www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. A State Department memo circulating the draft text observed that, "The statement, by the way contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted" 50 Document 51 . Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption of ties, met with Secretary of State George Shultz. He said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's defense. Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance. Most of the information in this briefing book, in its broad outlines, has been available for years. Some of it was recorded in contemporaneous news reports; Almost all of the primary documents included in this briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995 54 Note 3 . You will need to download and install the free 55 Adobe Acrobat Reader to view. It remarks on "Israeli acumen" in selling to both Iran and Iraq. The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense material damage. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 57 Document 2: United States Embassy in Israel Cable from Samuel W. A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to Iran while Americans are held hostage in Tehran, but that European arms dealers were providing it with weapons with or without government approval. In response, the Carter administration froze Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions. Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting that it is important that "our two countries be able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis," paving the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper's meetings in Baghdad. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 61 Document 6: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Praise for Visit of Under Secretary Draper , April 15, 1981. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 63 Document 8: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 64 Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper assures the head of the Iraqi interests section that he was extremely pleased with his visit to Baghdad and prospects for improved relations and increased trade. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 65 Document 10: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Policy on Arms Sales and Transfers to Iraq and Iran," June 3, 1981. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 68 Document 13: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. The State Department provides press guidance to regional missions regarding removal of Iraq from its list of countries that support international terrorism. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 69 Document 14: National Security Study Directive (NSSD 4-82) from Ronald W. Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia," March 19, 1982. President Reagan calls for a review of policy for the Middle East and South Asia, to prepare for decisions regarding procurement, arms transfers, and intelligence planning. Revised guidelines are needed because of regional diplomatic and global oil market developments. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 70 Document 15: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Iran was reporting chemical weapons use against its forces by this time. According to a 1991 article in the Los Angeles Times, American-built helicopters were used by Iraq for some of its chemical weapons attacks; Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 71 Document 16: Department of State Cable from George P. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 72 Document 17: Department of State, Office of the Secretary Delegation Cable from George P. By working together to combat terrorism, our efforts should be more effective. In its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program, the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that Iraq probably plans to eventually obtain nuclear weapons. The CIA says it has not identified such a program, but remarks that Iraq "has made a few moves that could take it in that direction," while noting the difficulty of clandestine research and development and procurement of the necessary technology and fissile materials. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 75 Document 20: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from Barbara K. Tells the State Department that a government official from (presumably) South Korea reported that Iraq asked his government to militarize Hughes helicopters that were sold and delivered earlier in 1983. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 76 Document 21: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99) from Ronald W. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 77 Document 22: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality," October 7, 1983. Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical weapons against Iranian troops. Officials from the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs tell Secretary Shultz that the department has additional information confirming Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 80 Document 25: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Jonathan T. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 82 Document 27: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to visit Iraq during his tour of Middle Eastern countries as an envoy for President Reagan, but notes that he does not think his visit will be worthwhile unless he meets directly with Saddam Hussein. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 83 Document 28: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 84 Document 29: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Ambassador Rumsfeld's Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein," December 14, 1983. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 85 Document 30: United States Embassy in Italy Cable from Maxwell M. At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein evinces "obvious pleasure" at a letter Rumsfeld brought from President Ronald Reagan. He encourages arrangements that might provide alternative transshipment routes for Iraq's oil, including pipelines through Saudi Arabia or to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan. Rumsfeld comments on Iraq's oil exports, suggests alternative pipeline facilities, and discusses opposition to international terrorism and support for a fair Arab-Israeli peace. Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act 88 Document 33: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Richard W. Eagleburger to William Draper, Dated December 24, 1983 , December 22, 1983. Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financial credits. It would have carried oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq's oil output that resulted from Iran's attacks on oil transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf and from Syria's closing of a pipeline that had transported Iraqi oil. International financier Bruce Rappaport, a friend of CIA director William Casey, was also a central figure in the proposed deal. The Israelis, for their part, demanded guarantees that pipeline facilities would not cause environmental damage. All involved had their reasons for at least hy...
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