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| 5/24 |
| 2002/4/18 [Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Israel] UID:24476 Activity:very high |
4/17 must reads:
http://www.ajds.org.au/intifada/mendes.htm
http://www.ajds.org.au/mendes.htm
I love this guy, we should all (including me sometimes) give this much
thought and consideration to all sides in the middle east.
\_ This guy sounds pretty biased to the palestinian side. Just listen
to the language he uses on scholars who take Israel's side.
\_ yeah, I thought that too, but it is still getting better, try
this, though I haven't finished it yet, soooo....
http://www.ajds.org.au/intifada/morris_shlaim.htm
\_ yeah, I thought that too, but it is still getting better
\_ Example please? I think it's quite rational. At least it lays out
the basic claims on each side pretty well, and I agree with the
conclusion. Namely that a) Israel's settlements in wb&gaza and
b) Palestinians' "right of return" claim are obstacles to peace.
Those settlements are morally indefensible IMO. Actually I
haven't even seen someone try to defend the idea. Any takers?
But clearly giving refugees land back from Israel isn't feasible
anymore.
\_ "Arabs didn't tell Palestinians to leave. Benny Morris says
so. All these other people who disagree are just
'ill-informed historians and propagandists,' repeating the
same arguments ad infinitum." Without looking more closely
into the issue, I ll take the side of many scholars who claim
X, over a single Benny Morris guy who claims not X.
\_ One concept: Jews all over the Middle East got kicked out of
the various Arab countries, their property taken, etc, and
went to Israel to start again because they had no where else
to go. They have no "right of return" to Syria, Tunisia,
Egypt, Iraq, Iran, or anywhere else. Palestinians are
*specifically not* welcome in _any_ Arab country. No one
wants them. They're a convenient economic, political, public
relations and terrorist weapon against Israel. The West Bank
was even worse off under Jordan's rule up to '67. In the
late 70's, Jordan officially gave up all claim to the WB.
Egypt no longer claims Gaza. Why is it the Jews will take in
other Jews who got forced from their homes but Arabs go out
of their way to *not* take in their so-called brothers?
Hint: *no one* wants the Palestinians. Jordan, Egypt, and
Kuwait all forced hundreds of thousands off their land in
one way or another. What's so damned special about the
Palestinians anyway? There are plenty of other people who
have a *much* better claim to an independent state and we
*never* hear about them. Kurds, Basque(sp?), Tibetans come
to mind. How about you give up some land for the American
Indians? You realise you live on tribal lands? Either
you've gotta say "tough shit" and life sucks to all of these
people or you're a hypocrite by not believing in all of their
causes, especially Native American's. Think about it. I'll
touch on this Native American thing later. You'll like it.
\_ What?! Are you saying that it's ok for the Israelites to be
as *barbaric* as the Turks, Saddam Hussein and the *commie*
Chinese?! Mighty fine company!
\_ And the Spanish and the US and many others. I'm saying
there's no difference and the *whole* world plays the
"might makes right" game. The difference in the Middle
East is that playing nice = get wiped out.
\_ Yea, Jews take in other Jews by settling them on Palestinian
land.
\_ And Arabs make more land for themselves by killing and
kicking out Palestinians *and* Jews. Chew on *that*.
\_ I like how neither of you talked about settlements.
One difference in this situation is that there just so
happens to be a chunk of land sitting there that is
rather perfect for creating a Palestinian state out of.
Well, if not for Israel deliberately building armed
camps all over the place. With Native Americans, yes
what the USA did was wrong. If you see someone doing
wrong, does Jewish religion say it's ok to copy them?
Or does it say to just not give a shit about non-Jews?
Go see the movie "The Bicycle Thief" btw. Also look at
East Timor, sometimes the UN actually kind of works.
Who says I don't believe in other people's causes?
But the US did its stuff 150 years ago. It's too late.
It's not too late in the case of Palestinians. And like
the other poster implied, do you want that Israel is
in the same moral category as those other regimes?
\_ How is it too late for the Native Americans? Hello?!
There's still MILLIONS of them on reservations right
here in this country TODAY! They're still being kicked
around and abused by our country RIGHT NOW! Are you
saying because the abuse *started* a long time ago, that
it is somehow OK that we continue it today? Sheesh.
Talk about settlements: ok, *you* currently live, work
and play on Native American land. When you're ready
to abide by the zillion and one treaties your government
broke to your direct benefit today then you'll be in a
non-hypocritical position to discuss other's faults. |
| 5/24 |
|
| www.ajds.org.au/intifada/mendes.htm Back to Articles Jewish Settlements and the Palestinian Right of Return: National Myths as joint barriers to Conflict Resolution by Dr Philip Mendes Monash University Recent events in the Middle East present a tragic and sobering reality for those of us committed to a peaceful solution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. More than ever, the region seems dominated by ideas and actions of extremism and violence, rather than those of moderation and reconciliation. Until the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada, I personally believed that a clearcut two-state solution was not only the most practical, but also the most likely, if not inevitable, outcome of the peace process. However, with hindsight, it now appears that the Oslo Accord was based on the inherently fatal defect of assuming that pragmatic conflict resolution could overcome the emotive and irrational aspects of the conflict. In short, the Oslo Accord did not require either the Israelis or the Palestinians to participate in a process of honest self-examination leading to a deconstruction of their core narratives regarding the history and the causes of the conflict. Consequently, neither side was willing to come to terms with the practical reality of dividing a land into two separate states, or move towards identifying the core limits of their proposed final state or territory. In particular, the Israelis failed to examine how the continued presence of militant Jewish settlements in sovereign Palestinian territory could possibly be compatible with a two-state solution. And similarly the Palestinians failed to conceptualise how the proposed return of hostile Palestinian refugees to Green Line Israel could possibly be acceptable to a sovereign Jewish state. The problem of the Jewish settlements needs to be addressed first for the simple reason that their presence has long acted as a foreclosure on the peace process. In addition, the current centre-right Israeli Government is firmly opposed not only to their dismantling, but even to a cessation of existing plans for expansion. Contrary to popular perception, the settlements were not solely the creation of right-wing governments committed to the concept of a Greater Israel. To be sure, the Begin and Shamir Likud governments were primarily responsible for their massive resourcing and growth. However, there was a broader national consensus in favor of Jewish settlement in the biblical areas called Judea and Samaria. Labor governments both prior to 1977 and following the Oslo Accord of 1993 also actively initiated and expanded settlements. The most recent Peace Now Settlement Watch report estimates that 146 Israeli settlements with a total population of around 203,000 settlers exist in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These settlements sit alongside a total Palestinian population of approximately three million people. This building has also been accompanied by the paving of over a hundred Israeli bypass roads designed to strengthen ties between the settlements and Green Line Israel. Many of these settlements exist in or near densely populated Palestinian areas. For a number of reasons, the presence of the settlers inflames Palestinian opinion. Firstly, the confiscation of Palestinian land for Jewish settlements involves a second dispossession for Palestinians, many of whom lost their original homes in 1948. Secondly, the settlers regard themselves as the true owners of the territories, and make no attempt to recognize Palestinian national or political rights. On the contrary, many settlers engage in verbal and physical abuse of the Palestinian population including violent assault and murder. Thirdly, the presence of the settlers provokes constant conflict and violence between Palestinians and the Israeli army. There seems to be a consensus inside Israel that the debate over the settlements was lost in the 1970s, and that they will never be dismantled. However, the one continuing certainty in the Middle East is that all Palestinians will continue to regard the settlements as illegal, immoral, and an unacceptable foreign intrusion into their territory. They will almost certainly continue to target the settlers with indiscriminate and often brutual violence in an attempt to force them to leave. There is therefore an urgent need for an internal Israeli debate around the future of the settlements, and their implications for the peace process. This debate would need to recognize the political errors of the Israeli core narrative of the last 34 years, and particularly the fatal mistake of aligning military and security concerns in the territories with political objectives. It will also require an explicit amendment to the Israeli Law of Return designating that it does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This is not likely to be a debate with a simple or speedy resolution. The Palestinian claim to a right of return inside Israel similarly acts as a core barrier to a two-state solution. The concept of a right of return was based on the UN General Assembly resolution 194 of December 1948 which gave Palestinian refugees the option of return or compensation. However, by the early 1950s, it was obvious that the Israelis would not permit the bulk of the refugees to return, and that equally the neighbouring Arab states would refuse to permit any organized resettlement. Prior to the 1967 Six Day War, Palestinian right of return rhetoric was used to deny the legitimacy of the State of Israel, and so provide a rationale for the Arab refusal to recognize the State of Israel. However, following the 1967 war, the international debate shifted from questions about the legitimacy of Israel within the Green Line borders to questions about the legitimacy of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The subsequent political contest for or against a two-state solution explicitly assumed that any resolution of the Palestinian refugee tragedy would be addressed within the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. The current Palestinian position, however is that a right of return must also apply to Green Line Israel. This position is backed by suicide bombings inside Israel which suggest an opposition to Israel per se, rather than an opposition to the Israeli occupation of the territories. To be sure, the proposed right of return is currently theoretical rather than real. However, as with the actual presence of coerced Jewish settlements inside Palestinian territories, a plan for a coerced Palestinian presence inside Israel constitutes an unacceptable foreign intrusion into a sovereign state. For the Palestinians, the right of return is a core narrative which clashes head-on with two forms of reality. Firstly, no representative segment of the Israeli population from Left to Right will accept the return of 1948 refugees to Israel. Secondly, the Palestinian narrative of 1948 has to confront the absolutely dichotomous Israeli narrative of 1948. For the Israelis, the core story of 1948 is not the dispossession of the Palestinians, but rather the unprovoked attack on the fledgling Jewish state by neighbouring Arab countries. Whilst a number of Israeli revisionist historians including most prominently Benny Morris have debunked the mythical Israeli version of 1948, few Palestinians have been willing to deconstruct the Palestinian version. One scholar, Professor Rashid Khalidi from Chicago University has, however, at least been willing to ask the hard questions. Writing in the 1999 text The Palestinian Exodus (edited by Ghada Karmi & Eugene Cotran), Khalidi acknowledges the immense gap between Israeli and Palestinian narratives of 1948, and the practical barriers to any return of refugees to Israel. Nevertheless, Khalidi recommends that Israel formally recognize its primary responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, and accept at the very least a responsibility to compensate the refugees for loss of property. He suggests that this recognition occur within the context of a truth and reconciliation commission similar to that currently existing in South Africa. What Khalidi doesn't do, however, is extend this prescription of repentance ... |
| www.ajds.org.au/mendes.htm Contact Us A HISTORICAL CONTROVERSY: THE CAUSES OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM During the 1948 Israeli/Arab war, approximately 500,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from the territory of Israel/Palestine. The issue of responsibility for the Palestinian exodus has since become one of the most vexed questions of the modern era. The official Israeli view has long been that the Palestinians left voluntarily at the behest of Arab leaders. Accordingly, the Palestinians were responsible for their own exodus and should be resettled in neighbouring Arab countries. In contrast, the Palestinians and Arab States argued that the refugees were driven out by planned and systematic Israeli violence. They demanded the right of the refugees to return to their former homes inside Israel. The on-going Israeli-Arab debate concerning the causes of the exodus has not been merely an academic exercise. Rather, both sides have persistently linked the events of 1948 with their contemporary political claims (Glazer, 1980:96). Prior to the 1967 Six Day War, the contentious issues were the Arab refusal to recognize the State of Israel, and the Israeli refusal to allow the Palestinian refugees to return. Since 1967, the differing versions of the exodus have also influenced debates around the legitimacy