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| 5/24 |
| 2004/8/13 [Politics/Domestic/Election] UID:32888 Activity:very high |
8/13 Washington Post editorial: "Swift Boat Smears"
"... Mr. Kerry a coward and a liar. This smear is contradicted by Mr.
Kerry's crew mates, undercut by the previous statements of some of
those now making the charges and tainted by the chief source of its
funding: Republican activists dedicated to defeating Mr. Kerry in
November."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58315-2004Aug11.html
\_ Well lets see, he has stated he was in Cambodia dozens of times
throughout his career, further indicating he was on secret
CIA / Seal missions and fought the Khmer Rouge. Do you believe
him?
\_ Kerry's people have said he was probably mistaken and probably
wasn't there on Christmas Day, as much as it was "seared" into
him. As for the TV commercial, the Post lays waste to it.
\_ I reject your explanation outright. He has repeated this
story dozens of times, including on the Senate floor.
He has stated this was a 'transformative' moment that
defines who he is, repeatedly. Do you believe what he
has said DOZENS of times or don't you? Do you believe
he went into Cambodia on CIA/ SEAl missions?
\_ Just what explanation are you rejecting? I just posted
what Kerry's people have said: Kerry has said on the
record that he was not in Cambodia on Christmas Day. (This
is the more accurate description -- take out my earlier
"probably's".)
\_ Yeah, I think he dropped of CIA/SEALs into Cambodia.
We know that the US was doing this as part of Operation
Pheonix during the early part of 1969 and that swift
boats were sometimes used for the insertion. Why do
think that he did not? I don't think he fought the
Khmer Rouge, but it is a little hard to tell exactly
which un-uniformed guerilla army someone belongs to
when they are shooting at you from 500 yards away.
http://www.serendipity.li/cia/operation_phoenix.htm
\_ On a 50 foot PFC with twin diesels that one
\_ On a 50 foot PCF with twin diesels that one
could hear hundreds of yards away? Sorry
I don't think so.
Here's some background on Camb. incursions.
http://csua.org/u/8l9
\_ You've got your "background", and you've got
Operation Phoenix. Now what do you get?
(Also, assuming a loud boat, maybe that's why
Kerry says he was getting shot at by all sides
while on his CIA mission(s). I would want a
better boat if I were there, but you take what
the Army/Navy gives you. SNAFU.)
\_ obJawsReference
\_ Interesting story. It proves that you can get
lost and end up in Cambodia by mistake, at least.
The CIA doesn't always tell The State Dept
what they are up to, especially if they know
that State might not approve. How do *you*
think the CIA and SEALs did their Cambodia
insertions? Do you think the guys walked
all the way from Saigon or something?
\_ Not by 50' twin diesel craft where
the captain becomes lost.
\_ BUSH GOOD, KERRY BAD!
\_ He thinks that Kerry did not drop CIA/SEALs into
Cambodia, probably because Kerry admitted not being
in Cambodia on Christmas Day, the day he said he was
on the CIA mission.
\_ Obviously he got the day wrong. I already suggested
that he may have confused Tet with Christmas in
his mind. Perhaps you missed that.
\_ Well, Kerry did say he got the day wrong, but
he also said the memory had been seared into
his mind, and I don't recall him ever suggesting
himself the Tet/Christmas explanation.
\_ There are a number of events seared into my
memory, but I don't remember the date (or even
year) of all of them.
\_ Yeah, I have the memory of my first blowjob
seared into my mind, but I couldn't tell you
what day it was. I would have to think pretty
hard to tell you which year it was even.
\_ Both of the above are pretty silly. In
Kerry's story, the fact that it's
Christmas day is CENTRAL to the story.
It's kinda like if you couldn't
remember if your first blowjob was
done to your penis or your finger.
\_ CENTRAL to the story? That's arguable.
The more appropriate analogy is
remembering you lost your virginity
on your birthday or your SO's birthday,
which happened to be one month apart:
You know you "moored" your "boat" in the
"delta" and you "completed your mission"
on one of your birthdays (depositing
your "seamen" under the "moon") and
there were a lot of other "missions"
where you traveled "closer to the
target" before and after that. "Mission
accomplished", but for some reason your
wife is pissed you got the wrong
birthday, and she doesn't believe you
anymore when you said she was the first
girl you slept with.
\_ Bwahaha!
