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| 11/23 |
| 2005/4/25-27 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:37355 Activity:moderate |
4/25 Duelfer's WMD report is now officially complete.
The only new stuff was addenda, the first one titled:
"Prewar Movement of WMD Material Out of Iraq"
ISG formed a working group to investigate the possibility of the
evacuation of WMD-related material from Iraq prior to the 2003 war.
... The declining security situation limited and finally halted this
investigation. ...
ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out
the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war. It
should be noted that no information from debriefing of Iraqis in
custody supports this possibility. ISG found no senior policy, program,
or intelligence officials who admitted any direct knowledge of such
movement of WMD. Indeed, they uniformly denied any knowledge of
residual WMD that could have been secreted to Syria.
Nevertheless, given the insular and compartmented nature of the Regime,
ISG analysts believed there was enough evidence to merit further
investigation. It is worth noting that even if ISG had been able to
fully examine all the leads it possessed, it is unlikely that
conclusive information would have been found. ...
Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was
unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria
took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of
limited WMD-related materials.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004
\_ Uhhhh... do I know you in person? If so, please call me. If not,
can we meet and talk in person? You have my email. Let's sit down
in a coffee shop or something, we can discuss this calmly -kchang
custody supports this possibility. ISG found no senior policy, program,
or intelligence officials who admitted any direct knowledge of such
movement of WMD. Indeed, they uniformly denied any knowledge of
residual WMD that could have been secreted to Syria.
Nevertheless, given the insular and compartmented nature of the Regime,
ISG analysts believed there was enough evidence to merit further
investigation. It is worth noting that even if ISG had been able to
fully examine all the leads it possessed, it is unlikely that
conclusive information would have been found. ...
Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was
unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria
took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of
limited WMD-related materials.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004
\_ still trying to justify Iraq War?
\_ no. -op
\_ So, now we're up to possible weapon related programs by proxies?
\_ well, if anything changed, the Intelligence Community is much
more confident saying "we're not sure, or probably not on WMDs"
rather than "NO DOUBT they got 'em!$!#52".
\_ I don't recall the intelligence community EVER saying that
Sadam had WMDs. I do remember Bush and a lot of politicians
acccusing Sadam without any reports to back them up, and with
several to contradict them.
\_ National Intelligence Estimate 2002
We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions
and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological
weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN
restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a
nuclear weapon during this decade. ...
Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its
chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program,
and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the
view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program. ...
Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This
Estimate
High Confidence:
...
- We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.
- Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological
weapons and missiles.
Moderate Confidence:
- Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient
material to make one but is likely to have a weapon by
2007 to 2009. (See INR alternative view, page 84)
Low Confidence:
...
"We were almost all wrong" - David Kay, Jan 2004 to Senate
\_ As I have said before, the only way that David Kay's
statement makes sense is if you redefine "we" in such
a way as to only include war supporters. Since most of
the planet opposed the war, it is not a very useful
statement. Remember, at least two CIA analysts quit
over what they saw as the politicizing of intelligence
information. We also now know that Wolfowitz and
Rumsfeld set up the Office of Special Projects to
do an end around the CIA.
\_ Yes, I agree that saying
"The 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMDs was almost all wrong.
The NIE contained the official collective judgment of
the Intelligence Community."
would have been much more accurate.
As for your remaining points, the bi-partisan
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of
the U.S. Regarding WMDs wrote:
"After a thorough review, the Commission found no
indication that the Intelligence Community distorted
the evidence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. What the intelligence professionals
told you about Saddam Hussein's programs was what
they believed. They were simply wrong."
-- Now, it could be that the bi-partisan Commission
is wrong, too. But why would I want to waste my time
arguing "Dubya LIED to us!" (which may be true, but
who's got the audio tapes?) with the 2002 NIE text
and Commission report as they are, when I can much
more easily argue incompetence at all levels of
government and lay down some facts:
56% of people polled mid-March this year STILL
thought Saddam had WMDs.
\_ Go ahead and believe the Washington whitewash
if you like. Read Sy Hersh's take on the whole
thing. He has more integrity than all eight of
thing. He has more integrity than all ten of
those politicians who signed that bogus report:
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?031027fa_fact
\_ Please note that I made no comment about
my confidence in various elements of the
bi-partisan Commission report.
