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| 5/24 |
| 2005/2/28-3/1 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:36460 Activity:high |
2/28 Hey, where's "GOOG is way overpriced at 100, they will tank when
shares are unlocked in February" guy? -tom
\_ Brilliant troll. Welcome to the dark side. -troll
\_ GOOG is below it's November high. Hasn't done much lately.
Check out stocks like BHP, RIO, PBR.
\_ "Hasn't done much lately"? It is up 80% in less than a year.
\_ yea, but the last time there's a big debate about it
was when it's around 200. Now it's 187.
\_ Wrong about the timing. Correct in the end. You will see.
\_ Well gee, then, Mr. Prognosticator, when should we start
shorting Google to make back the enormous sums we would have
lost if we'd listened to your advice in the first place? -tom
\_ If you had shorted when I said (after February) there's
a good chance you are actually ahead at the moment.
Addendum: Buy LEAPs now for 2006, especially on a run-up.
\_ The puts or the calls?
\_ The WMDs were destroyed just before the invasion, buried in the
desert, or shipped to Iran or Syria. You will see.
\_ Yes, ilya.
\_ That wasn't me, but yeah, I agree. Did you also think
insurgency wasn't funded and operated from Syria? -- ilyas
\_ Hey have you seen this:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html
"While a small number of old, abandoned chemical
munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq
unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons
stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications
that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions
thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad's
desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered
ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD
be discovered."
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/transmittal.html
"From the evidence available through the actions and
statements of a range of Iraqis, it seems clear that the
guiding theme for WMD was to sustain the intellectual
capacity achieved over so many years at such a great
cost and to be in a position to produce again with as
short a lead time as possible - within the vital
constraint that no action should threaten the prime
objective of ending international sanctions and
constraints."
\_ I responded to this, but some idiot deleted it and
I don't care enough to write another reply. -- ilyas
\_ You had written "Hussein would have nothing to
gain by doing so". Obviously, you think the
ISG-provided reason for destroying WMDs is BS.
\_ Yeah, I do. -- ilyas
\_ You should read these:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html#sect1
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxG.html
\_ The CIA is trying to make GWB look foolish.
\_ "We were almost all wrong, and I certainly include
myself here." -David Kay, first ISG head
\_ Yeah, that is the Administration line. It
conveniently forgets the 15M who protested
the war worldwide.
\_ Trying to predict the stock market is stupid. Nobody does this
consistently, which means at the end of the day a few people
get lucky. I think the statistic was that 90% of day traders lost
money over the long haul. It is especially stupid to try to
predict how one particular stock will perform a short period
of time. So, Tom, it's not time for you to gloat, but perhaps
time for you to dump.
\_ I'm not gloating; I don't own GOOG and I never have. From the
start, I was just pointing out the fallacies of the dweebs
predicting it would crash and burn. -tom
\_ Well, the problem with your post is that you can't predict
whether a single company will crash and burn or not,
especially so close on the heals of Enron and WorldCom.
So if a person were to predict that a company will crash
and burn they are no more or less right than if you
predicted that it would NOT crash and burn. The fallacy
here isn't that people predicted that the company will
crash and burn, the fallacy here is that anyone attempted
to predict anything at all.
The correct method of "prediction" would be to assign it
percentages, but under the terms of probability just because
you have a higher probability of being right or wrong
doesn't mean that you are actually right or wrong. Therefore
your belief that GOOG wouldn't crash and burn is no more or
less valid than other people's belief that it will. The
only thing that really is valid is that your belief probably
has a higher chance of being right than others, at least in
my opinion.
\_ The fallacies were in logic, not in conclusion. I
happen to disagree with the conclusion also, but that
was not my point. -tom
\_ If you think they are fallacies, then why not?
\_ This sentence makes no sense.
\_ Dubya-speak universal translator engaged:
"If you think GOOG won't crash, why not buy some?"
\_ GOOG is too young a company to realistically
value; comparing its value with YHOO (which people
were doing at the time) makes no sense at all.
I prefer to buy more mature companies, so I didn't
buy GOOG. It's on my watch list, and I will buy
some if the valuation is established enough to
be clear. -tom
\_ Google is at what people think it will be worth. Yahoo is
at what it is actually worth. The two companies are about
the same. Google is not worth that much more than Yahoo,
but their stock prices says otherwise. We'll see. -none of
the above poster.
