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This report provides the results of the Department of the Army's review into allegations that Sarin Nerve gas was used during Operation TAILWIND. Additionally, there is no evidence that Sarin nerve gas was stored by the Army in Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand. The Department of the Army's review into the alleged use of Sarin Nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND focused on three specific research efforts. First, we conducted a search for targeted documents which relate to the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. We searched in the National Archives' Washington National Record Center and within the Army organizations which could be expected to have been involved in any such use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. These searches revealed that there are no existing documents which indicate that the Department of the Army participated in the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. The Army Declassification Agency did a search of their database using eighteen specific keywords (listed on page 2 of their report, see tab entitled Archives Search). The search identified 132 folders which required additional review. Of these, 130 were at the National Archive's Washington National Record Center (WNRC) (located in Suitland MD) and 2 rolls of microfilm which are at the Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks (Carlisle, PA). This in-depth review of the contents of each folder and microfilm was NEGATIVE for Operation TAILWIND information. The Technology Management Office within the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army released a message to all Army organizations which could be expected to have documentary evidence of any use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. Each organi-zation was tasked to review their current files area and records holding areas, for all classified and unclassified documents that reference Sarin or TAILWIND during the period 1 Jan 70 and 31 Dec 75. This search resulted in four organizations reporting information pertaining to Sarin - none of which was related to Operation TAILWIND. Army Criminal Investigation Command National Guard Bureau Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Center for Military History The Army Judge Advocate General The Army Inspector General The Army Surgeon General Office of the Secretary of the Army Program Manager, Chemical Demilitarization Office TAB A contains the results of document searches directed by the Technology Management Office and the Army Declassification Activity. Second, the Center for Military History telephonically interviewed six of seven individuals identified as possibly having firsthand knowledge of Operation TAILWIND and, thus, any use of Sarin Nerve gas. SGT Jay Graves declined to be interviewed, but provided a statement to the Special Forces Association. None of the interviewees had personal knowledge of the use of Sarin or any lethal chemical agent during Operation TAILWIND. All stated that the purpose of the mission was to attack installations on the Ho Chi Minh trail and create a diversion for another operation. Adair one of the individuals interviewed also stated that there was no mention before or after the mission about defectors or Caucasians in the area of operations. Adair himself saw no Caucasians during the operation except his fellow soldiers. His mask had a bullet through the filter and when he breathed the gas, "I started throwing up, (and) fell to the ground in convulsions. Each interview attempted to gain answers to the following: Document any information regarding the use of lethal chemical munitions in Vietnam. Identify the exact storage location (base and country) of any lethal chemical munitions known by the interviewee. Identify the authority empowered to authorize the tactical use of lethal chemical munitions in support of Special Operations Group (SOG) missions. Identify the name and role of any soldier who might have additional information regarding Operation TAILWIND. The following lists the individuals who were interviewed: Individuals interviewed: Name Identified as a result of SGT Minton, FNU Provided FAC audio tape from SOCOM archives MSG Adair, Morris N. From USARV list of awarded individuals SGT Young, David L. From USARV list of awarded individuals WO1 Watson, William D. Referral SGT Schmidt, Craig Early Bird Article SGT Hagen, Michael E. Third, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics tasked the Army Materiel Command to provide answers to specific questions raised during internal DoD/Army discussions. We know that during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND, the Army had weapons containing lethal chemical agents stored within the continental United States and in Okinawa. There is no evidence that any lethal chemical agents were released for employment during the time of Operation TAILWIND. Following are the specific research questions: What was the quantity of Sarin the US Army controlled then and now? Where were lethal chemical munitions stored during the time of the operation? Who had authority to issue lethal chemical agents from the storage sites? TAB C contains the results of the research and the Army documents tasking the research. The Army researched additional issues which arose while developing this report. The research revealed that the shipping labels do not conform with marking requirements in place at the time of Operation TAILWIND, for ammunition con-taining lethal chemical agents. Thus, the presence of the shipping label does not indi-cate a presence of Sarin. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DA, orchestrated research to determine which DoD agency was the executive agent for lethal chem-ical agents, and who had command and control of the lethal agents stored in Okinawa during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND. The Center for Military History interviewed MG (Ret) John Hayes, the former Commander, 2^nd Logistics Command, Okinawa, where Sarin was stored during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND. MG Hayes had command and control of the Sarin stockpile in Okinawa during TAILWIND. TAB F contains the interview notes of MG(Ret) Hayes and other related documents. It cost the Department of the Army approximately $38,418 and 1,795 workhours to conduct this research. TAB C Detailed costs TAB D Analysis of shipping label and packing document allegedly related to a 1970 shipment of unusual weapons to Okinawa, provided by DoD for Army evaluation. TAB E Interviews of MG (Ret) John Hayes, former Commander, 2^nd Logistics Command, Okinawa, during the TAILWIND period, confirming command and control of lethal chemical munitions and disposition of these munitions under his command.
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