My point is how you slam home the undeniables
to the average Joe's.
My point is that your approach is not very
persuasive to those who can be persuaded.
\_ No, you are misreading the PIPA report. Only
56% of Bush supporters believed that. Not
56% of all Americans. Unless are reading
the results of a different poll perhaps?
\_ http://csua.org/u/bv7 (CBS News)
\_ http://csua.org/u/bv7 (CBS News Jan 2005)
\_ http://csua.org/u/bdm (Post/ABC Mar 13 2005)
56% of ALL Americans. The greatest tragedy
of Dubya's presidency is he has NOT been
loud and clear about what happened to the
primary reason he took the U.S. to war.
Dubya continues to let this misperception
linger among the majority of Americans, and
his people DAMN WELL KNOW ABOUT IT.
\_ If you can't dazzle 'em with brilliance,
baffle 'em with bullshit. |
| 11/23 |
|
| www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004 -> www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/ Reports Page Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqs WMD 30 September 2004 This report relays the findings of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The files comprising the PDF edition of this 1,000-page report are extrem ely large and, in practice, available only to visitors who have a broadb and connection. The HTML edition is available to all, regardless of conn ection speed. |
| www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?031027fa_fact HERSH How conflicts between the Bush Administration and the intelligence community marred the reporting on Iraqs weapons. Issue of 2003-10-27 Posted 2003-10-20 Since midsummer, the Senate Intelligence Committee has been attempting to solve the biggest mystery of the Iraq war: the disparity between the Bush Administrations prewar assessment of Iraqs weapons of mass destruction and what has actually been discovered. The committee is concentrating on the last ten years worth of reports by the CIA Preliminary findings, one intelligence official told me, are disquieting. The intelligence community made all kinds of errors and handled things sloppily, he said. The problems range from a lack of quality control to different agencies reporting contradictory assessments at the same time. One finding, the official went on, was that the intelligence reports about Iraq provided by the United Nations inspection teams and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitored Iraqs nuclear-weapons programs, were far more accurate than the CIA estimates. Some of the old-timers in the community are appalled by how bad the analysis was, the official said. If you look at them side by side, CIA versus United Nations, the United States agencies come out ahead across the board. In addition, there were widespread doubts about the efficacy of the United States inspection teams, whose operations in Iraq were repeatedly challenged and disrupted by Saddam Hussein. Iraq was thought to have manufactured at least six thousand more chemical weapons than the United States could account for. And yet, as some former United States inspectors often predicted, the tons of chemical and biological weapons that the American public was led to expect have thus far proved illusory. As long as that remains the case, one question will be asked more and more insistently: How did the American intelligence community get it so wrong? Part of the answer lies in decisions made early in the Bush Administration, before the events of September 11, 2001. In interviews with present and former intelligence officials, I was told that some senior Administration people, soon after coming to power, had bypassed the governments customary procedures for vetting intelligence. A retired CIA officer described for me some of the questions that would normally arise in vetting: Does dramatic information turned up by an overseas spy square with his access, or does it exceed his plausible reach? The vetting process is especially important when one is dealing with foreign-agent reportssensitive intelligence that can trigger profound policy decisions. In theory, no request for action should be taken directly to higher authoritiesa process known as stovepipingwithout the information on which it is based having been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. The point is not that the President and his senior aides were consciously lying. What was taking place was much more systematicand potentially just as troublesome. They created stovepipes to get the information they wanted directly to the top leadership. Their position is that the professional bureaucracy is deliberately and maliciously keeping information from them. They always had information to back up their public claims, but it was often very bad information, Pollack continued. They were forcing the intelligence community to defend its good information and good analysis so aggressively that the intelligence analysts didnt have the time or the energy to go after the bad information. The Administration eventually got its way, a former CIA official said. The analysts at the CIA were beaten down defending their assessments. And they blame George Tenetthe CIA directorfor not protecting them. A few months after George Bush took office, Greg Thielmann, an expert