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| 2003/2/23 [Politics/Domestic/President/Clinton, Politics/Domestic/President/Reagan] UID:27498 Activity:very high |
2/22 The BBC & The Perils Of Reporting From The Islamic Republic Of Iran
http://iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news_en.pl?l=en&y=2003&m=02&d=17&a=7
Plus 12 minutes video
Thank you jimmy carter and ramsey clark.
\_ really, it was carter who sold arms to Khomeni to help him
suppress rebellions?
\_ no, you must be thinking of Bill Clinton who bought
them from Iran to arm the mujahideen in Bosnia
and Kosovo.
\_ Carter is secretly a radical islamic terrorist who masterminded
the whole thing. I think he has something to do with Al Qeada too.
\_ We saw some of his (and Bill's) handiwork in
North Korea too. Please pick up a history book.
\_ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm
\_ LOL I love when people post this. Carter himself
tried to lavishly bribe the 5 or so Sandinista
generals to woo them to the US. Of source, we know
generals to woo them to the US. Of course, we know
delegated to the President.
the result. Incidentally, war powers are explicitly
delegated to the President. Of the 200+ conflicts
since the founding of the Republic Congress has
declared war ~ 5 times.
The overt funding by the Soviets to the Sandinistas
was well in excess of 1 Billion. As a proxy for the
Soviets, Castro had a large military advisory
and fighting contigent there as well (not to mention
angola and elsewhere in africa)
Right back at ya:
Clinton Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn
Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/DCH109A.html
\_ What does any of that have to do with Iran?
Please try to stay on topic.
\_ the topic is Republican administrations providing
arms to Iran, and the freepers don't want to
talk about that.
\_ Under the Democrats People exploit people
Under the Republicans it's the exact opposite |
| 5/24 |
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| iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news_en.pl?l=en&y=2003&m=02&d=17&a=7 It was expected that the reports would also be aired on BBC World's Reporters, a weekly showcase for BBC correspondents, for audiences around the world, including those inside Iran. More than two months later, the piece has yet to be run. Is the BBC deliberately choosing not to show this rare and excellent piece of social reportage from Iran to those who would be interested in it most? Are bosses at BBC World news concerned that the broadcast would be a catalyst for the uprising of the disenchanted in Iran? The report by the award wining team of BBC special correspondent Sue Lloyd-Roberts and world affairs producer Ian O'Reilly was a bold and accurate account of the social crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The extended 16 twelve-minute report focused on public hangings and floggings, the epidemic of suicides, the millions of people addicted to drugs and the disillusion of Iranian youth. After talking to a student leader without permission and filming prostitutes openly soliciting on the streets of Tehran, Lloyd-Roberts and O'Reilly were arrested and almost half of their tapes were confiscated. Two days later they were deported and told never to return to the IRI. The authorities accused them of attempting to expose a negative image of and being a danger to the national interest of the country. Back in London, despite lacking their confiscated material, they managed to compile a terrifying portrait of life in modern Tehran which was broadcast on BBC Two's Newsnight on 10th December 2002. Reportedly high-ranking officials of the IRI embassy in London together with an unidentified visiting Minister were amongst the more than a million viewers who watched the programme. In addition to seeing footages of hanging and stoning, they heard - A young Iranian woman complain," They've forced this veiling on us against the Qoran and against our will and lots of other pseudo doctrines as well. After the revolution, they controlled even innocent pastimes. My brother and sister were arrested, for goodness sake, for just walking down a street together. She said, its "because the mullahs want to get on with what they want to do. I think they let us get away with more these days, like with make-up and drugs. If he can't get these reforms through, he should resign We want a change in the political system but without violence. They expressed shock and horror at what is happening in Iran, thanked the BBC and Newsnight for at last taking an honest look at life under the mullahs and praised Sue for her bravery, honesty and determination to tell such a difficult and largely untold story. One can only imagine the official representatives of the IRI seething with rage. Not only had so many of the suppressed truths of the Islamic republic been aired before a British audience, they had also hugely underestimated the journalistic determination and professional guile of Lloyd-Roberts and O'Reilly. These officials believed that all uncomfortable disclosures had been prevented by the secret service confiscating nearly half of the Newsnight team's tapes and then deporting them. They had been unaware of the additional filming that Lloyd-Roberts and O'Reilly had done in the early mornings and late nights when they were not monitored by their official Government translator/minder. Using separate tapes which they did not declare to the authorities (and were not found in several searches) they had interviewed prostitutes, opposition politicians, drug users and ordinary people who just wanted to talk. As such they had evaded the tight parameters of newsgathering in the IRI, which restrict the free flow of information to the outside world. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance -- Ershad Activities of all foreign journalist and news agencies in Iran are "supervised" by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Known as Ershad the ministry acts as a liaison between various government centres and institutions. It issues press accreditation to foreign journalists working in the country and arranges schedules and appointments for those who are not resident. In effect Ershad controls their movement and access to news stories and sources of information. All foreign journalists have an on-going relationship with Ershad and are, directly & indirectly, subject to the ministry's various methods of supervision - methods which one way or another ensure that all reports are, in the eyes of the clerical establishment, politically correct - exceptions are rare and never repeated. As a resident foreign correspondent explained, "I can not cover a story without a written permit. Indeed the arrest and deportation of Lloyd-Roberts and O'Reilly is not an isolated case. In the past few years several journalists and news organizations have either been deported or barred from visiting Iran because the IRI has not liked their reporting. In Oct 2002 the government barred American- Iranian Christiane Amanpour, CNN's chief foreign correspondent, from entering Iran. Her troubles with the authorities appeared to stem from a series of reports she carried out in the country nearly two years before. In one of the items, Amanpour had shown the secret underground life of young Iranians going to parties to meet members of the opposite sex. In July 2002 the director for foreign correspondents' affairs of Ershad confirmed that "New York Times" columnist Thomas Friedman would not be allowed to return to Iran. He had been accused of espionage after he wrote a series of op-ed articles in June about his one-week trip to Iran. Friedman had written about a bomb that is "ticking away in Iranian society" because President Mohammad Khatami had failed to fulfil the hopes of the young. Damage Limitation Exercise In relation to Lloyd-Roberts and O'Reilly, the clerical establishment had been caught red handed. My sources tell me that the day after the broadcast, London officials of the IRI embarked on a massive further damage limitation exercise. Top of their list was that this report had, at all cost, to be stopped from being broadcast on BBC World news into Iran. A seasoned analyst of Iranian politics and society in Tehran who asked to remain anonymous believes that the IRI was faced with a dilemma. Diplomatic relations between Britain and IRI had been improving after a damaging row when the IRI government vetoed the appointment of David Reddaway as ambassador the previous year. Richard Dalton had been appointed British envoy to Tehran and was due to take up his ambassadorial post. In addition the IRI had entered into a much sought after negotiation with the European Union concerning a trade and investment agreement, subject to improvements in the human rights situation in Iran. Therefore from the IRI's point of view taking drastic action against the BBC, such as withdrawing resident correspondent Jim Muir's visa and accreditation and closing down their Tehran bureau would most probably be too drastic. No matter how much Lloyd-Roberts's report enraged and embarrassed them, it would create a public relations and diplomatic havoc which at this point the regime could ill afford. Muir was not in the IRI at the time but inevitably he had to take the brunt of the regime's admonishment. Muir must have been taken seriously by BBC World news bosses in London. Since, two months later, Lloyd-Roberts's Tehran report or a version of it has still not been broadcast on the BBC World channel. Extended foreign reports which first appear on BBC domestic outlets, often then turn-up on the weekly Reporters programme broadcast on BBC News 24 in the UK and on the BBC's commercial international news and current affairs television channel BBC World. BBC World is broadcast into over a hundred countries around the world, including Iran, and is watched by hundreds of millions of people every week - it has become the trusted international news channel of choice. The work of Lloyd-Roberts is normally showcased on the Reporters programme. However unusually, the social report from Tehran report was not transmitted. As it will be fighting its own war for dominance of the airways with rival international news channels, did the BBC W... |