\_ Their stock price says they are worth about the same: GOOG $51B,
YHOO $44B. -tom
\_ YHOO has PE 56, GOOG has PE 130. Any reasons why I should buy
GOOG instead of YHOO?
\_ Google has a much higher growth rate.
\_ Google maps is completely awesome.
\_ Yup. Or try searching for movie: anything, then playing
around.
\_ Are you saying this sarcastically? I didn't know they had
a map and I just tried it with firefox and it sucked shit,
the image won't even come up. Come on.
\_ Works for me. Sounds like you're blaming them for your
incompetence.
\_ You couldn't get <DEAD>maps.google.com<DEAD> to work? Under
Firefox? Not only does it work for me under firefox,
it works on Mozilla 1.6 on Linux. And no, I wasn't be
sarcastic, Google maps is seriously a great product.
\_ IE works, java on my firefox is broken. damn.
\_ Wow, it is nice! -pp
\_ I had too much security on my firefox java script, after
I enabled all the checkboxes, it works.
\_ Wow! Now I know why I also have this problem. After
I enabled only the "Change images" box, it works.
Thanks! -- !pp
\_ It looks similar to microsoft street and trips, is it the same?
\_ I just tried it. It looks cool, but it doesn't have the turn-
by-turn map like in Yahoo which is sometimes useful.
\_ Yes it does. Try clicking on the numbers next to each
direction step.
\_ I see. Is there an easy way to print out the turns?
\_ When all is said and done, there are more than a few people who
shorted GOOG. But for the stock to fall, there needs to be a real
reason. The key is Google ads. As spiffy as GOOG is, you need to
follow the money. As far as they can pull in the cash, they're
gonna do fine. The shorters are going to have to wait for a while. |
| 5/24 |
|
| www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html Iraq's WMD Contents Report Title: Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on I raq's WMD, 30 September 2004 Iraqs Chemical Warfare Program By God, spare us your evil. Key Findings Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanction s were lifted and conditions were judged favorable: * Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enem ys superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once alreadyduring the Iran-Iraq warand contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been disco vered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemic al weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Bag hdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG a ttributes to Baghdads desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffe ctual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered. IraqsCW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the m id-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civil ian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provi ded Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base. The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduc t a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the d ecline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf wa r and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorou s and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemica ls, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-related efforts. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraqs infrastructure, which would have enhanced Iraqs ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system. Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that en hanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had no t fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pr e-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Oper ation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and making-do with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items. In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor t he location and use of all existing dual-use process equipment. This pro vided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribe d activities, if required by the Regime. Iraqs historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization c hallenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW agent wh en the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have significantly jeopardized its chan ces of having sanctions lifted or no longer enforced if the UN or foreig n entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization activ ities. The available evidence is insufficient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of activities. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of weaponization activities. Saddams Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught t o all Iraqi officers and included the concept of a red-line or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever included a trigger for CW use. We believe these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions. Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have be en highly compartmentalized within the Regime. ISG found no credible evi dence that any field elements knew about plans for CW use during Operati on Iraqi Freedom. ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maint ained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intellig ence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an idea l, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-s cale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin. Interviews with key IIS officials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS activities in this area. ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possibl e movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, interviews , available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausi ble explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, w ere believed to be CW-related. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed. Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program Over a period of twenty years, beginning with a laboratory operated by th e intelligence services, Iraq was able to begin and successfully underta ke an offensive CW program which helped ensure the Regimes internal and external security. By 1984, Iraq was operating a number of CW agent prod uction plants, producing hundreds of tons of a range of weaponized agent s annually, for use against external and internal enemies of the Regime. The program was supported by a complex web of international procurement , R&D, weaponization and indigenous precursor production efforts. Iraq f ired or dropped over 100,000 chemical munitions against Iranian forces a nd its own Kurdish population during the Iran-Iraq war and then later to help put down the Shia rebellion in March 1991. Iraq again used CW successfully to help crush the popular revolt in 1991. It also had produced 50 nerve agent warheads for the 650 km-range al Husayn missile. Even when Iraq claimed to have complied with UNSCR 687 and its successors, Saddam retained components vital to restarting a CW program. Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separa te foldout and in tabular form at the back of Volume I Covering the per iod from 1980-2003, the timeline shows specific events bearing on the Re gimes efforts in the BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms and the ir chronological relationship with political and military developments t hat had direct bearing on the Regimes policy choices. Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion of each volume of te xt, we have also included foldout summary charts that relate inflection pointscritical turning points in the Regimes WMD policymakingto particul ar events/initiatives/decisions the Regime took with respect to specific WMD programs. Inflection points are marked in the margins of the body o f the text with a gray triangle. The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation Iraqs interest in CW began in the early 1960s and escalated in response t o a perceived threat from Iran and Israel to comprehensive CW research p rogram by the mid-1970s. The Regime initially sent a number of Iraqi off icers abroad for training in nuclear, biological and chemical defense. T hese officers later formed the nucleus of the Iraqi Chemical Corp... |
| www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/transmittal.html Iraq has endured decades of collapsing hopes and accumulati ng tragedy. It is numbing to consider the waste of so much human and res ource potential. Saddams ambitions conflicted with the region and the in ternational community. True to his name, he too often chose confrontatio n over cooperation. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were an integral element in the range o f tools Saddam drew upon to advance his ambitions. Therefore, to examine meaningfully WMD in Iraq means examining the leadership of Iraq concomitantly. The Iraq experience with WMD stretches over 30 years and three wars. Thou sands of victims died on battlefields, and civilians have been gassed in domestic terror campaigns. War and sanctions have ground civil society down to rudimentary levels. The most talented of Iraq have faced excruci ating dilemmasto comply with the Regimes directions or risk careers, the ir lives, and the lives of loved ones. Chronic, systemic fear on the par t of the best and the brightest was a feature of the intellectual elite. The international community has struggled with the Regime. Various attemp ts to coerce, co-opt, placate, or ignore Iraq produced confusion and inc onstancy. It is understandable that Saddam may not have understood where international forces were headed. Indeed, the international communitys focus on Iraq and WMD was affected by serendipity as well as considered national policies. Had the events of 11 September 2001 not occurred, Sad dam might well be still in power. But, he deeply miscalculated one last time and curtailed his own leadership. Saddam, his family, and cronies rose, enriched themselves, became corrupt , combusted, and collapsed. Saddams huge commitment to weapons technolog y consumed the best and brightest and led them to nothing but destructio n The Fertile Crescent was turned into a land filled with risk and chao s In many ways the arms inspectors have merely been leading the way in exploring the decay that Iraq became, and, indeed the corrupt systems th at grew parasitically on Iraq as it decayed. The goal of this report is to provide facts and meaning concerning the Regimes experience with WMD It aims to prov ide a dynamic analysis rather than simple static accounting of the debri s found following Operation Iraqi Freedom. The report will put into cont ext the WMD activities of the Regime and the trends and directions of th e Regime with respect to WMD Artificially separating the WMD from the R egime would not provide a synthetic picture. Such a picture would seem t o be more instructive than a simple frozen inventory of the program remn ants at one point in time. Readers will draw their own conclusions about various national and intern ational actions and policies. This report will, hopefully, allow a more complete examination of these events by showing the dynamics involved wi thin the Regime and where it was headed as well as the status of the WMD on the ground in 2003. The events surrounding Iraqi WMD have caused too much turmoil to be reduced to simple binary discussions of whether weap ons existed at one moment in time versus another. They deserve at least an attempt to look at the dynamics rather than a description of a single frame of a movie. It will seek to force broader and deep er understanding from multiple perspectives over time. This report will also attempt to broaden understanding by recalibrating t he perspective of the reader. The Regime was run by Saddam and the calcu lations he made concerning WMD were based on his view of relevant relate d factorsnot ours. Optimally, we would remove the reader temporarily fro m his reality and time. We would collect the flow of images, sounds, fee lings, and events that passed into Saddams mind and project them as with a Zeiss Planetarium projection instrument. The reader would see the Uni verse from Saddams point in space. Events would flow by the reader as th ey flowed by Saddam. Ideally, the reader would see what Saddam sawnot our television pictures of him. Saddam saw adulation in a crowd cheering him when he fired a rif le over their headsnot what we Westerners may see as a guy in a funny ha t recklessly firing a weapon. Imagine