on disarmament with the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research, or INR, was assigned to be the daily intelligence liaison to John Bolton, the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, who is a prominent conservative. Thielmann understood that his posting had been mandated by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who thought that every important State Department bureau should be assigned a daily intelligence officer. Bolton was the guy with whom I had to do business, Thielmann said. We were going to provide him with all the information he was entitled to see. Thats what being a professional intelligence officer is all about. But, Thielmann told me, Bolton seemed to be troubled because INR was not telling him what he wanted to hear. Thielmann soon found himself shut out of Boltons early-morning staff meetings. I was intercepted at the door of his office and told, The Under-Secretary doesnt need you to attend this meeting anymore. When Thielmann protested that he was there to provide intelligence input, the aide said, The Under-Secretary wants to keep this in the family. Eventually, Thielmann said, Bolton demanded that he and his staff have direct electronic access to sensitive intelligence, such as foreign-agent reports and electronic intercepts. In previous Administrations, such data had been made available to under-secretaries only after it was analyzed, usually in the specially secured offices of INR. The whole point of the intelligence system in place, according to Thielmann, was to prevent raw intelligence from getting to people who would be misled. Bolton, however, wanted his aides to receive and assign intelligence analyses and assessments using the raw data. In essence, the under-secretary would be running his own intelligence operation, without any guidance or support. He surrounded himself with a hand-chosen group of loyalists, and found a way to get CIA information directly, Thielmann said. In a subsequent interview, Bolton acknowledged that he had changed the procedures for handling intelligence, in an effort to extend the scope of the classified materials available to his office. I found that there was lots of stuff that I wasnt getting and that the INR analysts werent including, he told me. Bolton told me that he wanted to reach out to the intelligence community but that Thielmann had invited himself to his daily staff meetings. There was no place for INR or anyone elsethe Human Resources Bureau or the Office of Foreign Buildings. There was also a change in procedure at the Pentagon under Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Douglas Feith, the Under-Secretary for Policy. In the early summer of 2001, a career official assigned to a Pentagon planning office undertook a routine evaluation of the assumption, adopted by Wolfowitz and Feith, that the Iraqi National Congress, an exile group headed by Ahmad Chalabi, could play a major role in a coup dtat to oust Saddam Hussein. They also assumed that Chalabi, after the coup, would be welcomed by Iraqis as a hero. An official familiar with the evaluation described how it subjected that scenario to the principle of what planners call branches and sequelsthat is, plan for what you expect not to happen. Whats Plan B if you discover that Chalabi and his boys dont have it in them to accomplish the overthrow? When the official asked about the analysis, he was told by a colleague that the new Pentagon leadership wanted to focus not on what could go wrong but on what would go right. He was told that the studys exploration of options amounted to planning for failure. Their methodology was analogous to tossing a coin five times and assuming that it would always come up heads, the official told me. Getting rid of Saddam Hussein and his regime had been a priority for Wolfowitz and others in and around the Administration since the end of the first Gulf War. For years, Iraq hawks had seen a coup led by Chalabi as the best means of achieving that goal. After September 11th, however, and the militarys quick victory in Afghanistan, the notion of a coup gave way to the idea of an American invasion. Khidhir Hamza, an Iraqi defector, who declared that Saddam Hussein, in response to the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reactor, near Baghdad, had ordered future nuclear facilities to be dispersed at four hundred sites across the nation. Eve... |
| csua.org/u/bv7 -> www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/17/opinion/polls/main681342.shtml There was strong support for the war in 2003, but in the past year opinion has sh ifted toward the view that that the US should have stayed out of Iraq. In sharp contrast to opinion two years ago, Americans today disapprove of George W Bushs handling of the situation in Iraq. approval dropped to 34 percent last May While approval is higher now, it remains below 50 percent. Iraqs elections improved perceptions of how the President is handling Ira q, and how US efforts are going there, although not to the levels seen in 2003. Most Americans think the military action may yet fulfill one o f its purposes and bring stability and democracy to that country, though they believe it will take at least a few more