| www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm Chapter 27 President Reagan The President is the only individual granted power and responsibility by the Constitution. In other delegations of power and authority, the Constitution deals with entities -- the Congress, the courts, the states. In cases of conduct involving political objectives rather than venal objectives, the procedure of impeachment, which brings into play the political judgment of both houses of Congress, would ordinarily be preferred over criminal charges and a trial by jury. Further, the President's awesome responsibility for policy decisions necessary to our national safety was not intended to be belittled by requiring him to deal personally with the thicket of statutes, regulations, and orders that regulate Government activity. He ordinarily would be entitled to rely on his staff and Cabinet to see that his decisions are carried out in a legal manner. But because a President, and certainly a past President, is subject to prosecution in appropriate cases, the conduct of President Reagan in the Iran/contra matter was reviewed by Independent Counsel against the applicable statutes. It was concluded that President Reagan's conduct fell well short of criminality which could be successfully prosecuted. Fundamentally, it could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that President Reagan knew of the underlying facts of Iran/contra that were criminal or that he made criminal misrepresentations regarding them. In the Iran initiative, President Reagan chose to proceed in the utmost secrecy, disregarding the Administration's public policy prohibiting arms sales to nations supporting terrorism. North of the National Security Council staff and others associated with the initiative invited criminal acts including profiteering on the Iranian arms sales, the diversion of some of those proceeds to aid the contras, destroying documents, and lying to Congress to cover up their criminal activities. The President said he did not authorize any profits from the sale of arms to Iran and that he was unaware that there were excess proceeds and that some of them were diverted to aid the contras. The participants in the November 24, 1986, meeting were concerned, however, with the question of legality, rightly or wrongly. Weinberger was indicted by a federal Grand Jury on June 16, 1992, on five counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements. Weinberger was pardoned by President Bush on December 24, 1992. Only Poindexter could supply direct evidence, and he denied passing on this information. The wide destruction of records by North eliminated any possible documentary proof. Poindexter, who testified that he did not inform the President of the diversion, said he nevertheless believed the President would have approved it had it been presented to him. President Reagan made it clear to his national security advisers Robert C. In doing so, he confronted his staff with two virtually incompatible objectives. This determination to surmount Boland was seized on by North and others as a justification for violating Boland and later lying to Congress about such violations. Independent Counsel found no prosecutable evidence that the President expressly authorized or was informed of the illegal features of North's operational participation in the covert contra-resupply operation and his financing of the operation. President Reagan was aware of and even encouraged some aspects of external funding for the contras, such as solicitation of aid from third countries and contributions from private benefactors. President Reagan supplied information regarding his knowledge of these activities in sworn answers to written interrogatories posed by Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury, his testimony during the Poindexter trial, and a deposition by Independent Counsel in July 1992. In addition, North, Poindexter and other central figures testified during the investigation and in various trials. Documents were also produced after the Select Iran/contra Committees had completed their investigation in 1987. President Reagan's activities were analyzed in four broad aspects: the military and paramilitary support of the contras from 1984 to 1986; Military and Paramilitary Support to the Contras, October 1984 to October 1986 Financial Support From the congressional cut off of contra military aid until October 1986, when Congress again appropriated funds for contra assistance, there were three sources of funding developed by NSC officials to carry out President Reagan's generalized admonition to keep the contras together body and soul'': third-country grants; Of the three, third-country funding, particularly from the Saudis, was by far the biggest source, amounting to $32 million. Other governments, at the request of the Administration, made available weapons, documentation to disguise the origin of weapon shipments, and facilities to accommodate contra camps and provide logistical support. Although Vice President Bush and CIA Director William J. Casey felt third-country assistance would be legal absent any quid-pro-quo arrangement, Secretary of State George P. The Attorney General also said that any nation agreeing to supply aid could not look to the United States to repay that commitment in the future. Poindexter testified that he did not inform the President of the diversion, and Meese and White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Reagan, Remarks at a Meeting with the President's Special Review Board, 12/1/86, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1986 Vol. Domestic fundraising for the contras presented a more complicated