\_ The "undercut" statement is false if it refers to O'Neill. He was
defending Kerry in 1996 against a false statement, and mentioned it
in the May 4 press conference. Steve Gardner *was* a crewmate of
Kerry and is opposed to Kerry. Elliot has specifically made
chargest against Kerry which are not conflicted by his previous
statements.
\_ The editorial says nothing about O'Neill. The crew mates are
quoted in the article in support of Kerry's rescue of another
crew member. Gardner has not said anything disputing the rescue;
he has just said he thinks Kerry is an indecisive leader, putting
his crew members in jeopardy. You should quote what Elliot has
said that does not conflict with his previous statements. |
| 5/24 |
|
| www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58315-2004Aug11.html Page A22 DEMOCRATIC nominee John F Kerry has made his tour of duty in Vietnam -- a stint in which he earned three Purple Hearts, a Bronze Star and a Silver Star -- a centerpiece of his presidential campaign. To the extent, then, that there are legitimate questions about Mr Kerry's behavior -- either in Vietnam or back home as a prominent antiwar activist -- those are fair game. Mr Kerry's four-plus months in Vietnam made for an unusually short tour. He used his third Purple Heart to go home early, and his wounds were relatively superficial. Some veterans remain understandably bitter about Mr Kerry's antiwar statements; indeed, the candidate himself has said he would rephrase some of his more cutting accusations about US troops committing war crimes. But a new assault on Mr Kerry -- in an ad by a group calling itself Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and in a new book -- crosses the line in branding Mr Kerry a coward and a liar. This smear is contradicted by Mr Kerry's crew mates, undercut by the previous statements of some of those now making the charges and tainted by the chief source of its funding: Republican activists dedicated to defeating Mr Kerry in November. News Alert "John Kerry has not been honest about what happened in Vietnam," says George Elliott, Mr Kerry's former commanding officer. Elliott who recommended Mr Kerry for the Silver and Bronze stars, commending him as "calm, professional and highly courageous in the face of enemy fire." In a 1969 evaluation Mr Elliott had this to say: "In a combat environment often requiring independent, decisive action, LTJG Kerry was unsurpassed." "I know John Kerry is lying about his first Purple Heart because I treated him for that injury," says Dr. Letson isn't listed on Mr Kerry's medical record at the time. That doesn't disprove his claim to have treated Mr Kerry, who received a superficial shrapnel injury to his arm. Letson or others about the incident indicate that Mr Kerry was lying. Mr Kerry's wound doesn't seem to have amounted to much, but he didn't claim it did -- nor does that make him ineligible for a Purple Heart. The most potentially damning accusation in the ad concerns the the best-known episode of Mr Kerry's service, in which he saved the life of Jim Rassmann after the Special Forces officer was blown off Mr Kerry's Swift boat by a mine explosion. Three people quoted in the ad, all of whom say they were present that day, March 13, 1969, assert that Mr Kerry ordered his craft to flee the danger and turned around to rescue Mr Rassmann only after the shooting stopped. I know, I was there, I saw what happened," says Van O'Dell, a retired Navy enlisted man. "His account of what happened and what actually happened are the difference between night and day," says Jack Chenoweth, who commanded a different Swift boat. "When the chips were down, you could not count on John Kerry," says Larry Thurlow, another Swift boat commander. If accurate, this would demolish a central part of the picture of Mr Kerry as Vietnam hero. Mr Rassmann, having had no contact with Mr Kerry for the previous 35 years, came forward during the primaries to tell the story of how Mr Kerry, braving enemy fire and with an injured arm, pulled him back on board. "John came up to the bow, and I thought he was going to get killed because he was so exposed," Mr Rassmann recalled. Another crew mate, James Wasser, told ABC: "What boat were you riding on? It's also relevant to know who's underwriting this advertising campaign. The biggest single donor so far to Swift Boat Veterans for Truth isn't a Swift boat veteran but one of the leading Republican donors in Texas. Houston builder Bob J Perry gave the group $100,000, accounting for the bulk of the $158,000 in receipts it has reported. It's fair to ask whether truth is at the top of this group's agenda. |
