| WIKI | FAQ | Tech FAQ | |
 http://csua.com/feed/ | |
| ||||||
| 5/24 |
| 2004/10/4 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:33915 Activity:very high |
10/4 A clarification: Army chief of staff Shinseki was not fired; no one
listened to him and he retired after his four-year term.
Bush-appointed Secretary of the Army Thomas White was fired.
They both advocated 250K+ troops for the occupation, and actually
Tommy Franks did too, but Franks didn't do it as publically.
It is said that Dubya values "loyalty" above all else.
\_ Shinseki deserved to be fired to the Stryker and the black
beret.
\_ Dubya deserves to be fired for attacking Iraq when it had no
WMD stockpiles and saying "Bring 'em on" when he's not personally
in Iraq holding an M-16.
\_ Have you ever held a M-16? Or served?
\_ Please see reply under "why aren't you in afghanistan ..."
and lengthier explanation written to ilyas
\_ why aren't you in aghanistan w/ an M-16?
\_ I didn't say "Bring 'em on"
Notice the slope of the graph: link:csua.org/u/9bp
(Iraq casualties)
\_ I don't really understand this criticism. Do you not like:
(a) that Bush is commander in chief without 'proper'
military experience (he did serve, though not active
duty). More importantly though, we have this concept
in the US of the military being controlled by civilians.
It prevents 'excesses.'
(b) that Bush uses 'bravado language.' That's a narrower
complaint, but I wonder if it offends an average soldier
on the ground as much as it offends you. I bet it
doesn't. -- ilyas
\_ It's a simple matter: if you were too chickenshit to
fight back then, you'd damn well better be sure about
the wars you're having other men die for now.
\_ ilyas, you overwrote me AGAIN
\_ That's because I hate you. -- ilyas
\_ Stop overwriting dude. You lose respect when you
do and come off flippant.
\_ You know, we keep having this conversation, and I
keep saying the same thing -- when a thread is
this active, what makes you say it was me?
Is this because I am the only one who signs my
name? Sheesh. I probably overwrite posts
every now and again, but you d think with the
number of times I ve been accused of it I do it
24/7 out of spite. -- ilyas
\_ I have never said it was out of spite.
I just think you accidentally do a :w! or
the equivalent or it's a problem with some
merge script. Nevertheless, it happens a lot,
which is why I complain.
\_ Bush "served" in the National Guard so he wouldn't jump
off a helo into a hot LZ and get shot to shit in Vietnam.
He was too important to die there, like many other children
of powerful families. Sorry, I just need to talk about
"intent" when anyone tries to pass off his Guard service
as sufficient.
To address your primary point, your confusion is well
founded. Basically, you need to perceive Dubya as someone
not qualified to lead a war to begin with -- this is easy
to believe when we didn't find WMD stockpiles and with his
escaping into the Guard. Of course, if you believe Dubya
is a strong leader (as the average soldier does), then
you won't have problems with his saying "Bring 'em on".
not qualified to lead a country during wartime to begin
with -- this is easy to believe when we didn't find WMD
stockpiles and with his escaping into the Guard. Of
course, if you believe Dubya is a strong leader (as the
average soldier does), then you won't have problems with
his saying "Bring 'em on". [I didn't delete your reply
ilyas, but I changed the wording in my post to reflect
your criticism]
\_ I don't think you understand Kerry's wartime
service either. He did everything possible
to avoid service and combat. Only because
of an unlucky fluke did Kerry actually see combat.
\_ I don't fault Kerry, or Bush, or anyone else
from wanting to avoid combat. Wanting to avoid
combat is the only rational human reaction.
I would scared of a president who sought out
combat, that would be indicative of mental
illness or terminal stupidity. Have you ever
talked to a veteran of any war? NOBODY wants
to be on the front lines. -- ilyas
\_ But you CAN fault someone for using family
connections to get into the Guard during
the Vietnam War where you would see a nearly
zero chance of being shipped to Vietnam with
your other well-connected classmates. ;-)
\_ Between getting into the Texas Air National
Guard and staying in the U.S., and captaining
a patrol boat on the coast of Vietnam -- there
lies a sizeable gap.
\_ Not when those were originally acting as
an equivalent to the Coast Guard. They never
saw combat. Their role was redefined
shortly after Kerry transferred. Flying
F104 fighter jets is not a cake walk,
mortality rates with mechanical
malfunction were high.
