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War-Gamed Why the Army shouldn't be so surprised by Saddam's moves. By Fred Kaplan Posted Friday, March 28, 2003, at 1:55 PM PT Much has been made of Thursday's remark by 32 Lt. Planned over a two-year period, at a cost of $250 million, the game involved 13,500 personnel from all four services--Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines--who waged mock war in 17 simulation locations and nine live-force training sites. The scenario envisioned a war in a fictitiously named Persian Gulf country that resembled Iraq. The objective was to test (and, if all went well, to validate) a set of new combat theories based less on massive force and more on speed, agility, highly accurate weapons, and supremely coordinated command and control. These theories--known as "military transformation" and " 36 effects-based operations"--would serve as the underlying strategy of the real war against the real Iraq that's happening now. Marine Corps general named Paul Van Riper wrote an e-mail to some of his friends, casting grave doubt on this conclusion. Pentagon war games pit "Red Force" (simulating the enemy) against "Blue Force" (the United States). In this war game, as in many war games over the years, Van Riper played the Red Force commander. At one point in the game, when Blue's fleet entered the Persian Gulf, he sank some of the ships with suicide-bombers in speed boats. Yet, Van Riper said in his e-mail, the game's managers remanded some of his moves as improper and simply blocked others from being carried out. According to the Army Times summary, "Exercise officials denied him the opportunity to use his own tactics and ideas against Blue, and on several occasions directed Red Force not to use certain weapons systems against Blue. As he explained in his e-mail, "You don't come to a conclusion beforehand and then work your way to that conclusion. However, it also quoted a retired colonel who was familiar with the game and supportive of the theories being tested. Scripted war-game enemies may roll over, but, as we're seeing, real enemies sometimes think of tricky ways to fight back. Advertisement Also on MSN For MSN's complete coverage of the conflict in Iraq, click 39 here. Marine in Iraq on Slate's home page by Eric Feferberg/Agence France Presse. Join the Fray, our reader discussion forum 47 POST A MESSAGE 48 READ MESSAGES Remarks from the Fray: Military bureaucracies routinely fail to adapt to new ideas, and insist, as one observer put it, on "fighting the last war". The Royal Navy, prior to World War II, would not allow British submarines to participate in wargames after dark, because it was too difficult for the British destroyers to find them. The exercises were scripted to allow the Royal Navy to believe they had the German submarine problem entirely under control. And curiously enough, the German U-Boat commanders weren't gracious enough to withdraw from combat after dark. This forced the British Navy to actually learn its trade, and master the extremely delicate art of hunting submarines for real. In the year and a half that it took them to do this, the Germans were able to wreak havoc across the Atlantic, sinking cargo almost at will and nearly bringing Britain to its knees. Van Riper, as a Marine Lieutenant General, should make that distinction, play only for the sake of "exercise" and replace the whining attitude with the win/win outcome such exercises are designed to engender. He's obviously an excellent Marine, but his desire to "play it out to the finish" clouded his judgment as to the common good. There are no perfect military plans, only perfect intentions. But the question leads to another failure on the part of the civilian leaders at the Pentagon. War games are based largely on intelligence estimates, and by all accounts Rumsfeld and company have done more to distort the interpretation of raw intelligence than a triple dose of Mr.
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