www.theatlantic.com/unbound/fallows/jf2003-01-08/vandergriff2.htm
Twice nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for his work in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, he has also been featured in The New Yorker and numerous other magazines. He is a commercial-rated pilot and one of the few civilians to have flown both the F-100 and the F-15. Donald Vandergriff is an active duty army officer currently serving as deputy director of Army ROTC at Georgetown University. He was editor of 36 Spirit, Blood, and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century. He is the author of around twenty-five articles on military affairs. James Fallows is The Atlantic's national correspondent and the author of 37 Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy (1996) and of 38 Free Flight: From Airline Hell to a New Age of Travel. Previously in Fallows@large: 40 Inside Admissions (September 25, 2002) A dialogue between James Fallows and Jacques Steinberg, the author of The Gatekeepers: Inside the Admissions Process of a Premier College. From: Donald Vandergriff To: James Fallows Subject: Re: What's wrong with the military? Generation warfare, though, is not confined to a specific historic period. All four can be seen somewhere in the world today and are driven by specific cultural attributes. Officers of this period were from the aristocratic class, possessed little or no professional training, and operated under one individual making all or most of the tactical and operational decisions. The French Revolution spurred the transformation from first- to second-generation warfare. Second-generation warfare is essentially an industrial war of attrition, characterized by Materialschlacht (German for material might). Grant, George Patton, John Shirley Wood, and David Hackworth). It advocates the use of massive firepower, calling for a strictly controlled battlefield outlined by detailed graphics. Both the divisional and corps graphics in Desert Storm and the checklists and lock-step industrial-based education at Army branch schools and combat-training centers illustrate this tendency. Despite the Revolution in Military Affairs that occurred during World War I with the introduction of third-generation warfare, the United States decided to remain with second-generation warfare. It has remained obsessed with maintaining a small regular Army supported by a strategy of mobilization, built upon a force of amateurs, and sustained by an industrial-age personnel system. Unfortunately, second-generation warfare--which is based on a culture that promotes centralized decisions and which often now relies on information technology--tends to stifle subordinate independence and autonomy. Third-generation warfare evolved during World War I as a German bottom-up, idea-based, and technologically supported reaction to the Allies' material superiority. It relies on groups of highly trained units led by well-educated and well-trained leaders trusted to make on the spot decisions to bypass enemy strengths and attack his vulnerabilities, such as headquarters, supply depots, and artillery units. The key to third-generation warfare's success was that the Germans already possessed a culture that emphasized decentralization and rapid decision-making by its officer corps and NCOs. On the battlefield this involves nonlinear tactics, such as making penetrations based on awareness of surfaces and gaps, reconnaissance pull (where scouts find weaknesses and larger forces follow their success), and multiple thrusts. It includes Auftragstatik (mission tactics), which are decentralized but harmonized by the ideas of commander's intent and Schwerpunkt (focus of effort). Third-generation requires the utmost in thought and agility from its officers, leaders, and units. Fourth-generation warfare is an extension of third-generation warfare, with no limits to its depth, no front lines, and targets beyond the traditional military ones. The concept was introduced in a now famous article published in the October, 1989 issue of Marine Corps Gazette called "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" by William S. Wilson is an authority on fourth-generation warfare and through his prolific writings on the subject he is introducing it to many police departments in this country as well as to junior leaders. The military bureaucracy has once again shown its true face by forcing Col. Fourth-generation warfare involves irregular warfighting skills/capabilities in close-quarters combat and small unit operations among state/non-state participants. Army's current second-generation-focused doctrine, fourth-generation warfare calls for a decreased reliance on firepower/attrition in ground combat. It also decreases the reliance on deep strike/strategic bombardment in air warfare. The officer corps that operates in a fourth-generation-warfare environment must be expert in fast-transient littoral penetration operations, information war operations, Special Forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/anti-terrorist/anti-nuclear operations, and combat. It is the third and fourth generations of warfare that present a challenge to the current Army culture. Army in dealing with the evolving face of war is a cultural one. In terms of potential opponents, Army planners tend to focus on China because of its economic size and conventional and nuclear threats. When the Army planners do think of other threats, they focus on "targets" for weapons systems to take out. Yet, reality suggests that many potential opponents exist within "rogue" states or "states of concern" such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Serbia, and Afghanistan. What makes the threat of warfare more likely is if these countries harness their potential with an understanding of fourth-generation warfare. You also asked me to explain what, if anything, the terms "transformation" and "RMA" mean? The disciples of RMA believe that the advocacy and bankrolling of technology will mean future wars can be fought at a distance with no blood sacrifices from our side (meaning politically safe as the scale of risk aversion grows). There is no true revolution here, but just a continual belief that weapons systems can provide some type of "silver bullet" that will enable decision makers to avoid facing the reality of war--that war is dirty, vicious, and must be fought and won by the people on the ground using their minds and character. I don't endorse RMA in my book because a true revolution causes cultural, not technological, changes. John Boyd would point his finger and say to the Pentagon bureaucrats, "Machines don't fight wars. My fear with RMA is that as technology continues to evolve, especially in the avenues of information warfare, it will lead to increased oversight by each level of command. Lay this technology over our current force structure, with its many layers of command managed by people who have risen through a personnel system that has strong ties to the industrial/Progressive era, and the result will be that our military ends up even more centralized with a slower OODA loop (slow decision making cycle). This was demonstrated during NATO's war with Serbia, and again in Afghanistan, though I must attest to the superior performance of the Special Forces teams on the ground, who were making real-time decisions based on the enemy, not on out-of-date directives made back in the States. At least some people in the Army are recognizing this conflict between the outdated way it manages people and the ongoing technological evolution. You also asked me about my struggle to change the military personnel system and how the prospect of war with Iraq may affect those efforts. This question ties in well with the ending to the last answer. This entails a lot, and going to one of the numerous "task force" Web pages the Army has recently established will attest to the effort now taking place to study the impact the evolving face of war will have on the future Army. It remains to be seen whether what is now being written will turn into reality. Many in the Army have recently recognized what has been known for centuries by military leaders and historians--that groups of soldiers and leaders that are kept together ...
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