\_ While your points have merit, they are
still not enough. Kerry's real chance
of getting into combat (which came to be
realized as you described) were measurably
higher than dying in an F-104 malfunction.
"However, in retrospect, the [F-104] was
not intrinsically any more dangerous to
fly than lots of other military aircraft
of the day, and the high accident rate can
be blamed more on inadequate and
insufficient crew training rather than
on any flaw with the basic design."
\_ Personally, I think previous service record has little
to do with 'wartime leadership.' An argument could be
made that Bush's questionable showing would impact
soldier morale -- except it obviously does not.
The lack of WMDs is certainly a point against the war.
Personally, I believe humanitarian (and utilitarian,
in that civilian casualties WILL happen)
reasons are enough for exercising US military power,
but I know not everyone agrees. Btw, I differ from
classic libertarians in this way. I also strongly
suspect Saddam had a program and the pieces are in Syria
now, just like the scientists are. -- ilyas
\_ I am not making an argument on soldier morale.
I am not making an argument that you need to have
been a soldier to be a successful wartime president.
I am explaining how rational people can feel that
Bush's comment has problems. The average soldier,
as I have noted, does not have a problem with what
Bush said.
I should also clarify "wartime leadership" once
more. It was Bush's call, ultimately, to take the
U.S. into war in Iraq, so he is accountable for
the good and the bad.
As for your strong suspicion that "a program and
the pieces are in Syria", are you also including
WMD stockpiles -- because we went to war because
they had WMD stockpiles, not because they had a
program.
You also need to consider David Kay's comments on
this.
\_ Yes, I am considering the stockpiles also, and
I think Saddam did have chemical stockpiles.
I think criticisms of the situation in Iraq needs
to be grounded far more in realities on the ground,
and less on what Bush did or did not do 30 years
ago, or what his PR team had him say. Speaking
more generally, criticism of the policy is much
more effective than criticism of the man.
Bush should certainly get all the flak for fuckups
in Iraq, but I at least give him some bonus
points for acting and getting an obviously bad man
'off the streets.' Certainly 'rational people'
who think he shouldn't be POTUS will have
problems with all sorts of things he says and
does. -- ilyas
\_ It's not only what he did 30 years ago; it's
also that Dubya is likely the most inarticulate
president we've had this century, and this does
contribute towards people's negative opinions.
(Is he a strong leader who just has trouble
expressing himself; or is his verbal clumsiness
and 11-minute paralysis during the 9/11 attack
indicative of a man with more serious problems?
You can find reasonable people believing both.)
Anyways, here are Kay's comments.
He was in charge of finding weapons, and he did
have the full faith of the Bush people to find
them, and you better believe he knew he was
ending his career by testifying as he did:
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript
A more detailed transcript:
http://csua.org/u/9bq
"My belief that they did not move large
stockpiles of WMD to Syria is based on my
conclusion that there were not large stockpiles
to move. ... I don't know."
\_ As we are progressing in this argument the
defended claim becomes weaker and weaker,
now it has to do with 'large' stockpiles.
Here is what I think. I know very little
of what happened in Iraq before and during
the invasion. I do know this, however:
Saddam used chemical weapons before, and
so had to have the trained units, the
equipment, and the stockpiles at one point.
I don't believe he is the kind of man who
would let it all go even with the UN
inspectors around. Can I prove this? Of
course I can't. But to me, Saddam having
chemical weapons and finding some common
ground with Syria prior and during the war
seems more likely than him just giving them
up. Another thing worth mentioning is that
not one country except the US had any
stake in the US finding WMDs in Iraq.
Everyone wanted the US to fail. So
while I don't accuse any of them of
collaborating with Iraq, a black ops along
these lines, if it did happen, would not
surprise me in the least. At any rate,
no country would try very hard to catch
Saddam moving the stuff.
Bush is inarticulate, and that's a minus.
No argument there. -- ilyas
\_ So what was Kay referring to in saying
"We were all wrong"? I'm pretty sure
he would have loved to have provided
"better news" for Bush.
\_ Kay had no proof. I have no proof
either. I am telling you what I
believe, and why. -- ilyas
\_ So what was Kay referring to in
saying "We were all wrong?"
I don't believe you've tried to
answer this question.
\_ Well, if Kay believes
Saddam didn't have WMDs, I
disagree with him. I don't
think the US truly has the
capability to hunt them down.