of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Part one of this essay will trace the history of the Israeli version of exodus. Some consideration will be given to analyzing its influence on international attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, both prior to and after the Six Day War. Part two will examine the history of Palestinian/Arab versions of the exodus. Part three will briefly consider middle-ground versions which have attempted to find a balance between the polarized Israeli and Palestinian versions. Part four will analyze the seminal writings of the Israeli revisionist historian Benny Morris and his influence on the debate. Parts five and six will consider Israeli and Palestinian critiques of Morris. Part seven will briefly discuss the other exodus - that of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. Part One: The Israeli Version 1948-1967 The official Israeli version of the Palestinian exodus first appeared in an October 1948 report to the Israeli Government by Yosef Weitz, director of the Jewish National Fund's Lands Division and Chairman of the Government's Transfer Committee. Weitz wrote that the Arabs expected that their exile would last only a few weeks, after which time they would "return not only to their own homes but also to the houses of the Jews and the Arabs would inherit the possessions" (Morris, 1986d:550-551). Weitz's thesis concerning Arab responsibility for the Palestinian flight was soon adopted by Joseph Schechtman, a prominent American Jewish writer and former confidante of the right-wing Zionist leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky (Khalidi, 1959:22; Schechtman drafted a pamphlet distributed by the Israeli Information Office in New York which claimed that the Palestinian exodus was promoted by the Arab leadership - "the Arab Higher Committee, municipal authorities, local commanders and, at a later stage, by the Arab Governments themselves" (Schechtman, 1952:6). In a later publication, Schechtman quoted a number of alleged statements by Arab leaders and newspapers which appeared to confirm the "Arab orders" thesis (Schechtman, 1963:195-198). These quotes were to become standard fare in Israeli propaganda over the next 30 years. Yet careful analysis would suggest that none of them qualify "as solid historical evidence or proof" of Arab responsibility for the exodus (Morris, 1988). The purpose of the Weitz/Schechtman account was explicitly political: to provide a legal and moral justification for the Israeli refusal to allow the Palestinians to return to their former homes. Conversely, evidence that the Palestinians had been forcibly expelled would strengthen their claims for repatriation and/or compensation (Peretz, 1994:6; The Israeli version of the Palestinian exodus has exerted enormous influence on western opinion, persuading not only Jewish supporters of Israel but also wider political and intellectual elites of the justice of the Israeli case (Kidron, 1988:88; As early as January 1949, Edwin Samuel, a former member of the British colonial administration in Palestine, repeated the Israeli allegation that "the exodus was ordered by the Mufti in order to discredit the Jews and weaken their economy" (Samuel, 1949:13). Similarly, the American journalist Kenneth Bilby wrote in 1950: "The Arab exodus, initially at least, was encouraged by many Arab leaders such as Haj Amin el Husseini, the exiled pro-Nazi Mufti of Jerusalem, and by the Arab Higher Committee from Palestine. These ardent nationalists wanted no Arabs living under Jewish military rule and, additionally, they viewed the first wave of setbacks as merely transitory. Let the Palestine Arabs flee into neighboring countries. It would serve to arouse the other Arab peoples to greater effort, and then when the invasion struck the Palestinians could return to their homes and be compensated for their absence with the property of Jews driven into the sea" (Bilby, 1950:30-31). In 1956, the American military historian Edgar O'Ballance commented on the "unusual complete and voluntary evacuation of the Arabs from their towns and villages as the Jews advanced". According to O'Ballance, "There were several reasons for this mass exodus, perhaps the first being due to the Arab leaders themselves who early in the war had ordered Arabs living on the edges of the mixed areas to evacuate their villages so as to leave the field clear for the Arab Liberation Army to conduct military operations. They convinced the Arabs that their removal would only be for a short time, and that they would be able to return to their homes on the heels of Kaukji's victorious men, when loot and plunder from the Jews would more than compensate for any discomfort they might have to experience" (O'Ballance, 1956:63). Another study by Mizra Khan argued that the Palestinians fled "under orders as part of a deliberate policy to clear areas for the invading Arab armies and to prevent stagnation of the war by the conclusion of local truces" (Khan, 1956:37). An authoritative study of the exodus by the Israeli academic