picture. There is no doubt that, at least beginning with his appearance at a dinner for the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund in April 1985 and continuing through mid-1986, President Reagan, like North, was a frequent and enthusiastic fundraiser for contra-related causes. The President's appeals seem to have been confined to non-lethal, humanitarian'' aid. He held meetings and exchanged commendatory correspondence with its officials and big contributors, often at North's request. President Reagan stated that he did not know that North wound up with actual control of the funds raised through NEPL and passed them through to the secret Swiss accounts managed by retired Air Force Maj. My understanding came from briefing papers provided to me by my staff and by correspondence I received from NEPL . I thought of their effort on behalf of the NFF as identical to these other information programs. I was generally aware that some assistance was flowing from the private sources to the NFF and that some of this assistance would have included military support. This information was public knowledge as early as 1985 and was even mentioned in Congressional debate about a request for funding in August 1985. I believed such activity to be similar to the efforts by Americans in other conflicts. Although I did not seek or directly encourage private citizens to provide military support, I did encourage William Simon and others to provide humanitarian assistance through the Nicaraguan Freedom Fund (Tab 14A). I also knew, as had been previously reported in the press, that Mrs. Garwood had contributed money to refurbish a Medevac helicopter. I understood her contributions to be of a humanitarian nature, and when I met Mrs. The President's knowledge was much more complete regarding the obtaining of funds for the contras from foreign governments. But Independent Counsel found no evidence that he knew that, after North had set up his secret contra-resupply operation, control over most of those contributions also passed to North. In May or June 1984, McFarlane advised the President that the Saudi Arabian ambassador, Prince Bandar, volunteered to deliver $1 million-per-month to a contra bank account. On June 25, 1984, third-country solicitation was discussed at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). CIA Director Casey reported that the CIA was down to $250,000 remaining from the Fiscal 1984 appropriation for the contras, and that the contras had arms and ammunition to last only until August. Casey brought up the subject of third-country funding, prompting a debate between Secre... |
| www.globalresearch.ca/articles/DCH109A.html NOTE: This paper assumes the reader is acquainted with the basic facts of the Bosnian war leading to the IFOR deployment. SFOR begins its mission in Bosnia under a serious cloud both as to the nature of its mission and the dangers it will face. While IFOR had successfully accomplished its basic military task - separating the factions' armed forces - there has been very little progress toward other stated goals of the Dayton agreement, including political and economic reintegration of Bosnia, return of refugees to their homes, and apprehension and prosecution of accused war criminals. It is far from certain that the cease-fire that has held through the past year will continue for much longer, in light of such unresolved issues as the status of the cities of Brcko (claimed by Muslims but held by the Serbs) and Mostar (divided between nominal Muslim and Croat allies, both of which are currently being armed by the Clinton Administration). Moreover, at a strength approximately one-third that of its predecessor, SFOR may not be in as strong a position to deter attacks by one or another of the Bosnian factions or to avoid attempts to involve it in renewed fighting: "IFOR forces, despite having suffered few casualties, have been vulnerable to attacks from all of the contending sides over the year of the Dayton mandate. Focuses Bomb Probe on Iran, Saudi Dissident," Chicago Tribune, 11/4/96 - it is irresponsible in the extreme for the Clinton Administration to gloss over the extent to which its policies have put American personnel in an increasingly vulnerable position while performing an increasingly questionable mission. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April 1995, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described by Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark until after the decision was made. The Militant Islamic Network (page 5): Along with the weapons, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence operatives entered Bosnia in large numbers, along with thousands of mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Muslim world. Also engaged in the effort were several other Muslim countries (including Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey) and a number of radical Muslim organizations. For example, the role of one Sudan-based "humanitarian organization," called the Third World Relief Agency, has been well documented. The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime (page 8): Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided green light policy is a complete misreading of its main beneficiary, the Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic. Rather