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| 5/25 |
| 2005/3/31-4/1 [Politics/Domestic/President/Bush, Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:36994 Activity:high |
3/31 "We conclude that the intelligence community was dead wrong in almost
all of its prewar judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction"
-Bi-partisan Commision on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
U.S. Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, in letter to Pres. Bush
\_ What fucking difference does it make? "The world is better
without Saddam", no shit!
\_ I wonder if this will significantly change the 56% of those polled
in mid-March that still think Saddam had WMDs.
\_ That would require people actually paying attention.
\_ you misspelled "with brains".
\_ You don't need brains. All you need are conservative
talk show hosts talking about how "EVERYBODY was wrong"
how Dubya ain't a liar, EVERYBODY thought Saddam had
them. Instead, they're all talking about a vegetable,
but that's life, uh, the culture of life.
\_ "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no
doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of
the most lethal weapons ever devised. ... The United States and
other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we
will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward
tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of
horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be
removed. ... Recognizing the threat to our country, the United
States Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to support the use
of force against Iraq." Pres. Bush, 3/17/03
\_ "The commission said it was ``not authorized to investigate
how policy makers used the intelligence assessments.''"
I thought that's what this one was supposed to be...
\_ Nonono ... they were authorized to investigate whether policy
makers PRESSURED the intelligence analysts / agencies while the
intelligence was being analyzed.
If you were right, then Condi "centrifugue tube" Rice would be
out as the moronic Stanford Provost that she was.
\_ Listening to NPR's freshair made me really depressed
to hear how many morons are in the State Department and how
good they are at squashing people who actually come up with
good ideas. Damn depressing.
\_ I told you so. -motd thought leader
\_ So it was for oil right? Yeah prices are at record lows.
So it was a distraction right? Yeah Iran is going to nuke Israel
A narrow vision
\_ It was to assert America's military strength, and change US
policy to one of aggressive intervention, per PNAC. -tom
\_ which is yet more proof that republican men have bad
sex lifes and take it out elsewhere just like the famous
quote from Good Morning Vietnam ... The world would be a
safer place if there was alot more sex (and the condoms to go
with it)
\_ say WHAT? tom holub is a hard core left wing socialistic
dweeb and he's not getting any.
\_ wrong, kchang. -tom
\_ Tom does seem to take the MotD awfully seriously.
Tom, do insults here keep you up at night?
\_ No, but yermom does.
\_ It is not George's fault he trusted the most important decision
of his life to a guy code named "Curveball."
http://csua.org/u/bjl |
| 5/25 |
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| csua.org/u/bjl -> story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=584&e=2&u=/nm/20050331/pl_nm/security_usa_curveball_dc Iraq war, the Bus h administration relied on bogus intelligence from a mysterious Iraqi ch emical engineer code-named "Curveball," whose dramatic tips about mobile germ labs made their way to top policymakers with little vetting. Reuters Photo In its final report issued on Thursday, the presidential commission that investigated intelligence failures in Iraq cast Curveball as the "pivota l" source behind the intelligence community's escalating warnings about Iraq's biological weapons programs before the invasion. The intelligence commission, in its report, said it found no evidence tha t Bush, Cheney and other administration officials put political pressure on intelligence analysts to skew any of their judgments about Iraq's we apons programs. CIA for fail ing to raise these doubts, which emerged after the October 2002 intellig ence estimate was published but before Powell's speech at the UN Only in May 2004, more than a year after the invasion, did the CIA formal ly deem Curveball's reporting "fabricated." The commission blamed the breakdown on Defense Department intelligence "c ollectors" for abdicating their responsibility to vet a critical source. The commission also accused CIA analysts of placing "undue emphasis" on C urveball's information "because the tales he told were consistent with w hat they already believed." But ultimately, the commission said, blame rests with US intelligence c hiefs for failing to tell White House policymakers about Curveball's "fl aws" in the weeks before the war. The commission said Curveball was not the only bad source the intelligenc e community relied upon. Another asylum seeker reporting through Defense channels provided one rep ort in June 2001 that Iraq had transportable facilities for the producti on of biological weapons. Another source on the mobile labs was brought to the attention of the Def ense Intelligence Agency by Washington-based representatives of the Iraq i National Congress. The CIA's Directorate of Operations later judged hi m to be "a fabricator." Republication or r edistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the pri or written consent of Reuters. Reuters shall not be liable for any error s or delays in the content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon . |