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| 2005/5/11-13 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:37638 Activity:moderate |
5/11 Told you it was the smoking gun:
http://csua.org/u/c0p (yahoo news)
\_ Well, the people decide if it's a smoking gun or not, but it did
appear on http://CNN.com's front page today:
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/11/britain.war.memo/index.html
If you ask me, Dubya et al. will just say they had two bi-partisan
committees (9/11 Commission and WMDs in Iraq Commission) say that
political pressure did not change analysts' intelligence judgments.
Sorry to be trite, but, Paula's getting away with it, why can't
Dubya?
\_ Where is the full text of the memo so I can decide for myself?
\_ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
Blair's people have not disavowed authenticity of the memo, and
have instead said it's "nothing new", and that the UK tried
hardest to go the diplomatic route.
Unfortunately, Saddam accepted the UN inspectors when asked,
and the U.S. kicked them out this time instead of Saddam kicking
out the inspectors.
and the U.S. kicked them out this time instead of Saddam.
Dubya's people told Dubya that Saddam definitely had WMDs and
that Blix wasn't going to find anything because Blix's people
were inept.
Dubya's people == The Stupid. Dubya == (no words are necessary)
\_ Check your history. Saddam Hussein never kicked out any
inspectors. Last time, they left of their own in advance of
Clinton's bombing campaign. It's interesting that otherwise
well-informed people seem to not know this. That's not meant
to be disrespect, BTW. I just think it's interesting.
-- ulysses
\_ "kicked them out" is a simple way of saying that in 1994
(or was it 1998?) Saddam simply made it impossible for them
to do their jobs and so they left.
\_ It is a bit more complicated than that. First, they left
in a huff because SH was not co-operating, then the UN
condemned SH, then SH let them back in, then he kicked them
out and Clinton threated SH, then SH let them back in
but did not co-operate, then Clinton pulled them out
and bombed Iraq in Desert Fox. IIRC. Shit, it turns out
to be even more convoluted than that:
http://csua.org/u/c12
But in any case, at least once, SH kicked the inspectors
out.
\_ See, this is exactly what I thought it was. It wasn't that
Bush had decided to go into Iraq. It was that Bush didn't
think anything other than military action would get Saddam to
disarm so given the ultimatum, he expected Saddam to reject
anything other than armed conflict. Smoking gun my ass.
\_ "C reported on his recent talks in Washington.
There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military
action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified
by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route,
and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the
Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion
in Washington of the aftermath after military
action."
The inspectors were on the ground. Saddam posed no
threat to us or his neighbors. Bush wanted this war
and he got it.
\_ You're a sick fuck. I wish there were ghosts so the 100k+
people who have died because of this man could twist your
soul in every last pit of hell.
\_ What 100k+? The number dead depends on your political
bias. http://csua.org/u/c10
\_ It wouldn't have to if we actually bothered to COUNT
THEM. Sick fucker.
\_ If the US kept count, then we'd be arguing over
the accuracy of the count. Whether you'd argue
for over- or under- counting depends on your
political bias, of course.
\_ How 'bout we just say "LOTS." I hope LOTS
of ghosts twist your soul in hell.
\_ How do you know it's "LOTS"? When is it
"LOTS" anyway? Isn't that subject to
interpretation depending on one's political
bias?
\_ How many would not be "LOTS"? You really
are an obnoxious little bastard.
\_ Exactly. It all depends on your
personal bias.
\_ No, I think you're an obnoxious
little bastard regardless of
personal bias.
\_ The Lancet is a medical journal, it does not have
a political bias. It is just reporting inconvenient
\_ HA HA HA HA HA!!
\_ Let me guess, you are one of those guys
who thinks evolution is an evil plan
to turn our children away from Christianity?
facts so the Neocons try and politicize them.