| www.serendipity.li/cia/operation_phoenix.htm Ralph McGehee, 1996-02-19 Until outlawed in mid 70s CIA directly involved in assassination attempts against Castro of Cuba, and Congolese leader Lumumba. CIA also encouraged plots that resulted in assassination of Dominican Republic President Trujillo, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in 63 and Chilean Rene Schneider in 73. Most extensive assassination op was Operation Phoenix conducted during latter part of VN war. The Need to Know: Covert Action and American Democracy, 83. From 65-68 US and Saigon intel services maintained an active list of VC cadre marked for assassination. Phoenix Program for 69 called for "neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of VC targeted for arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees established in provincial interrogation centers to determine fate of VC suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green Berets and navy SEALs most common recruits for Phoenix Program. Green Beret detachment B-57 provided admin cover for other intel units. One was project cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of collaborating with NVNese, and kgb. Another was project oak targeted against svnese suspected collaborators. They controlled by special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, which worked with CIA outside of general abrams control. Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix op from 1/68 thru 5/71, CORDS reported 20,857 VCI killed. Kenneth osborn of program said Phoenix became a depersonalized murder program. A dept of defense analyst thayer, found that 616 suspected VCI targeted by Phoenix from 1/70 thru 3/71 were killed by Phoenix forces. After war NVNese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach said CIA's assassination program slaughtered far more than the 21,000 officially listed by the US In some parts of south 95% of communist cadre assassinated or compromised by Phoenix. Manning, R, (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 72. Vietnam, 68-72 Under Phoenix "security committees" in provincial "interrogation centers" would determine fate suspected NLF. Counterspy spring/summer 78, 8 Vietnam, 69 Under Phoenix in July 69 "Vietnam information notes," a state dept publication said target for 69 elimination of 1,800 VCI per month. Vietnam, 73 According to Defense Dept official 26,369 South Vietnamese civilians killed under Phoenix while op under direct US control (Jan 68 thru Aug 72 ). Colby in 73 admitted 20,587 deaths thru end 71 , 28,978 captured, and 17,717 "rallied" to Saigon gvt. All Phoenix stats fail to reflect US Activity after "official" US Control of op abandoned. Counterspy spring/summer 75 8 Vietnam, 75 Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy spring/summer 75 6 Vietnam, in 82 Ex-Phoenix operative reveals that sometimes orders were given to kill US military personnel who were considered security risks. He suspects the orders came not from "division", but from a higher authority such as the CIA or the ONI. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) summer 82 52. Phoenix Program to neutralize VCI (tax collectors, supply officers, political cadre, local military officials, etc). Plan to send pru or police teams to get in practice, death the frequent result of such ops, some times through assassinations pure and simple. Phoenix Program took over 20,000 lives, 65-72 US Congress,Church Committee Report. Vietnam, July 71 Colby inserted chart to Representative Reid showing that some 67,282 persons had been neutralized by Phoenix ops against VC between 68-71 Of these 31 percent had been killed, 26% rallied, and 43% captured or sentenced. Vietnam, 67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the pru's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Vietnam, Phoenix Program, late 60 early 70 took over 20,000 lives in Vietnam. Phung Hoang aka Phoenix Program quotas for units set by komer for all 242 districts. One result indiscriminate killing with every body labeled VCI. Law professor at University of Washington, Seattle, Roy L Prosterman, designed the land reform program the US Government promoted in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador. In each place the program was accompanied by a rural terror. In Vietnam the Phoenix Program killed 40,000 civilian between August 68 and mid-71; Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Winter 90 69 Consequences. Vietnam, 67-70 Phoenix a fiasco, it unmanageable and encouraged outrageous abuses. Vietnam, 75 according to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval up to thirty thousand special police, CIA and Phoenix related Vietnamese employees were left behind. Saigon CIA station managed to pull out only 537 of its 1900 Vietnamese including close to 1000 high-level Vietnamese who had built close relationships with the agency over the years. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) 6-7/79 4 Vietnam, 68-72 CI Phoenix project run jointly CIA and US Army military intel. Vietnam, 75 US military provided approx 600 case officers to supplement 40-50 CIA case officers for Phoenix ops. Volkman, E, & Baggett, B (1989), Secret Intelligence, 150. Vietnam, 65-69 CI/pacification efforts initiated by French culminate in Phoenix Program designed to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructure. Made official June 68, Phoenix was intensification of ci ops and involved "mass imprisonment, torture and assassination." Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and pics. Military intel working with mss, ARVN intel and regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and public safety, including field police. Phoenix to increase identification VC infrastructure and passing info to military, police, and other elements who were to induce defections, capture them, or attack them in their strongholds. Vietnam, 67-73 In 67 CIA proposed all US Intel agencies pool info on VC at district, province and Saigon levels for exploitation. Program first called intel coor and exploitation program (icex). Manned by two US soldiers, 2 census grievance, one rd cadre, and one special branch. Diooc intel clearinghouse to review, collate, and disseminate info. Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees using informants and diooc's blacklist. Vietnam, 67 12/20/67 Prime Minister signed directive 89-th. Vietnam, 67 Phoenix Program in fledgling stage conceived and implemented by CIA. Vietnam, 68 Phoenix Program statistics were phony a bust and a fake. Vietnam, 69 Program of 69 campaign called for elimination of VCI. In each province the chief established a province security committee (PSC). PSC controlled the npff and sp who maintained province interrogation centers (pics). Vietnam, 71 CIA had no intention handling over attack on VCI to national police command. CIA advisers to special police advised to begin forming special intel force units (sifu). Sifu targeted at high-level VCI, as substitutes for pru. They sign CIA planned manage attack on VCI thru sb, while keeping Phoenix intact as a way of deflecting attention. Vietnam, 71 In revising Phoenix Program (because of all communist penetrations in gvt) first steps to hire southeast asia computer associates (managed by a CIA officer) to advise 200-odd VNese techs to take over MACV and CORDS computers. VNese were folded into big mack and Phung Hoang management info system (phmis). Vietnam, 72 In report on Phoenix effectiveness in 9/72 Phung Hoang crossed out and anti-terrorist inserted. Program renamed special police investigative service (spis). US provides data processing facilities for spis thru, Computer Science Services, inc. Which runs intel thru machines to classify and collate them and the... |
| csua.org/u/8l9 -> www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20040812-090520-8656r.htm John Kerry that he had spent Christmas 1968 aboard his swift boat some five miles inside Cambodia and had been shot at by our Vietnamese allies, as well as the Khmer Rouge. I would like to offer some insights and some background about the subject of Cambodia as it related to the US war effort in Vietnam in that period. I served as a Foreign Service officer in the American embassy in Saigon from March 1968 to February 1970 and subsequently at the American embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, from 1970 to 1972. My job in the political section of our embassy in Saigon was to be the "Cambodia Man" My principal tasks were to follow border incidents involving US forces along the Cambodian border. I worked as a liaison with US forces, wrote reports to Washington, followed the intelligence about Communist use of Cambodia and, given that we did not have an embassy in Phnon Penh at that time, maintained contact with the Australian embassies in Saigon and Phnom Penh because the Australians were the US protecting power in Cambodia. I also worked with the International Control Commission (ICC) in Saigon and Phnom Penh. The International Control Commission had been established by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 that ended the French Indochina war. The ICC had separate commission offices in the former French states of Indochina: North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The offices were to monitor their local military situations. The ICC was staffed by representatives of Canada, Poland and India. While really powerless to enforce the 1954 agreements and the ongoing IndoChina war, the four commissions were kept in place as some sort of presence on the ground. Prince Sihanouk, the head of state of Cambodia, used the ICC to chastise the United States and Republic of Vietnam vigorously and publicly for alleged border incidents. If there was a border incident, he dispatched the ICC to the site. Prince Sihanouk had broken diplomatic relations with the United States in 1965 over continuing border incidents. With the increasing use of Cambodia by the Communists after 1965, the United States offered helicopters and communications equipment to the ICC in Phnom Penh in 1968 to help the commission do its job of locating the more than 12 Communist base areas in the technically "neutral" state of Cambodia. It should be recalled that Communist troops (VC/NVA Viet Cong/North Vietnamese) came out of the sanctuaries in the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia, a mere 35 miles west of Saigon, for the Tet attacks on Saigon in January 1968. However, Prince Sihanouk, as the official host of the ICC, declined the offer of equipment, saying bluntly that the Russians would not be pleased. The Cambodians did agree in 1968 to receive US intelligence about the details of Communist sanctuaries. After Richard Nixon assumed office in 1969, Prince Sihanouk agreed to reopen the US embassy, but insisted on the closure of the Phnom Penh ICC office to keep the political balance between the Communists and the United States. During 1968, there