Rony Gabbay also lent some support to the Israeli Government thesis. According to Gabbay, the exodus could be attributed to several diverse factors including the cultural characteristics of Arab society, and direct orders from the Arab Higher Committee to evacuate the civilian population. Gabbay identified three principal motives for the planned evacuation: "A) Knowing that the Arab countries had already committed themselves to send their regular armies into Palestine, evacuation would clear the villages and the adjacent roads for the quick advance of these armies. Infantry as well as air forces would have easier tasks, and would be able to limit their attacks to the Jewish positions, cities and settlements without any danger of hitting Arab populated areas; B) To bring home to the Arab people of the neighbouring countries the reality of war in Palestine and enlist their support; C) To impress the outside world with the fact that no Arab was prepared to acquiesce in the establishment of the State of Israel and live under its rule" (Gabbay, 1959:95-96). Further presentations of the "Arab orders" thesis were made by the American academics William Polk and Edmund Asfour, and by numerous pro-Israel sources (Polk, 1957:293; Even the noted Jewish anti-Zionist Moshe Menuhin accepted the basic legitimacy of the thesis (Menuhin, 1969:109). Perhaps the most influential pro-Israel source of this period was Leon Uris' best-selling novel Exodus (Salt, 1985:60). According to Uris, the Palestinian exodus was caused by the Arab leaders who "wanted the civilian population to leave Palestine as a political issue and a military weapon. The Arab generals planned an annihilation of the Jewish people. Documented proof exists that the Arabs were promised they could return to their homes on the heels of Arab victories to loot the destr... |
| www.ajds.org.au/intifada/morris_shlaim.htm Avi Shlaim in The Guardian February 21, 2002 The Guardian Benny Morris was the radical Israeli historian who forced his country to confront its role in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. Later he was jailed for refusing to do military service in the West Bank. As the cycle of violence in the Middle East intensifies, he launches a vicious attack on the 'inveterate liar' Yasser Arafat - and explains why he believes a peaceful coexistence is impossible The rumour that I have undergone a brain transplant is (as far as I can remember) unfounded - or at least premature. But my thinking about the current Middle East crisis and its protagonists has in fact radically changed during the past two years. I imagine that I feel a bit like one of those western fellow travellers rudely awakened by the trundle of Russian tanks crashing through Budapest in 1956. Back in 1993, when I began work on Righteous Victims, a revisionist history of the Zionist-Arab conflict from 1881 until the present, I was cautiously optimistic about the prospects for Middle East peace. But at least the Israelis and Palestinians were talking peace; The Palestinians appeared to have given up their decades-old dream and objective of destroying and supplanting the Jewish state, and the Israelis had given up their dream of a "Greater Israel", stretching from the Mediterranean to the Jordan river. And, given the centrality of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a final, comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and all of its Arab neighbours seemed within reach. But by the time I had completed the book, my restrained optimism had given way to grave doubts - and within a year had crumbled into a cosmic pessimism. One reason was the Syrians' rejection of the deal offered by the prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres in 1993- 96 and Ehud Barak in 1999-2000, involving Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for a full-fledged bilateral peace treaty. What appears to have stayed the hands of President Hafez Assad and subsequently his son and successor, Bashar Assad, was not quibbles about a few hundred yards here or there but a basic refusal to make peace with the Jewish state. What counted, in the end, was the presence, on a wall in the Assads' office, of a portrait of Saladin, the legendary 12th-century Kurdish Muslim warrior who had beaten the crusaders, to whom the Arabs often compared the Zionists. I can see the father, on his deathbed, telling his son: "Whatever you do, don't make peace with the Jews; Arafat is the symbol of the movement, accurately reflecting his people's miseries and collective aspirations. Unfortunately, he has proven himself a worthy successor to Haj Muhammad Amin al Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, who led the Palestinians during the 1930s into their (abortive) rebellion against the British mandate government and during the 1940s into their (again abortive) attempt to prevent the emergence of the Jewish state in 1948, resulting in their catastrophic defeat and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. Husseini had been implacable and incompetent (a dangerous mix) - but also