\_ Oh look, more oil-for-food scandal news! |
| 4/3 |
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| csua.org/u/c0p -> story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ep/20050506/en_bpiep/anewmemogateknightriddercoversleakedbritishdocumentthatdisputesbushclaimsoniraq That changed on Friday, when Knight Ridder circulated a lengthy report on the memo by Warren P Strobel and John Walcott. The memo was first disclosed earlier this week by the Sunday Times of Lon don. A White House official told Knight Ridder that the administration wouldn't comment on the leaked document. Did the Administration deliberately manipulate intelligence to deceive the American people about the strength of its case for war? The memo reports on a US visit by Richard Dearlove, then head of Britai n's MI-6 intelligence service. The visit took place while the Bush admin istration was declaring to Americans that no decision had been made to g o to war, Knight Ridder observed today. The MI-6 chief's account of his US visit was paraphrased this way: "The re was a perceptible shift in attitude. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. T here was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action." Strobel and Wolcott noted that the White House has repeatedly denied accu sations by top foreign officials that intelligence estimates were manipu lated. But they report that a former senior US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, called it "an absolutely accurate description of what tra nspired" during Dearlove's visit to Washington. Save up to 75% on a World Cruise Looking to travel the world at a great low rate? Check out our complete, up-to-date listing of discounts on cruises departing in the next 90 days. |
| www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/11/britain.war.memo/index.html WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Eighty-nine Democratic members of the US Congress l ast week sent President George W Bush a letter asking for explanation o f a secret British memo that said "intelligence and facts were being fix ed" to support the Iraq war in mid-2002 -- well before the president bro ught the issue to Congress for approval. The Times of London newspaper published the memo -- actually minutes of a high-level meeting on Iraq held July 23, 2002 -- on May 1 British officials did not dispute the document's authenticity, and Michae l Boyce, then Britain's Chief of Defense Staff, told the paper that Brit ain had not then made a decision to follow the United States to war, but it would have been "irresponsible" not to prepare for the possibility. The White House has not yet responded to queries about the congressional letter, which was released on May 6 The letter, initiated by Rep. John Conyers, ranking member of the House J udiciary Committee, said the memo "raises troubling new questions regard ing the legal justifications for the war as well as the integrity of you r own administration. "While various individuals have asserted this to be the case before, incl uding Paul O'Neill, former US Treasury Secretary, and Richard Clarke, a former National Security Council official, they have been previously d ismissed by your administration," the letter said. But, the letter said, when the document was leaked Prime Minister Tony Bl air's spokesman called it "nothing new." In addition to Blair, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Defense Secretary Geo ff Hoon, Attorney General Peter Goldsmith, MI6 chief Richard Dearlove an d others attended the meeting. A British official identified as "C" said that he had returned from a mee ting in Washington and that "military action was now seen as inevitable" by US officials. "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD But the intelligence and facts were be ing fixed around the policy. "The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publi shing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action." The memo further discussed the military options under consideration by th e United States, along with Britain's possible role. It quoted Hoon as saying the United States had not finalized a timeline, but that it would likely begin "30 days before the US congressional el ections," culminating with the actual attack in January 2003. "It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided," the memo said. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran." The British officials determined to push for an ultimatum for Saddam to a llow UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq to "help with the legal just ification for the use of force ... Britain's attorney general, Peter Goldsmith, advised the group that "the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action" and t wo of three possible legal bases -- self-defense and humanitarian interv ention -- could not be used. The third was a UN Security Council resolution, which Goldsmith said "w ould be difficult." Blair thought that "it would make a big difference politically and legall y if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors." "If the political context were right, people would support regime change, " the memo said. Later, the memo said, Blair would work to convince Bush that they should pursue the ultimatum with Saddam even though "many in the US did not t hink it worth going down the ultimatum route." |
| www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html The Times and The Sunday Times electronic paper The Times and The Sunday Times electronic paper The Sunday Times - Britain May 01, 2005 The secret Downing Street memo SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY DAVID MANNING From: Matthew Rycroft Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02 cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard W ilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally M organ, Alastair Campbell IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq . It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents. John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. The only way to overthr ow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried an d expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their n eighbours to line up with the US. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD But the intelligence and facts were being fixed ar ound the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthu siasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was li ttle discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfe ld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 ho ur) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait). Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 d ays with the air campaign beginning even earlier. The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involveme nt were: Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons. The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activ ity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressi onal elections. The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this w eek. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military act ion, even if the timing was not yet decided. Sadd am was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less t han that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This wou ld also help with the legal justification for the use of force. The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a leg al base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self -defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first an d second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of th ree years ago would be difficult. The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically a nd legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime chang e and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was produ cing the WMD There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whe ther we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space t o work. On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military p lan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ul timatum. John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in onl y when he thought the threat of military action was real. The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It woul d be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context t o Bush. Conclusions: We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any m ilitary action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we w ere considering a range of options. The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds coul d be spent in preparation for this operation. CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed milita ry campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week. The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam. He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countrie s in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states. John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence updat e We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consi der legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers. 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| csua.org/u/c12 -> www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=Iraq+disarmament+crisis+timeline+1997-2000&gwp=8&curtab=2222_1 Diane Seaman, enters the building through the back door and catches several men running out with suitcases. The suitcases contained log books for the creation of illegal bacteria and chemicals. The letterhead comes from the president's office and from the Special Security Office (SSO). Bill Clinton remarks "(Hussein's) regime threate ns the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal. Senate Democrats also passed Resolution 71, which urged President Clinton to "take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs." Ohio for an internationally televised "town hall" meeting on a possible war with Iraq. Angry audience members and protestors disrupt the meeting. Bucharest to meet with scientists who can provide missile guidance systems. UNSCOM learns of this event, but is never able to get this information to the UN Security Council. Kofi Annan of assisting Iraqi efforts at impeding UNSCOM's work. "Iraq is not disarming," Ritter said, and in a second statement, "Iraq retains the capability to launch a chemical strike." few hours before the attack began, 125 UN personnel were hurriedly evacuated from Baghdad to Bahrain, including inspectors from the UN Special Commission on Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency." In Resolution 1284, Iraq was once again ordered to allow inspections teams immediate and unconditional access to any weapons sites and facilities. |
| csua.org/u/c10 -> csua.org/u/index.html Shortcut This URL 7 Shortcuts are now Base 36 encoded to make them shorter. |
| CNN.com -> www.cnn.com/ About 250 prisoners freed from Abu Ghraib The United States today freed about 250 detainees from Abu Ghraib prison, site of alleged abuses that prompted global outrage and led to days of hearings on Capitol Hill. Today marks the first mass prisoner release since the abuse scandal broke several weeks ago. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had visited the prison Thursday. |