentence is hilarious though:
This part is true but hilarious though:
"In practice, much of the international community would find it
difficult to stand in the way of the determined course of the US
hegemon. However, the greater the international support, the greater
the prospects of success." |
| 5/24 |
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| www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1650822,00.html The Times and The Sunday Times electronic paper The Times and The Sunday Times electronic paper The Sunday Times - Britain June 12, 2005 Ministers were told of need for Gulf war excuse Michael Smith MINISTERS were warned in July 2002 that Britain was committed to taking p art in an American-led invasion of Iraq and they had no choice but to fi nd a way of making it legal. The warning, in a leaked Cabinet Office briefing paper, said Tony Blair h ad already agreed to back military action to get rid of Saddam Hussein a t a summit at the Texas ranch of President George W Bush three months ea rlier. The briefing paper, for participants at a meeting of Blairs inner circle on July 23, 2002, said that since regime change was illegal it was nec essary to create the conditions which would make it legal. This was required because, even if ministers decided Britain should not t ake part in an invasion, the American military would be using British ba ses. This would automatically make Britain complicit in any illegal US a ction. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Di ego Garcia, the briefing paper warned. This meant that issues of legali ty would arise virtually whatever option ministers choose with regard t o UK participation. The paper was circulated to those present at the meeting, among whom were Blair, Geoff Hoon, then defence secretary, Jack Straw, the foreign secr etary, and Sir Richard Dearlove, then chief of MI6 The full minutes of the meeting were published last month in The Sunday Times. The document said the only way the allies could justify military action w as to place Saddam Hussein in a position where he ignored or rejected a United Nations ultimatum ordering him to co-operate with the weapons ins pectors. It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Sadda m would reject, the document says. But if he accepted it and did not at tack the allies, they would be most unlikely to obtain the legal justi fication they needed. The suggestions that the allies use the UN to justify war contradicts cla ims by Blair and Bush, repeated during their Washington summit last week , that they turned to the UN in order to avoid having to go to war. The briefing paper is certain to add to the pressure, particularly on the American president, because of the damaging revelation that Bush and Bl air agreed on regime change in April 2002 and then looked for a way to j ustify it. There has been a growing storm of protest in America, created by last mon ths publication of the minutes in The Sunday Times. A host of citizens, including many internet bloggers, have demanded to know why the Downing Street memo (often shortened to the DSM on websites) has been largely ignored by the US mainstream media. The White House has declined to respond to a letter from 89 Democratic co ngressmen asking if it was true as Dearlove told the July meeting th at the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy in Wa shington. The Downing Street memo burst into the mainstream American media only las t week after it was raised at a joint Bush-Blair press conference, forci ng the prime minister to insist that the facts were not fixed in any sh ape or form at all. John Conyers, the Democratic congressman who drafted the letter to Bush, has now written to Dearlove asking him to say whether or not it was accu rate that he believed the intelligence was being fixed around the poli cy. He also asked the former MI6 chief precisely when Bush and Blair had agreed to invade Iraq and whether it is true they agreed to manufactur e the UN ultimatum in order to justify the war. He and other Democratic congressmen plan to hold their own inquiry this T hursday with witnesses including Joe Wilson, the American former ambassa dor who went to Niger to investigate claims that Iraq was seeking to buy uranium ore for its nuclear weapons programme. |
| www.tompaine.com/articles/20050613/downing_street_ii.php Opinions Downing Street II Ray McGovern June 13, 2005 Ray McGovern is a co-founder of the Truth Telling Coalition and of Vetera n Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. He had a 27-year career as a CI A analyst, and now works for Tell the Word, the publishing arm of the ec umenical Church of the Saviour in Washington, DC. Yesterday, London's Sunday Times published the text of another SECRET UK EYES ONLY briefing document prepared for senior British officials. July 21, 2002, two days before British intelligence chi ef Richard Dearlove gave Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top national security advisers a briefing based on discussions with American counterp arts in Washington. July 23, 2002, meeting, published by the Rupert Murdoch's Sunday Times on Ma y 1, 2005, included Dearlove's matter-of-fact report that President Geor ge W Bush had decided to bring about "regime change" in Iraq by militar y action; that the attack would be "justified by the conjunction of terr orism and WMD" (weapons of mass destruction); and that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." Creating Conditions At that meeting, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw noted that the evidence reg arding "weapons of mass destruction" was "thin." And British Attorney Ge neral Peter Goldsmith pointed out that "the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action." But Blair gave them the back of his hand, ordering them to "work on the assumption that the UK would t ake part in any military action." It is a safe bet that the British seemed a bunch of nervous Nellies in th e eyes of the hard-nosed "neoconservatives" running our policy toward Ir aq. The briefing paper of July 21 shows senior British officials preoccu pied with the question of how to fix it so the war would be legal. The p aper makes it clear that US military plans assumed, "as a minimum, the use of British bases on the islands of Cyprus and Diego Garcia." Even t his minimum gave rise to serious legal questions. The briefing paper of July 21, 2002, offers this clear picture of what th e British see as the US goal. "US military planning unambiguously ta kes as its objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by elimination of Iraqi WMD" But, alas, with the evidence of WMD "thin," and an invasion to bring about "regime change" illegal, the British foun d themselves between Iraq and a hard placeWashington. The document reek s not only of obsequiousness toward the United States, but also wonderme nt at Washington's policiesparticularly with respect to international l aw. US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the inter national community. but would be difficult to establish b ecause of, for example, the tests of immediacy and proportionality. In lay terms, that must mean that, absent any immediate threat, those