Saddams window to the outside worl d limited to television reports regularly reporting the statements by th e President of the United States about him. Imagine Saddams view of the fear/hate/confidence/idolatry in the eyes of his chosen ministers and wonder if what they were saying was true or wha t they were not saying. How did he see the reports of uprisings tentativ ely offered to him by underlings filled with fear. The reader could see how various moves and pressures are either advancing or delaying greater achievement. The reader could see the dubious quality of the data prese nted directly and through the reports of underlings. However, this report will provide the reader a handrail to grasp in the form of a time line that will also se rve as a constant reminder of contemporaneous events that filled the fie ld of Saddams view. The objective throughout this, perhaps unusual prese ntation, is to emphasize that WMD is always part and parcel of something else. The timeline is a tool to collect significant events as they flow ed past Saddam. Examining this flow shows inflection points where fundam ental decisions were made concerning WMD These will be addressed in det ail since they are moments when factors determining the course selected by Saddam can be illuminated with some degree of confidence. Complicating understanding and analysis of the former Regimes WMD is the tendency to bring our own assumptions a nd logic to the examination of the evidence. Like the operating system of our computers, we have log ic and assumptions that are virtually built in. We have been applying th em successfully so long in our own frame of reference that we forget the y are present and shape our thinking and conclusions. When considering t he very different system that existed under the government of Saddam Hus sein, there is a risk of not seeing the meaning and not seeing the impli cations of the evidence. Analysts were asked to look for something they may notexpect or be able t o see. A challenge like that faced by scientists engaged in the search f or extraterrestrial intelligence. They have to consider what evidence th ey might see that they could not recognize. They cannot expect to detect radio transmissions like ours. Likewise, analysts here should not expec t to find extensive government documents or parliamentary records reflec ting Saddams decisions on WMD The Regime simply did not operate that wa y An obvious corollary is that not finding such documents is not meanin gful one way or the other. The former Regime was Sadda m, and he was the one person who made important decisions. It was his as sessment of the utility of various policy options that was determinant. It was Saddams calculations of risk and timing that mattered. A corollary to this is that the relevance and importance of his top advis ors and ministers is also very different from that of similarly titled f unctionaries in other countries. The testimony of such individuals is in teresting, but must be understood for what it is in the Iraqi context. T hese individuals had a role and existence vastly different than in other countries. Those around Saddam knew their future depended on their ability to divine what he wanted and to be able to respond favorably to his requests. Tho se who survived knew how to relate in this environment. This meant that they were often forced to anticipate what Saddam wanted because they did not want to be in a position to have to say no. Complicating their lives was the tendency of Saddam to hold his cards clo se while he allowed minions to debate. Saddam did not lead by espousing detailed goals and objectives. He tended to allow ideas to float up and he would consider themoften never pronouncing on them one way or the oth er. This meant that much guidance to the government was implicit rather than explicit. For investigators, a consequence is that forensic evidenc e of Presidential direction may not exist, but it does not mean that suc... |
| www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html#sect1 Iraq's WMD Contents Report Title: Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on I raq's WMD, 30 September 2004 Iraqs Chemical Warfare Program By God, spare us your evil. Key Findings Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanction s were lifted and conditions were judged favorable: * Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enem ys superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once alreadyduring the Iran-Iraq warand contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been disco vered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemic al weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Bag hdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG a ttributes to Baghdads desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffe ctual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered. IraqsCW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the m id-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civil ian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provi ded Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base. The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduc t a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the d ecline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf wa r and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorou s and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemica ls, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-related efforts. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraqs infrastructure, which would have enhanced Iraqs ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system. Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that en hanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had no t fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pr e-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Oper ation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and making-do with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned items. In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor t he location and use of all existing dual-use process equipment. This pro vided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribe d activities, if required by the Regime. Iraqs historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization c hallenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW agent wh en the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have significantly jeopardized its chan ces of having sanctions lifted or no longer enforced if the UN or foreig n entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization activ ities. The available evidence is insufficient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of activities. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of weaponization activities. Saddams Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught t o all Iraqi officers and included the concept of a red-line or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever included a trigger for CW use. We believe these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions. Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have be en highly compartmentalized within the Regime. ISG found no credible evi dence that any field elements knew about plans for CW use during Operati on Iraqi Freedom. ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maint ained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intellig ence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an idea l, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-s cale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin. Interviews with key IIS officials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS activities in this area. ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possibl e movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, interviews , available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausi ble explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, w ere believed to be CW-related. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed. Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program Over a period of twenty years, beginning with a laboratory operated by th e intelligence services, Iraq was able to begin and successfully underta ke an offensive CW program which helped ensure the Regimes internal and external security. By 1984, Iraq was operating a number of CW agent prod uction plants, producing hundreds of tons of a range of weaponized agent s annually, for use against external and internal enemies of the Regime. The program was supported by a complex web of international procurement , R&D, weaponization and indigenous precursor production efforts. Iraq f ired or dropped over 100,000 chemical munitions against Iranian forces a nd its own Kurdish population during the Iran-Iraq war and then later to help put down the Shia rebellion in March 1991. Iraq again used CW successfully to help crush the popular revolt in 1991. It also had produced 50 nerve agent warheads for the 650 km-range al Husayn missile. Even when Iraq claimed to have complied with UNSCR 687 and its successors, Saddam retained components vital to restarting a CW program. Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separa te foldout and in tabular form at the back of Volume I Covering the per iod from 1980-2003, the timeline shows specific events bearing on the Re gimes efforts in the BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms and the ir chronological relationship with political and military developments t hat had direct bearing on the Regimes policy choices. Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion of each volume of te xt, we have also included foldout summary charts that relate inflection pointscritical turning points in the Regimes WMD policymakingto particul ar events/initiatives/decisions the Regime took with respect to specific WMD programs. Inflection points are marked in the margins of the body o f the text with a gray triangle. The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation Iraqs interest in CW began in the early 1960s and escalated in response t o a perceived threat from Iran and Israel to comprehensive CW research p rogram by the mid-1970s. The Regime initially sent a number of Iraqi off icers abroad for training in nuclear, biological and chemical defense. T hese officers later formed the nucleus of the Iraqi Chemical Corp... |
| www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxG.html Since OIF, we have c onducted numerous interviews of senior regime officials and military off icers in an effort to confirm whether Iraq had weaponized CW ready to us e or whether there was a red line concept that would have triggered a CW attack. We believe that there was indeed a red line defense for Baghdad, but it w as a simple multi-ring conventional defense that quickly broke down unde r Coalition assault, and not the coordinated, prepared plan depicted in prewar intelligence reporting. Prior to OIF, historical reports describe Iraqi plans for defensive use o f CW to disrupt or halt the advance of enemy troops and to disrupt enemy staging areas before their attack. During the run-up to OIF, the Intelligence Community received additional information pointing to a red line around Baghdad that, if crossed by Co alition forces, would trigger an Iraqi CW attack. One of the four field commanders was Kamal Mustafa, the Republican Guard Secretary. The battalion was reportedly equipped with CW shells, including mustard and unidentified binary agents, and was commanded by Col. Origin of the Red LineThe Sandhurst Approach Information acquired from various military sources and documents indicate s that Iraq developed a defense doctrine that included a directive to de fend to the last by all means necessary once Coalition forces approached a red line. Sources report that Saddams Leadership Defense Plan was bas ed upon a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi Officers, but we have no t found evidence that the plan explicitly included a trigger for CW use. The fundamental principles are based upon concentric defensive perimeters or layered defensive lines. Advancing forces would meet the heaviest resistance here, and it was the final staging area. Reporting indicates that the multiline defense was attempted by some Iraq i forces defending against Coalition advances during OIF, with poor resu