years to do so. SUPPORT FOR THE WAR In the most recent CBS News/New York Times Poll, released earlier this mo nth, 50 percent of Americans said the US should have stayed out of Ira q, while 46 percent thought the US did the right thing in taking milit ary action. As the war began, Americans overwhelmingly approved of US action against Iraq; Support remained high, especially after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003. and coalition casualties and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal c ame to light, support for the war waned. By July 2004, 45 percent though t the action in Iraq was the right thing to do -- the lowest level of su pport since March 2003. Most Republicans say it was the right thing to do, an d most Democrats say the US should have stayed out. As has often been the case in the past year, men are a bit more likely than women to say t he action was the right thing to do. THE PRESIDENT AND THE WAR Today fewer than half the public approves of President Bushs handling of the war with Iraq, but his approval rating has increased five points sin ce Iraq held its election January 30. Forty-five percent now approve of Bushs handling of Iraq, while 50 percent disapprove. The President won high approval ratings for his handling of the conflict during the major combat phase of the war, with a high of 79 percent appr oval in April 2003 after the fall of Baghdad. But at the end of the summ er of 2003, as US troops continued to take casualties even after the P resident declared that major combat had ended, more Americans began to d isapprove of the Presidents handling of the situation. There was a brief surge following the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, but mor e Americans have disapproved of Bushs handing of the war since March 200 4 In May 2004, only 34 percent approved. Since th at election in January, Americans have become more positive about US e fforts. In a CBS News/New York Times poll out earlier this month, 53 per cent of Americans said things were going well for the US in Iraq -- th e highest number in our polls since shortly after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003. Before Iraqs election, Americans' outlook had been much more dire: in January, 57 percent said US efforts in Iraq we re going badly, as majorities had since April 2004. There were high points in Americans assessment of US efforts in Iraq. I n May 2003, shortly after major combat was declared over, seven in 10 Am ericans thought things in Iraq were going well. And after the capture of Saddam Hussein, 65 percent said things were going well. Most Americans -- 55 percent -- say Iraq will become a democracy but that the process will take longer than two years , while just 9 percent thought Iraq would become a democratic country wi thin two years. And a sizeable number -- 34 percent -- say Iraq will pro bably never become a stable democracy. In the most recent CBS News/New York Times Poll, 55 percent said US . troops should remain in Iraq as long as that takes, but four in 10 tho ught US troops should leave Iraq as soon as possible. In the spring of 2004, when fighti ng in Iraq was intense and abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib became publi c, American opinion was different. In May 2004, just 38 percent thought US troops should remain in Iraq until it was stable -- the lowest numb er to date. Fifty-five percent said US troops should leave Iraq as soo n as possible. Yet many Americ ans remain convinced that Iraq either has, or did have, the weapons that were never uncovered. In January, 56 percent of Americans said they tho ught Iraq probably did have weapons of mass destruction that the US si mply could not find. While still a majority, this is a significant drop from the 81 percent who, shortly after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 , believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. THINK IRAQ HAD WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Probably did Jan. Just 19 percent said the terror threat against the US had decrease d Few Americans have thought the terror threat had decreased because of the Iraq War, and more have said it had increased. However, that percentage is much lower now than it was during the early phases of the war. THREAT OF TERRORISM AGAINST US AS A RESULT OF IRAQ WAR Increased Jan. In a news conference, President Bush called Iraq's parliamentary meet ing a victory for democracy. Kimberly Dozier reports from the ground in Iraq that it isn't a total win for the West. |