This would involve omniscience
and the capability to make the
rest of the world bend over,
including most of the Middle
East. A bunch of sensitive
scientists ended up in Syria,
I don't see why the same
couldn't happen to barrels of
poison. We didn't search in
Syria, heck, we didn't even
search Iraq properly (because
we can't dig up the entire
desert). Again, I am
articulating a belief which
I cannot prove to you, based
on my understanding of
Middle East politics, the game
'other Powers' are playing, and
Saddam's psychology. I am not
making any kind of 'case,' (it
would be very weak if I did) I
am just going with my intuition.
-- ilyas
\_ There are some that feel like that if they attack us, that
we may decide to leave prematurely. They don't understand
what they're talking about if that's the case. Let me
finish. There are some who feel like the conditions are
such that they can attack us there.
My answer is: please don't.
\_ On August 1, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld replaced General Shinseki
(who consequently retired) as Army Chief of Staff with General
Peter J. Schoomaker after Shineski "questioned the cakewalk
scenario, and told Congress (that February) that we would
need several hundred thousand soldiers in Iraq to put an end
to the violence against our troops and against each other."
In other words, Rumsfeld fired him/forced him out.
\_ Did you take this off http://disinfopedia.org? If so, the above
text has a URL footnote. The URL does not support the text.
There is no doubt that Shinseki was isolated, not taken
seriously, and left out of the loop after what he said broke
on CNN. But to say he was fired is technically not correct. -op |
| 5/24 |
|
| www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript -> www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/ US Transcript: David Kay at Senate hearing Former top US weapons inspector David Kay addresses the Senate Armed Se rvices Committee. Former top US weapons inspector David Kay addresses the Senate Armed Se rvices Committee. Story Tools ON CNN TV Wolf Blitzer talks with former weapons inspector David Kay on "Wolf Blitz er Reports" at 5 pm ET Wednesday. Following is a transcript of Kay's opening remarks before committee membe rs began questioning him. KAY: As you know and we discussed, I do not have a written statement. I do have a few preliminary comments, but I suspect you're more interested in asking questions, and I'll be h appy to respond to those questions to the best of my ability. that was my privilege to direct is unparalleled and the country owes a great debt of gratitude to the men and women who have served over there and continue to serve doing that. A great deal has been accomplished by the team, and I do think ... it imp ortant that it goes on and it is allowed to reach its full conclusion. I n fact, I really believe it ought to be better resourced and totally foc used on WMD; But I also believe that it is time to begin the fundamental analysis of h ow we got here, what led us here and what we need to do in order to ensu re that we are equipped with the best possible intelligence as we face t hese issues in the future. Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here. Chirac, as I recall in April of last year, referred to Iraq's possession of WMD The Germans certainly -- the intelligence service believed that there wer e WMD It turns out that we were all wrong, probably in my judgment, and that is most disturbing. We're also in a period in which we've had intelligence surprises in the p roliferation area that go the other way. The case of Iran, a nuclear pro gram that the Iranians admit was 18 years on, that we underestimated. It was discovered by a group of Irani an dissidents outside the country who pointed the international communit y at the location. The Libyan program recently discovered was far more extensive than was as sessed prior to that. Certainly proliferation is a hard t hing to track, particularly in countries that deny easy and free access and don't have free and open societies. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one la st chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical e vidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial UN Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U N about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material. I think the aim -- and certainly the aim of what I've tried to do since l eaving -- is not political and certainly not a witch hunt at individuals . It's to try to direct our attention at what I believe is a fundamental fault analysis that we must now examine. And let me take one of the explanations most commonly given: Analysts wer e pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the political agenda of one or another administration. I deeply think that is a wrong explanatio n As leader of the effort of the Iraqi Survey Group, I spent most of my day s not out in the field leading inspections. In the course of doing that, I had innumerable analysts who came to me in apology that the world that we were finding was not the world that they had thought existed and that they had estimated. And never -- not in a single case -- was the explanation, "I was pressure d to do this." The explanation was very often, "The limited data we had led one to reasonably conclude this. And each case was different, but the conversations were sufficiently in d epth and our relationship was sufficiently frank that I'm convinced that , at least to the analysts I dealt with, I did not come across a single one that felt it had been, in the military term, "inappropriate command influence" that led them to take that position. It was the honest difficulty based on the intelligence t hat had -- the information that had been collected that led the analysts to that conclusion. And you know, almost in a perverse way, I wish it had been undue influenc e because we know how to correct that. We get rid of the people who, in fact, were exercising that. The fact that it