www.amconmag.com/2004_10_25/feature.html
Copyright 2004 The American Conservative October 25, 2004 issue The War Bin Laden Wanted How the US played into the terrorists plan By Paul W Schroeder George W Bushs re-election campaign rests on three claims, distinct but always run together: that the United States is at war against terror, t hat it is winning the war, and that it can ultimately achieve victory bu t only under his leadership. Critics of Bush cont end that the US is losing the struggle against terror on the most impo rtant fronts and that only new leadership can bring victory, but except for a few radicals, no one denies that the struggle against internationa l terrorism in general and groups like al-Qaeda in particular constitute s a real war. The question comes up in the campaign only when Republican s such as Vice President Cheney charge that Democrats view terrorists as mere criminals and do not recognize that the country is at war. The cha rge, though falseno Democratic leader would commit political suicide by even hinting thisis effective politically. Some experts on international law and foreign policy object to calling th e struggle against terrorism a war, pointing for example to the legal pr oblem of whether under international law a state can declare war on a no n-state movement and claim the rights of war, or arguing that terrorism constitutes a tactic and that no one declares war against a tactic. Both arguments indicate the sloppy thinking that pervades the rhetoric of th e War on Terror. The first point, moreover, has important practical cons equences for such questions as the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere, and for our relations with allies, other states, and the UN. Yet these kinds of arguments seem too academic to m atter. The general public can hardly understand them, much less let them influence their votes. Other reasons, howeverdifferent, more powerful, highly practical, and as tonishingly overlookedargue against conceiving of the struggle as a war and, more important still, waging it as such. The reasons and the logic behind them are somewhat complicated, but the overall conclusion is sim ple: by conceiving of the struggle against international terrorism as a war, loudly proclaiming it as such, and waging it as one, we have given our enemies the war they wanted and aimed to provoke but could not get u nless the United States gave it to them. This conclusion is not about semantics or language but has enormous impli cations. It points to fundamentally faulty thinking as one of the centra l reasons that America is currently losing the struggle, and it means th at a change in leadership in Washington, though essential, will not by i tself turn the course of events. What is required is a new, different wa y of thinking about the struggle against terrorism and from that a diffe rent way of waging it. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda repeatedly and publicly declared war on the United States and waged frequent attacks against its property, territory (including embassies abroad), and citizens for years before the spectac ular attack on 9/11. This admission would seem to destroy my case at the outset and end the discussion. If bin Laden and al-Qaeda declared war o n the United States and committed unmistakable acts of war against it, t hen obviously the US had no choice but to declare war in reply, just a s it had to do so against Japan after Pearl Harbor. First, states frequently wage real, serious wars of the conventional sort again st other states without declaring war or putting their countries on a wa r footing. In the latter 20th century, this practice became the rule rat her than the exception. Second, revolutionary and terrorist organizations and movements have fo r centuries declared war on the governments or societies they wished to subvert and overthrow. Yet even while fighting them ruthlessly, states r arely made formal declarations of war against such movements. Instead, t hey treated these groups as criminals, revolutionaries, rebels, or tools of a hostile foreign power, not as organizations against which a recogn ized legitimate government declares and wages war. A revolutionary or terrorist movement has much t o gain from getting a real government to declare war upon it. This gives the movement considerable status, putting it in some sense in the same league with the government with which it is now recognized as at war. No sensible government wishes to give such quasi-legitimacy to a movement it is trying to stamp out. Consider Napoleons treatment of the insurrec tion in Spain from 1808 to 1813. The insurgents had powerful claims to b elligerent status and even legitimacy. They maintained a government in a small corner of Spain, represented the former legitimate Bourbon govern ment Napoleon had overthrown, included the regular Spanish army, and wer e supported and recognized by a major power, Great Britain. But Napoleon always insisted they were nothing but brigands, used this designation a s justification for the brutal campaign he waged against them, and ackno wledged a state of war with them only when, defeated in Spain and on oth er fronts, he decided to cut his losses, evacuate Spain, and make peace with them and the Bourbon regime. Other reasons further explain why legitimate governments have not declare d war on terrorist or revolutionary organizations that waged war against themfor example, the fact that when one declares war one has to operat e under the prevailing laws of war, and these can be constricting for a legitimate government, as the United States is currently finding out in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Thus declaring a war on terrorism and waging it as a genuine war has to be justified as an exception to a powe rful rule, not accepted as the obvious response to a terrorist attack. Readers may find this an impractical, academic argument and respond, So what? Besides, what difference does it make what you call a campaign against terrorism if in fact you intend to wage an all-out figh t to exterminate terrorist organizations with every weapon at your comma nd? In practical terms, that is war, whatever name you use for it, and i t is good for the American public, the world, and the enemy to face it. The issue is not whether the American public after 9/ 11 needed squarely to face the fact that the United States had been atta cked by a dangerous enemy and had to fight back. had a right to use military force against that enemy anywhere (thoug h only where) it was sensible and practical to do so. The relevant, practical questions instead are, first, whe ther it was necessary to declare war on that enemy in order to confront the attack and fight back with every useful means, including military fo rce. As just indicated, the historical and practical answer to that ques tion is no. Second, was a public declaration of war against terrorism in general needed to prepare psychologically for a serious campaign agains t the enemy? The reaction of the American public and virtually every oth er government and people to the 9/11 attack and the subsequent American counterattack makes clear that for this purpose a formal declaration was unnecessary. The support in America and abroad for a powerful campaign against al-Qaeda was overwhelming. The only question left is the one central to the argument: did the Americ an government, by constantly and solemnly declaring the nation at war ag ainst terrorism and repeatedly summoning the rest of the world to join u p or else be ranked among Americas enemies actually help or hurt the ca mpaign against the terrorist enemy? The natural response might be, How could the declarations of war possibl y have hurt? Even if they were not strictly necessary, they served to un ite the American people and gird them for possible sacrifices and losses and to rally the rest of the world behind the American effort. It was never in dispute that Osama bin Laden deliberately, repeatedly, an d in the most spectacular way possible provoked a war with the United St ates. Once again this looks like an intellectual befogging the issue and ignori ng the obvious. H e hates America and its ...
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