who chose to invade and occupy Iraq anyway would flunk the "test of proport ionality." Grasping at straws, the document raises the possibility of de manding Iraqi acceptance of an unacceptably intrusive UN inspection re gime: It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Sadda m would reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access)... However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely t o achieve a legal base for military action by January 2003. The British, you see, knew that the summer months in Iraq are uncomfortab ly hot. Thus, January was the time they thought an invasion would have t o begin, or the attack would have to be put off until autumn. Nevert heless, this failed to provoke Saddam Hussein into the kind of reaction that could be used as an ostensible casus belli. Iraq wound up tolerating the strictest inspection regime in modern h istory. And when UN inspectors found Al Samoud missiles with a range g reater than that permitted, Saddam allowed them to be destroyed. One can visualize the British lawyers wringing their hands: Foiled again. Breaking The Laws Of War While the White House may have deemed British government lawyers lily-liv ered or perhaps "quaint," they were under a good deal of pressure from t he British military establishment, which wields more influence in the Br itish government than its domesticated Pentagon counterparts do in Washi ngton. To his credit, British Admiral Michael Boyce, chief of the defens e staff, demanded a straightforward, written opinion from the attorney g eneral that attacking Iraq would be lawful, before Boyce would put his t roops at risk of subsequent prosecution as war criminals. This put the bite on Attorney General Goldsmith who had long shared the d oubts of the legal establishment about the legality of starting a war wi thout unequivocal endorsement by the United Nations. After much equivoca tion, Goldsmith bowed to Blair and was asked to appear before the cabine t on March 17, 2003, two days before the war began. Goldsmith read a bri ef statement saying he now thought attacking Iraq was lawful, and Blair quickly moved the discussion on. The Briti sh attorney general reportedly confided to lawyer friends during Februar y and early March 2003 that he found himself in an "impossible" position , and wondered aloud if he should stay in the job. Admiral Boyce, upset that he was never shown Goldsmith's more equivocal a dvice to Blair prior to March 17, has now said that if British troops ar e brought to trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC), British mi nisters should be "brought into the frame as well." The London Observer asked Boyce if Blair and Goldsmith should be included. American forces, of course, do not have to worry about the ICC, since the Bush administration "unsigned" the signature that President Bill Clinto n had affixed to the treaty in December 2000. Nor have US government o fficials shown themselves to be sticklers about international law. In No vember 2003, Richard Perle, then a key leader of the Defense Policy Boar d and a principal intellectual author of the invasion of Iraq, left inte rnational lawyers astonished when he told a London audience, "I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right thing." The Evidence Strengthens When asked about the July 23, 2002, minutes at their press conference las t week in Washington, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair did a good job of obfuscatingenough to mislead our corporate press into the all-t oo-familiar he-said, she-said reporting. What went unnoticed was the fa ct that in the process, the two leaders unintentionally acknowledged the authenticity of the minutes, which read like a meeting of Mafioso. And these new British revelations have already strengthened the ca se against the Bush administration. The first paragraph of the Downing Street minutes of July 23, 2002, warns that they "should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know it s contents." In a democracy, we the people have a genuine need to know t he background of decisions on war and peaceso the source who leaked the minutes and other documents were performing a duty that can be seen as truly patriotic. And patriotic leaks can be done without revealing in formation that truly needs to be protected. |
| www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1648758,00.html The Times and The Sunday Times electronic paper The Times and The Sunday Times electronic paper The Sunday Times - World June 12, 2005 Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action The paper, produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002, is incomplete because the last page is missing. The following is a transcript rather than the original document in order to protect the source. PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES ONLY IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION (A Note by Officials) Summary Ministers are invited to: Note the latest position on US military planning and timescales for p ossible action. Agree that the objective of any military action should be a stable an d law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the intern ational community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or intern ational security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD Agree to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a rea listic political strategy, which includes identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein and creating the conditions necessary to justify governme nt military action, which might include an ultimatum for the return of U N weapons inspectors to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime Minister to President Bush ahead of the briefing of US military plans to the President on 4 August. Note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed F orces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the MO D should bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operation al Requirements under cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and the outcome of SR2002. Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabi net Office Chairmanship to consider the development of an information ca mpaign to be agreed with the US. Introduction 1 The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proce eding apace. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it. This is particul arly important for the UK because it is necessary to create the conditio ns in which we could legally support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support. This note sets the m out in a form which can be adapted for use with the US Government. Dep ending on US intentions, a decision in principle may be needed soon on w hether and in what form the UK takes part in military action. New ringtones Get the very latest ringtones for your mobile - choose from our large ran ge of pop, classical, TV and movie greats ......................................... The Sunday Times Enterprise Network Case studies, information, advice, events and exclusive offers for middle market businesses online ......................................... |