wasn't tells me that we've got a much more fundamental p roblem of understanding what went wrong, and we've got to figure out wha t was there. And like I say, I think we've got other cases other than Iraq. I do not t hink the problem of global proliferation of weapons technology of mass d estruction is going to go away, and that's why I think it is an urgent i ssue. And let me really wrap up here with just a brief summary of what I think we are now facing in Iraq. there's still going to be an unresolva ble ambiguity about what happened. A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately p hysical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting. I'm going to go take the gold t oilet fixtures and everything else imaginable." I've seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The result is -- document destruction -- we're really not going to be abl e to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclus ions that we're going to come to. But I do think the survey group -- and I think Charlie Duelfer is a great leader. I think you will get a s full an answer as you can possibly get. George Tenet, for having the courage to select m e to do this, and my successor, Charlie Duelfer, as well. Both of us are known for probably at times regrettable streak of independ ence. I came not from within the administration, and it was clear and cl ear in our discussions and no one asked otherwise that I would lead this the way I thought best and I would speak the truth as we found it. I think that shows a level of maturity and understanding that I think bod es well for getting to the bottom of this. But it is really up to you an d your staff, on behalf of the American people, to take on that challeng e It's not something that anyone from the outside can do. So I look for ward to these hearings and other hearings at how you will get to the con clusions. I do believe we have to understand why reality turned out to be different than expectations and estimates. But you have more public service -- ce rtainly many of you -- than I have ever had, and you recognize that this is not unusual. earlier that I've been drawn back as a result of recent film of remin ding me of something. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the combi ned estimate was unanimity in the intelligence service that there were n o Soviet warheads in Cuba at the time of the missile crisis. Robert Kennedy disagreed with the estimate and chose a course of action less ambitious and aggressive than recommended by their advisers. But the most important thing about that story, which is not often told, i s that as a result after the Cuban missile crisis, immediate steps were taken to correct our inability to collect on the movement of nuclear mat erial out of the Soviet Union to other places. So that by the end of the Johnson administration, the intelligence commun ity had a capability to do what it had not been able to do at the time o f the Cuban missile crisis. I think you face a similar responsibility in ensuring that the community is able to do a better job in the future than it has done in the past. |
| csua.org/u/9bq -> homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/davidkay-sasc-20040128.html Liar Glossary {Transcript begins with opening statement in progress, when the hearing r oom audio tape begins} Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt tha t the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most leth al weapons ever devised. a further report and I stress a furt her report from Dr. David Kay on his efforts and the efforts of the t eam which he was privileged to work with, known as ISG. interim official report to this committee on October 3rd. Kay has stepped down from this position and has been succeeded by Dr. excuse me Mr Charles A Due lfer, a former colleague and member of the UN Special Commission with Dr. Kay volunteered and I emphasize that, volunteered to resume his p ublic service; worked diligently for six months in Iraq, under difficult and often dangerous conditions; and just concluded his work last week, and reported to the director of Central Intelligence. webcast begins here, 2-hours 50-minutes:} Working with General Dayton and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) your mission was to search for all facts repeat, all facts relevant to the many i ssues about Iraq and Iraq weapons of mass destruction and related progra ms. You initiated what was and continues I emphasize continues to be a very difficult, complex, mission that, in your own words, is yet to be c ompleted. June}, p atience is required, to ensure we complete a thorough assessment of this important issue. In this hearing today, we hope to receive your assessment of what has bee n accomplished to date. And what in your professional judgment remains to be done by the ISG. It is far too early to reach any final judgments or conclusions. second official interim report of the I SG group in the time frame of late March. It is crucial that the important work of the ISG group go on. Kay has stated that although weve not found evidence of large stoc kpiles of WMD or forward-deployed weapons the ISG group have made the following evidence as a part of their record that will be forthcoming: First, evidence of Saddam Husseins intent to pursue WMD programs on a large scale. Actual, ongoing chemical and biological research programs. An active program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon, a progr am that was interrupted only by the start of the war in March. And evidence that in all probability they were going to build those wea pons to incorporate in the warheads what we know not for sure, but certa inly the possibility of weapons of mass destruction. Evidence that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his fledgli ng nuclear program as late as 2001. And most important, evidence that clearly indicates Saddam Hussein was conducting a wide range of activities, in clear contravention of the Uni ted Nations resolutions. Kay