a trickster and liar. Nobody had trusted him, neither his Arab colleagues nor the British nor the Zionists. Above all, Husseini had embodied rejectionism - a rejection of any compromise with the Zionist movement. He had rejected two international proposals to partition the country into Jewish and Arab polities, by the British Peel commission in 1937 and by the UN general assembly in November 1947. In between, he spent the war years (1941-45) in Berlin, working for the Nazi foreign ministry and recruiting Bosnian Muslims for the Wehrmacht. Abba Eban, Israel's legendary foreign minister, once quipped that the Palestinians had never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity. After Husseini came Arafat, another implacable nationalist and inveterate liar, trusted by no Arab, Israeli or American leader (though there appear to be many Europeans who are taken in). In 1978-79, he failed to join the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David framework, which might have led to Palestinian statehood a decade ago. In 2000, turning his back on the Oslo process, Arafat rejected yet another historic compromise, that offered by Barak at Camp David in July and subsequently improved upon in President Bill Clinton's proposals (endorsed by Barak) in December. Instead, the Palestinians, in September, resorted to arms and launched the current mini-war or intifada, which has so far resulted in some 790 Arab and 270 Israeli deaths, and a deepening of hatred on both sides to the point that the idea of a territorial- political compromise seems to be a pipe dream. Palestinians and their sympathisers have blamed the Israelis and Clinton for what happened: the daily humiliations and restrictions of the continuing Israeli semi-occupation; But all this is really and truly beside the point: Barak, a sincere and courageous leader, offered Arafat a reasonable peace agreement that included Israeli withdrawal from 85-91% of the West Bank and 100% of the Gaza Strip; As to the Temple Mount (Haram ash-Sharif) in Jerusalem's Old City, Barak proposed Israeli-Palestinian condominium or UN security council control or "divine sovereignty" with actual Arab control. Regarding the Palestinian refugees, Barak offered a token return to Israel and massive financial compensation to facilitate their rehabilitation in the Arab states and the Palestinian state-to-be. Arafat rejected the offer, insisting on 100% Israeli withdrawal from the territories, sole Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount, and the refugees' "right of return" to Israel proper. Instead of continuing to negotiate, the Palestinians - with the agile Arafat both riding the tiger and pulling the strings behind the scenes - launched the intifada. Clinton (and Barak) responded by upping the ante to 94-96% of the West Bank (with some territorial compensation from Israel proper) and sovereignty over the surface area of the Temple Mount, with some sort of Israeli control regarding the area below ground, where the Palestinians have recently carried out excavation work without proper archaeological supervision. Again, the Palestinians rejected the proposals, insisting on sole Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount (surely an unjust demand: after all, the Temple Mount and the temples' remains at its core are the most important historical and religious symbol and site of the Jewish people. It is worth mentioning that "Jerusalem" or its Arab variants do not even appear once in the Koran). Since these rejections - which led directly to Barak's defeat and hardliner Ariel Sharon's election as prime minister - the Israelis and Palestinians have been at each other's throats, and the semi- occupation has continued. The intifada is a strange, sad sort of war, with the underdog, who rejected peace, simultaneously in the role of aggressor and, when the western TV cameras are on, victim. The semi- occupier, with his giant but largely useless army, merely responds, usually with great restraint, given the moral and international political shackles under which he labours. And he loses on CNN because F-16s bombing empty police buildings appear far more savage than Palestinian suicide bombers who take out 10 or 20 Israeli civilians at a go. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has emerged as a virtual kingdom of mendacity, where every official, from President Arafat down, spends his days lying to a succession of western journalists. The reporters routinely give the lies credence equal to or greater than what they hear from straight, or far less mendacious, Israeli officials. One day Arafat charges that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) uses uranium- tipped shells against Palestinian civilians. Then, for lack of independent corroboration, the charges simply vanish - and the Palestinians go on to the next lie, again garnering headlines in western and Arab newspapers. Daily, Palestinian officials bewail Israeli "massacres" and "bombings" of Palestinian civilians - when in fact there have been no massacres and the bombings have in... |