than being the tolerant, multiethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is clear evidence that the ruling circle of Izetbegovic's party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), has long been guided by the principles of radical Islam. This Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of three important officials, including President Izetbegovic himself; The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments Both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia issued reports late last year. The House report is classified, with the exception of the final section of conclusions, which was released on October 8, 1996; Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms, Avoid Iran," Los Angeles Times, 7/14/96 Among the key conclusions of the House Subcommittee were the following (taken from the unclassified section released on October 8): * "The President and the American people were poorly served by the Administration officials who rushed the green light decision without due deliberation. The Iranian presence and influence in Bosnia jumped radically in the months following the green light. Iranian elements infiltrated the Bosnian government and established close ties with the current leadership in Bosnia and the next generation of leaders. Iranian Revolutionary Guards accompanied Iranian weapons into Bosnia and soon were integrated in the Bosnian military structure from top to bottom as well as operating in independent units throughout Bosnia. The Iranian intelligence service intelligence service VEVAK ran wild through the area developing intelligence networks, setting up terrorist support systems, recruiting terrorist 'sleeper' agents and agents of influence, and insinuating itself with the Bosnian political leadership to a remarkable degree. The Iranians effectively annexed large portions of the Bosnian security apparatus known as the Agency for Information and Documentation (AID) to act as their intelligence and terrorist surrogates. This extended to the point of jointly planning terrorist activities. That is, the Iranians and other Muslim militants had long been active in Bosnia; In short, the Clinton Administration's policy of facilitating the delivery of arms to the Bosnian Muslims made it the de facto partner of an ongoing international network of governments and organizations pursuing their own agenda in Bosnia: the promotion of Islamic revolution in Europe. That network involves not only Iran but Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (a key ally of Iran), and Turkey, together with front groups supposedly pursuing humanitarian and cultural activities. For example, one such group about which details have come to light is the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Sudan-based, phoney humanitarian organization which has been a major link in the arms pipeline to Bosnia. WP, 9/22/96 (Sheik Rahman, a native of Egypt, is currently in prison in the United States; Binladen was a resident in Khartoum, Sudan, until last year; It may have been simply a straightforward effort to determine whether chemical weapons were being shipped into Bosnia. It was certainly, at least in part, an opportunity to examine a rocket in which the United States had some interest. The Mujahedin Threat In addition to (and working closely with) the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence are members of numerous radical groups known for their anti-Western orientation, along with thousands of volunteer mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Islamic world. From the beginning of the NATO- led deployment, the Clinton Administration has given insufficient weight to military concerns regarding the mujahedin presence in Bosnia as well as the danger they pose to American personnel. Many of the fighters are concentrated in the so-called "green triangle" (the color green symbolizes Islam) centered on the town of Zenica in the American IFOR/SFOR zone but are also found throughout the country. The Clinton Administration has been willing to accept Sarajevo's transparently false assurances of the departure of the foreign fighters based on the contention that they have married Bosnian women and have acquired Bosnian citizenship --- and thus are no longer "foreign"! Bodansky, an analyst with the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, is an internationally recognized authority on Islamic terrorism. For example, in February 1996 NATO forces raided a terrorist training camp near the town of Fojnica, taking into custody 11 men (8 Bosnian citizens - two of whom may have been naturalized foreign mujahedin and three Iranian instructors); The Sarajevo government denounced the raid, claiming the facility was an "intelligence service school"; Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1995 The evidence that the leadership of the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and consequently, the Sarajevo-based government, has long been motivated by the principles of radical Islam is inescapable. Following Khomeini's accession to power in 1979, Izetbegovic stepped-up his efforts to establish Islamic power in Bosnia and was jailed by the communists in 1983. Says," New York Times, 1/l/97, and Washington Times, 1/2/97 Adil Zulfikarpasic, a Mus... |