www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1007288,00.html
I did this with great sadness but, in doing so, I was able to leave Iraq with a clear conscience. If I had stayed any longer, I might not have been able to say that. I feared my role with the reconstruction council was sliding from what I had originally envisioned - working with allies in a democratic fashion - to collaborating with occupying forces. I had returned to Baghdad in May, a few weeks after the fall of Saddam Hussein, with much hope after 25 years in exile from my country. It was one of the most difficult decisions of my life to accept the invitation of the US government to return with more than 140 other Iraqis as part of this council to help with the postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation of ministries so that Iraq could eventually be turned over to a transitional government. My understanding of this council, which first reported to retired general Jay Garner, and is now under civil administrator Paul Bremer, was that we would work with Iraq's ministries, not as ministers, but in the background as advisers. Its goal was to restore Iraq's badly damaged infrastructure - the electricity, the hospitals, the water supplies and the transportation routes - at least to its pre-war state so that the country could be turned over to a transitional government. Though we council members came from all over the world, we are all Iraqis. I accepted the fact that we were a defeated country, and had no problem working with the US. But there seemed to be no interest on the part of the coalition in involving Iraqis as advisers on the future of their nation. Even reporters who visited us took note, writing that although the reconstruction council has an office within the presidential palace, there seems to be little done there apart from members reading their email. There was euphoria when Baghdad first fell, but the Americans acted with arrogance. While many Iraqis are relieved to see Saddam out, and accept the fact that the US is the only power than can secure some semblance of order, they now see it acting as an occupier. Sadly, the vision for a transitional government and democratic elections put forward by Wolfowitz seems to have been forgotten in the everyday pressures of postwar Iraq. Wolfowitz is just one player and there are many others on the ground in Iraq who do not share his vision. Even the soldiers here bluntly say they take their orders from their general, not from Bremer. Bitter disputes between the defence department and the state department continue to affect the situation. Even though Bremer has the formal authority within Iraq, it seems like each and every decision must go back to Washington, and we are the victims of indecision. We're not talking here about trying to achieve an ideal political system. People cannot understand why a superpower that can amass all that military might can't get the electricity back on. Iraqis are now contrasting Saddam's ability to bring back power after the war in 1991 to the apparent inability of the US to do so now. Sitting together to consider the future of Iraq are 25 representatives, hand-picked by the US-led coalition. The composition is not a bad one, but few of the members have substantial domestic constituencies. Whether the council is effective or not depends on whether its members are able to reach any consensus. There may be others, though many will no doubt stay and hope for the best. For my part, when I think about the Iraqi people - how strong they are, how hard they work - I remain optimistic for my country in the medium term. There are many signs that Iraqis are working together, without serious tensions between ethnicities. In the short term, however, I fear there will be more conflicts, run through with Iraqi and American blood. Isam al-Khafaji is a professor of political economy at the University of Amsterdam and author of the forthcoming Tormented Births: Passages to Modernity in Europe and the Middle East. He was a member of the Democratic Principles Working Group convened by the US state department to discuss the future of Iraqi governance. Special report 60 Iraq Guardian book 61 The War We Could Not Stop - the real story of the battle for Iraq, published by Guardian Books and Faber.
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