lts: * The 34th Infantry Division used the method in defending the Khanaquin Border Crossinghowever, Coalition forces moved so rapidly and so many Iraqi soldiers deserted that the situation quickly became chaotic, and the notion of falling back to a stabilized line or lines was impossible. Late 2002Early 2003: Struggling To Generate a High-Level Defense Strategy Available evidence indicates that the Iraqi Pre-OIF defense strategy evol ved over a rather short time, from mid-2002 through the end of that year , and transitioned to the level of detailed tactical planning only short ly before OIF (see Chapter 1, Regime Strategic Intent). High-Level Discussions Began in Earnest Only in Mid-2002 on a Regime Defe nse Plan. Starting in mid-2002 through OIF, the Intelligence Community r eceived reporting that the Iraqi regime intended to use CW if Coalition forces invaded Iraq or threatened Baghdad. Iraqs layered defense plan re portedly included the use of chemical weapons once Coalition forces cros sed the defensive red line. Discussions about the deployment of WMD repo rtedly took place at various military levels, according to multiple repo rts. Rewards were reportedly provided to those scientists who came up with ideas for using WMD to thwart any potential US attack on Iraq. Reportedly both before and after OIF, planning an Iraqi defense strategy against Coalition forces underwent several stages. An initial plan appea rs to have been delivered by December 2002 and most likely underwent rev isions until OIF. Defense plans were posited on three defensive lines, with the third and final line including Baghdad and its suburbs. Conventional training had been intensified by senior command, but there had been no increase in CBW training programs. Typical defensive chemical protection clothing and related materiel were provided, as were defensive chemical-warfare-related procedures. Interrogations with several Iraqi division-level officers after OIF confi rm that Saddams Defense Plan was based upon a layered defense doctrine. The innermost circle of defense was referred to as the red line. The last line of this defensive plan was considered the red line, but, according to the officer, CW was not part of the defensive strategy because Saddam had indicated in a meeting that he had none. LTG Al-Rawi has eluded capture, and we have not been able to corroborate this information or confirm this meeting. Salih Ibrahim Hammadi Al-S almanihead of the Baghdad division of the Republican Guard during OIFindicated that all Iraqi forces were given a preestablished red line to defend. Consistent with Sandhurst teachings, the red lines were established by HQ and were the final defensive fallback position where troops were to fight with the strongest resistance. By April, the regime was nearing its end, and the discussions it had were no longer useful: * Latif Nusayyif Al-Jasim Al-Duriformer member of the RCC and Deputy Se cretary of the Baath Military Bureauindicated that at the last meeting he attended with Saddam and leading military and political figures in April 2003, Saddam was still asking what kind of weapons preparations were accomplished and if any more were needed. Other attendees regarded this as the farewell meetings rather than a planning meeting. Tariq Aziz also substantiated the fact that the last meeting with Saddam still did not include in-depth tactical discussion or presentation. Figure 3 denotes Former Staff General Salih al-Salmanis impression of the red-line doctrine for the defense of Baghdad (the graphic provides a n approximation of the layered defense structure). Figure 2 on the previous page in denoting the layered defense and red line. Flag-Level OpinionNo Knowledge of CW Plans, but Conventional Wisdom Expects It At the same time as policymakers at the Presidential level were trying to generate a plan for defense against the Coalition, generals and high le vel defense officials believed that a plan for CW use existed, even thou gh they themselves knew nothing about the details. Several high-ranking Iraqi military officials claimed CW was not part of an organized Iraqi Defense Plan but kept open the possibility that discu ssions took place in closed venues at higher levels. This suggests that Iraqi conventional wisdom agreed that CW was part of a secret plan, even in the absence of direct evidence: * A major contributor to the Iraqi Defense Plan, former Defense Ministe r Sultan Hashem Ahmad Al-Tai, was captured by Coalition forces in September 2003. The Minister asserts that at no time was WMD discussed in strategy meetings to lay out an Iraq Defense Plan but does not rule out the possibility that discussions ensued at higher levels. Hashem also noted the large number of people who were shocked when Saddam announced in December 2002 in an open forum that Iraq did not possess WMD * After OIF, the commander of the Iraqi militarys chemical corps, Gen. Amar Husayn al-Samarrai informed the US that Iraqi leaders had intended to concentrate their forces around the critical cities of Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Tikrit, with each city surrounded by several defensive layers. Samarrai was not aware of any offensive strategy to use CW against Coalition forces but indicated his job was to make sure the Iraqi military was fully equipped to handle a coalition chemical attack. He contends the bombing in late March 2003 resulted in the inability to prepare chemical weapons immediately against Coalition forces. Investigation Into Nontraditional CW UseThe Fedayeen Saddam Traditional tactics in the deployment of CW would have been under the con trol of Saddam and Qusay Husayn with the SSO and RG delivering and deplo ying the munitions either by missile (with heavy MIC assistance), mortar , or artillery. However, ISG also investigated whether there was any evi dence of CW use planned by the two most skilled groups in unconventional /nontraditional tactics and methods, the Saddam Fedayeen and the IIS, sp ecifically the special operations elements of M14 cooperating with M16 t echnical experts. There are no indications from the limited intelligence available that Fed ayeen doctrine included the use of CW if a red line was breached. There is some evidence to indicate that Uday wanted... |