www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200411100848.asp
November 10, 2004, 8:48 am The Trouble with Roe The Specter controversy is not about abortion. A firestorm engulfs Senator Arlen Specter's bid to become chairman of the powerful Senate Judiciary Committee, the place where judicial nominatio ns have gone to die a politicized death ever since the venomous brawl ov er Judge Robert H Bork in 1987 and with more regularity since the fil ibuster made its unprecedented appearance as the grim reaper during Pres ident Bush's first term. The storm is ignited, however, by two wary flan ks of the wrong divide.
Click Here For 30 years, the nation has been torn asunder by abortion. It is, by now , almost quaint to observe that people of good will and great intellect find themselves on both sides of the question of when life begins at w hat point it becomes our obligation as a society to acknowledge its sanc tity, to accord it, however defenseless it may be, the protection for "l ife" explicitly reserved in the US Constitution, and venerated in both American tradition and natural law. But of course, abortion has been a hotly disputed issue for far longer th an that. What has made the last three decades different is not abortion as such. What changed, with the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 decision i n Roe v Wade was the popular perception of republican democracy itself. It is not abortion but rather this transcendent issue of self-determina tion of who, finally, will govern the American people that is the co re of the controversy roiling the Senate judiciary committee as well as the confirmation process. No doubt, to have become "Roe" a term now no less familiar and freighte d than "Vietnam" or "New Deal" in conjuring a historical sea change th e case had to be about abortion. Still, the United States would be an in calculably healthier place today had it involved flag-burning or bigamy or some other brouhaha that excites partisan passions but not so much so that it towers above its terrain, the tree that loses the forest. It is at the epicenter of a generation's turbulent fault lines, pitting social duty against individual autonomy, the religious against the secular, ethical convention against emergent s exual freedom, and science against itself as technology both extended vi ability and became ever more creative about ending or altering it. Tragically, though, all this has hopelessly obscured what is most critica l about Roe: constitutional governance. Abortion aside, Roe is about whe ther the American people should decide for themselves, democratically, h ow they will live their lives, or whether they should submit to robe-cla d philosopher kings. To understand this requires recognition of two very simple (I would argue , unassailable) premises. First, the US Constitution, in whose ultimat e interpretation the Supreme Court has been thought dispositive since it claimed that power in 1803 (Marbury v Madison), simply does not, and w as never intended to, provide a definitive, substantive answer to every question or even most questions confronting our society. Because where the Constitution provides an answer, the will of the people, expressed through debate and election s, is trumped. The people can change the outcome only by amending the Co nstitution. Since the Constitu tion does not answer every question, there is necessarily some undefined expanse of life's matters as to which people can reasonably debate whet her the Constitution does or does not prescribe an outcome. Now, if we w ere ruled by physical force, might would determine right the ability t o project raw power would dictate results. Legal License The profession of lawyering involves a nigh-infinite elasticity, colloqui ally referred to as "the ability to argue both sides" of any question. Words are expanded o r contracted to the limits of plausibility in order to press a particula r point of view. Consequently, how much actual democracy there is in our democracy depends in the end on how much license is reposed in the nati on's most elite lawyers, appointed as federal judges, to expand or contr act the words of the Constitution. That the case arose in the context of ab ortion as opposed to some other social or cultural controversy as to whi ch the Constitution does not provide a clear answer should have been a s ideline. Yet abortion polarizing, ultra-loaded abortion remains to t his day the tail wagging the democratic dog. Though the practice has existed for centuries, we had somehow lived through 186 years of constit utional governance without its being noticed that the document guarantee d a right to terminate pregnancies. This latent discovery in 1973 was pr eeminently about lawyers and words. In this instance, it was about the f ecund potential of the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of liberty, glosse d by a developing line of cases incubating a parallel right to privacy a similarly malleable concept, different from liberty in that lawyers h ad had to derive it from Constitution's glowing penumbra, the term being absent from the actual document. Practically speaking, in the adroit hands of the nation's best lawyers, t erms such as "liberty" and "privacy" are boundless and, lest we forget , the Constitution, to say nothing of its many penumbras, ellipses and l acunae, contains many such words. The upshot is this: The more those wor ds can be stretched, the more forbidding a fortress they become around l ife's disputes, and the less remains for the American people to determin e for themselves. Instead of the masters of our fate, we become the subj ects of those empowered to say what the words mean: the judges. Arlen Specter & the Constitution The judiciary-committee controversy is not about abortion. It is about wh ether there is any meaningful limiting principle that compels judges, re gardless of their predilections and the trendy pieties of any particular era, to stay their hands so that Americans are free to live as they cho ose including in 50 different ways if that is the judgment of the peop le in 50 different states. There are, essentially, two competing visions of judicial philosophy. The first, the one that is regnant at this time (and to which it appears Se nator Specter subscribes), is that the Constitution with its many plia ble terms is as manipulable as necessary to place beyond democracy any issue that may be said to reflect a "value" the American people revere at a given time. The problem here is that this camouflages a brute power reality. In truth, the American people have very few values which enjoy such broad consensus that, given the choice, our society would enshrine them in ou r Constitution and render them immune from further popular consideration , regardless of evolving attitudes or changed circumstances. Constitutio nal protection, we must admit, is a forbidding carapace one need look no further than the contortions engaged in by would-be reformers when va lues incontestably engraved in the Constitution, like free speech and be aring arms, collide with innovative schemes like campaign finance and gu n control. It is a commonplace for judicial opinions to couch various concerns in ex travagant rhetoric about values claimed to be venerated by all Americans . Yet, at bottom, this reflects nothing more or less than the subjective preferences of a majority (often a bare, fractious majority) of judges whose views about social issues, even if they masquerade as legal issu es, should be of no greater moment than what the people of, say, Bayonne or Des Moines think about abortion, or gay marriage, or stem-cell resea rch. The second school of thought holds merely this: that judges are not supre me. It contends that there are firm, objective limits to the areas of li fe that jurists may remove from the democratic self-determination of the American people. They are found in the text of the Constitution as it w as originally understood at the time its provisions were adopted. This philosophy is erect ed on an unchanging premise: In a democracy, it is to be presumed that g reat social conflicts will be resolved democratically. That presumption is not beyond rebuttal, but for it to be overcome there must be unmistak ab...
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