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The brainstorming sessions were run by then-Senior Vice President Brad Silverberg, who would ultimately head the company's Internet and Windows 95 strategies. He concluded that Apple would be dangerous in only one way: if it put all its resources behind making the company synonymous with this powerful medium called the Internet. Two years later it would be Netscape Communications and its Navigator Web browser that would epitomize the young medium's explosive potential. But it paid a heavy price: well over $100 million a year in development and marketing costs for Internet Explorer, according to federal court documents, an antitrust battle that attorneys estimate may have cost as much as $100 million in legal fees, and shattered relationships with government and industry figures. For the most part, according to industry veterans, the answer seems to be yes. Although Netscape never developed into a serious threat to Windows, it definitely had that potential. When Mosaic was released in 1993, only a handful of people at Microsoft were focused on the Internet. By the end of 1994, when Netscape released Navigator, a small Microsoft team had put together a browser strategy and 30 licensed technology from Mosaic spinoff Spyglass to create the first version of Internet Explorer, but the company was still focused on the release of Windows 95. In May of that year, Gates sent a now-famous 31 memo to his top staff highlighting the "Internet tidal wave," ordering them to refocus much of the company's activities on the Net. If software developers could have written their code instead for Netscape, which in turn could work with any operating system, the need to run Windows on every machine might have quickly diminished. Maybe it was a little paranoid, but Netscape developers had the same thought. The company was 33 pushing employees to do everything they could to raise the browser's market share, as underscored in an April 1996 memo to top Microsoft staff from Brad Chase, then a senior executive. The original Internet Explorer team was just five or six people. But Microsoft's aggressive distribution strategy eventually drew the attention of federal regulators, leading to one of the most complex and bitterly contested legal battles in corporate history. As documented later in voluminous court filings during the government's historic antitrust case, Microsoft: Gave the software away for free to Internet service providers and computer makers. Offered to pay whatever ISPs owed to Netscape if they agreed to switch from its rival. Paid America Online to convert subscribers to software using Internet Explorer technology. Provided co-marketing funds and lowered Windows pricing to PC makers that agreed to promote Internet Explorer. Labeled Internet Explorer an integral part of the Windows operating system, thereby prohibiting computer manufacturers from modifying or deleting it. By January 1998, Microsoft executive Joachim Kempin was able to report to CEO Bill Gates that Navigator was being shipped through only four of 60 outside distribution channels, such as ISPs and computer manufacturers. Later that year, Internet Explorer's market share had 34 caught up to Navigator by some critical measures. For most practical purposes, the 36 war was over by the following year. Greg Sullivan, lead product manager for Microsoft's Windows client division, says that the computing community as a whole has benefited from the Web's standardization around Internet Explorer. Competing platforms would have meant that developers would have had to duplicate their efforts more often, he said. Although software efforts with tiny market share such as Opera, Apple's Safari, and the open-source Mozilla project are evolving, they note, Internet Explorer itself has made no sweeping advancements in Web browser technology in years. The back button, bookmarks, address bar and home page button--all original Mosaic features--are still the basic tools of Web navigation. They contend that, under the hood, major strides were made in Internet Explorer's integration into the Windows system and the component-built model that helped win over big companies like AOL. In a way, Silverberg said, the fact that Internet Explorer never became synonymous with the Internet can be a measure of Microsoft's success. Nielsen added that Netscape never made any huge advancements either. Even Netscape co-founder Marc Andreessen says his company had slowed its pace of innovation by the end of true competition. By that time, Netscape had been forced to give away its browser for free, following Microsoft's lead. Others contend that the little browser advances have in sum been crucial to making the Web a mainstream consumer phenomenon. Aside from technology, perhaps Microsoft's most enduring legacy in the browser business is its public reputation for controversial pressure tactics with rivals and partners alike. Even years later, analysts say the lack of any serious punishment for Microsoft's deeds during the browser wars has left potential partners wary. Few now, as then, are willing to talk on the record about their experiences. From Microsoft's Bill Gates to Netscape founder Jim Clark, these are some of the most influential figures in the high-stakes browser battle. He took center stage as a 38 forgetful witness in the Justice Department's antitrust lawsuit against the company. He stepped down as CEO in 2000, becoming chairman and chief software architect, but remains Microsoft's most visible executive. He left Microsoft in 1999 and ultimately co-founded Ignition Partners, a venture capital firm focused on wireless and communication companies. He went on to form his own venture group, The Barksdale Group, which disbanded last year. He is now "special adviser" to the General Atlantic Partners venture capital group and CEO of Barksdale Management, a philanthropic investment group. Colbeth has since served on the board of several high-tech companies, including Webplan, OBCTV and Photowave.
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