were some 50 "incidents" along the Cambodian border involving US forces. Some of these incidents involved the US "Brown Water Navy." That is, the Navy Riverine Forces, which used small patrol craft such as PBRs and swift boats in the Mekong Delta and along the waterways adjacent to the Cambodian border. I also worked with the Navy on the issue of gun-running through Cambodia. The Navy was particularly seized with the debate over whether the Vietnamese Communists were being resupplied through the "Sihanouk Trail," which was the extension of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, or by sea aboard Chinese freighters and hundred-ton steel-hulled trawlers through the port of Sihanoukville. The Johnson administration demanded proof of the CIA and Navy intelligence positions that postulated that the only way munitions of the amount being expended in South Vietnam's III and IV Corps could be resupplied was by ship. The Navy and local CIA station did a good job of making their case, but the supergrade CIA representatives and the senior State Department officials who came out from Washington to investigate the issue in October 1968 refused to accept that thesis because to do so would require the administration to put heat on Prince Sihanouk to do something about the use of Sihanoukville by the Communists. After Prince Sihanouk's ouster in 1970, we in the embassy in Phnom Penh confirmed the assumptions by the CIA and US Navy in Saigon concerning the trade through "neutral" Cambodia's port of Sihanoukville. Elmo Zumwalt, who was the commander of naval forces in Vietnam beginning in mid-1968 and before he moved up to become chief of naval operations in 1970. Zumwalt, unlike most senior American military, had served as an assistant naval attache in Europe as a more junior officer and knew the international political and diplomatic game. Zumwalt was politically sensitive about the activities of his Riverine units causing border incidents. There were established US forces "rules of engagement" that governed the activities of American forces near the Cambodian border. There was, for example, a "no-fly zone" along the Cambodian border, where US forces ground units, aircraft and boats were prohibited from routinely approaching or entering Cambodia. I should note here that allied forces in Vietnam from Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines were used in areas away from the border just to avoid adding diplomatic problems. As US forces in 1966 and 1967 progressively pushed the Vietnamese Communists farther and farther away from Vietnamese population centers, US commanders sought permission for "hot pursuit" operations against Communist forces attacking from Cambodian territory. This always was denied, much to the military's frustration. The Cambodians patrolled the crossing border points on the Bassac and Mekong Rivers and had fortifications above the frontier. Zumwalt took over, a US Army LCM landing craft sailing north on the Mekong River -- loaded with lubricants, gas, rations, beer and a forklift, as well as a number of US soldiers -- missed the turn from the Mekong River to the Bassac River (the two main north-south rivers that flow through the Mekong Delta) in order to reach its destination on the southern portion of the Bassac. Apparently the troops were somewhat bemused from the heat and the beer consumed and sailed right up into Cambodia, where they were halted by a Cambodian patrol craft and taken to the frontier base and then up to Phnom Penh. Creighton Abrams, newly in command, was furious, and Adm. Zumwalt's predecessor was nonplussed, blurting out that it wasn't one of his boats. Abrams snarled, "Yeah, it was one of mine and why did they do it?" We got the crew and LCM back eventually, but that was the only river incident involving the Cambodian border or Navy actions inside Cambodia to my recollection. There were continuing firefights along the Vinh the Canal, which is a kilometer inside the Vietnamese border and stretches straight as a shot from the Gulf of Siam to the Bassac River. The canal fronted the southern Communist base areas inside Cambodia and the Navy patrol craft frequently interdicted Communist infiltrators. There were plenty of incidents on land in 1968 involving US ground forces and aircraft along the 800-mile-plus length of the Cambodian border with Vietnam. A favorite VC/NVA tactic was to pull up next to a Cambodian military post, shoot at the Americans and then leave and let the Cambodians receive American counter-battery fire or aircraft strikes. Finally, concerning the assertion that Mr Kerry was shot at by the Khmer Rouge during his Christmas 1968 visit to Cambodia, it should be noted that the Khmer Rouge didn't take the field until the Easter Offensive of 1972, when the Vietnamese forces that had attacked the Cambodians initially in March 1970 pulled out of Cambodia to attack the US and Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. Only Vietnamese Communist soldiers were found on the battlefields of Cambodia in 1970-72. The bottom line of all this is that in the 15 years of active American military involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia, between 1961 a... |