| csua.org/u/bdm -> www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/polltrend_031405.html Washington Post-ABC News Poll: Social Security/Iraq Tuesday, March 15, 2005 This Washington Post-ABC News poll was conducted by telephone March 10 - 13, 2005, among 1,001 randomly selected adults nationwide. Margin of sam pling error for overall results is plus or minus three percentage points . a Social Security 35 56 9 b The situation in Iraq 39 57 4 c The economy 43 55 2 d The US campaign against terrorism 59 38 3 e Health care 44 48 8 *Half sample answered b-c, other half answered d-e. Economy/ Health Social Something No Terrorism Iraq jobs care Security else opin. If changes are not made, do you think the Social Security system is heading for a crisis down the road, or not? a Increasing the Social Security tax rate 32 64 4 b Collecting Social Security taxes on all the money a worker earns, rather than taxing only up to the first $90,000 of annual income 56 40 4 c Raising the retirement age to receive full Social Security benefits to 68, instead of the current 67 33 66 2 d Further reducing the benefits paid to people who retire early. For instance, people who retire at age 62 would get 63% of their full benefits, rather than the current 70% 36 62 2 e (HALF SAMPLE) Changing the way Social Security benefits are calculated so that benefits increase at a slower rate than they would under the current formula 37 57 6 f (HALF SAMPLE) Reducing guaranteed benefits for future retirees 20 75 5 9g. Would you support or oppose a plan in which people who chose to could invest some of their Social Security contributions in the stock market? Who do you trust to do a better job handling Social Security, (Bush) or (the Democrats in Congress)? On another subject, all in all, considering the costs to the United S tates versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war wit h Iraq was worth fighting, or not? Again thinking about the goals versus the costs of the war, so far in your opinion has there been an acceptable or unacceptable number of US . Acceptable Unacceptable No opinion 3/13/05 27 70 3 12/19/04 27 70 3 6/20/04 29 71 1 4/18/04 33 65 2 1/18/04 34 62 4 12/21/03 37 60 4 11/16/03 33 64 3 10/29/03 35 62 3 10/13/03 37 60 3 9/13/03 43 55 2 9/7/03 38 57 5 8/11/03 42 53 5 7/10/03 44 52 3 6/22/03 51 44 5 4/9/03 66 28 6 4/3/03 62 32 5 3/27/03 58 34 9 13a. Does Does not No opinion 3/13/04 42 57 2 5/23/04 40 58 2 5/6/04 38 57 5 4/18/04 45 53 2 3/7/04 43 53 3 12/21/03 48 47 5 10/13/03 42 53 5 9/13/03 42 55 2 8/26/03* 44 54 2 *Gallup. Do you think the war with Iraq has or has not contributed to the long -term security of the United States? IF YES: Has it contributed to the l ong-term security of the United States a great deal, or somewhat? Do you think the number of US military forces in Iraq should be (in creased), (decreased), or kept about the same? Kept about No Increased Decreased the same opinion 3/13/05 15 44 37 4 16. Withdrawn Decreased but not No immediately withdrawn immediately opinion 3/13/05 27 72 1 17. Do you think the United States (has gotten bogged down in Iraq), or d o you think the United States (is making good progress in Iraq)? Has gotten Is making No bogged down good progress opinion 3/13/05 54 43 4 10/3/04 LV 58 38 4 9/26/04 LV 59 37 4 RV 60 36 4 9/8/04 RV 54 40 6 5/23/04 65 33 2 5/6/04 60 35 5 4/18/04 59 41 0 18. Do you think the war in Iraq has left the United States in a stronger position in the world, a weaker position, or hasn't it made much differ ence to the US position in the world? No No Stronger Weaker difference opinion 3/13/05 28 41 30 1 4/18/04 29 35 36 0 4/9/03* 52 12 31 5 Persian Gulf War: 3/4/91 84 3 13 1 *4/9/03 and previous: "Do you think the war will leave the United States" 19. Considering everything, do you think most of the Iraqi people support or oppose what the United States is trying to do in Iraq? No No Better Worse difference opinion 3/13/05 67 25 4 4 20b. No No Better Worse difference opinion 3/13/05 74 18 4 4 21a. Did Did not No opinion 3/13/05 61 36 3 1/16/05* 57 39 4 *"Do you think holding these elections will or will not bring" 22. As a result of the war, do you think the chances that democracy will spread in the Middle East are better, worse or unchanged? Before the war, do you think Iraq did or did not provide direct suppo rt to the Al Qaeda terrorist group? IF YES: (Is that your suspicion only ), or (do you think there's been solid evidence of that)? Provided Not provided No support support opinion 1/28/03 68 17 15 24. Shortly before the war, do you think Iraq did have weapons of mass de struction that have not been found, or do you think Iraq did not have an y weapons of mass destruction? Did have weapons Did not have weapons No opinion 3/13/05 56 40 4 Compare to: Do you think Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction that have not been found, or do you think Iraq did not have any weapons of mass destructio n? Did have weapons Did not have weapons No opinion 2/11/04 61 33 5 25. In making its case for war with Iraq, do you think the Bush administr ation (told the American public what it believed to be true), or (intent ionally misled the American public)? Told the American public Intentionally misled No what it believed to be true the American public opin. Do you think the US experience in Iraq will make the Bush administr ation more likely or less likely to use military force to resolve disput es with other countries, or don't you think it has made a difference? Considering everything, do you think the United States did the right thing in going to war with Iraq or do you think it was a mistake? On another subject: For each country I name, please tell me whether y ou think it does or does not pose a threat to the United States. IF YES: Would you say it's a serious threat, or not serious? Compare to: Do you think Iraq does or does not pose a threat to the Unite d States? |