and I quote you: It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What w e learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potenti ally than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war. held during the Clinton ad ministration and did not change in the Bush administration. Th e important thing is when they differ, to understand why. Kay, to continue the work of this committee in developing a body of fact from which reasonable pe ople, at the conclusion of that collection of facts, can reach their own objective thoughts and conclusions. But I hope that you will, in your testimony, indicate that since the work is not completed since Iraq is as big as California, and Baghdad appr oximates the sprawling territory of Los Angeles that we could find cac hes and reserves of weapons of mass destruction, chemical or biological, or even further evidence about their nuclear program. And why do scientists in custody today continue not to be forthcoming, if there was nothing to hide or nothing substantial existed? Query: Saying what you dont want to hear is not forthcoming? cientists say a lack of fear today has n ot changed their stories. To the best o f my knowledge, there are no weapons of mass destruction. They were eith er destroyed by UN inspectors, or unilaterally by Iraq, years ago. The work of the Iraq Survey Group has shown that Saddam Hussein had WMD i ntentions, had WMD programs that did survive, and did outwit for 12 year s the United Nations Security Council and the resolutions indeed, the inspections, in large measure. CJHjr If ultimately the findings of the Iraq Survey Group do differ from the pr ewar assessments of our intelligence community, differ from assessments of the United Nations, differ from assessments of intelligence services of many other nations, indeed that is cause for concern. But we are not there yet, in terms of the totality of fact on which to dr aw such serious conclusions. Today and tomorrow our policymakers must be able to rely on the intellige nce they are provided. The safety and security of the men and women of t he armed forces are dependent on intelligence. The only people the rest of the world trusts, to report the tr ue facts, honestly, including exculpatory facts which US officials stu bbornly conceal, and minimize. CJHjr So collectively, all of us the Congress, the executive branch, and othe r nations we must vigorously continue to pursue the collection of the facts, as the ISG is doing, and upon that completion then draw our concl usions and take such corrective measures as may be necessary. As we speak, over 1,400 individuals, military and civilian, are on the gr ound in Iraq, seeking the facts about Iraqs WMD programs. Anonymous, some werent hon est enough, many not rational enough, and most not fearless enough, to s peak truth to power. CJHjr I have confidence in the commitment and the ability of General Dayton, Mr Duelfer (your successor), and representatives from our coalition partn ers to complete this mission. They have some of the best and brightest o f our military, and our intelligence community, to complete this task. And Congress has provided the necessary means a very substantial approp riation of recent. We remain committed to providing the resources that a re necessary for the completion of the ISG work. Kay to the hearing, and stating our thanks for his work on the Iraq Survey Group. Kays recent reported statements for example: that the intelligence community was wrong about there being stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war; Kays recent statements raise serious questions, about the accuracy a nd objectivity of our intelligence, and about the administrations publi c statements before the war that were supposedly based on that intellige nce. weapons of mass destruction not programs, not program-related activities, not intent ions. Before the war, the administration in order to support its decision to go to war made numerous, vivid, unqualified, statements about Iraq hav ing in its possession weapons of mass destruction not programs, not p rogram-related activities, not intentions. Actual weapons is what the administrations statements focused on. copy} about a threat from Iraqs weapons of mass destruction . He asserted the following, quote: Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against o ur friends, against our allies, and against us. Vice President Cheney was not talking about programs or inte ntions, he was specifically referring to existing weapons that were be ing amassed for use against us. The president of the United States and the secretary of defence would n ot assert as plainly and bluntly as they have, that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid b asis for saying it. said {780 kb html with images}, quote: We know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersi ng rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations. Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one-to-four weeks to escape detection. There can be no doubt, Secretary Powell said: no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and he has the abili ty to dis... |
| disinfopedia.org -> www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Disinfopedia Dan Quayle," engaged in "robotic repetition" of memorized phrases, and "gave the appearance of being what his critics charge he is : callow, jejune, unserious." "Public relations in such an environment is incredibly difficult - and even worse if you mishandle the media." The company has managed to enrage journalists by reneging on promises to grant interviews and by o rganizing a press conference and then refusing to allow questions from t he 20 reporters who showed up. org AntiSpam note: To avoid attracting spam mail robots, email addresses on t he Disinfopedia are written with AT in place of the usual symbol, and we have removed "mail to" links. Replace AT with the correct symbol to get a valid address. Lobby your g overnment for more effective antispam regulations. |