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| 5/25 |
| 2004/3/16 [Politics/Domestic/Election, Politics/Foreign/MiddleEast/Iraq] UID:12709 Activity:nil |
3/16 "It--mah' view uh--uh de situashun wuz dat he--he had--we--we recon',
de best intelligence dat we had and oda' countries had and
dat--dat we recon'd and we still do not know--we gots'ta know."
-- Donald Rumsfeld 3/15/04
\_ I like poking him in the ribs and listening to him squeal. Hey
inflamed gallbaldder boy, squeal some more!! <poke> <poke>
\_ You realize that was ashcroft?
\_ No, he doesn't; he's an idiot.
\_ there's that Princeton education talking...
\_ Then again Saddam's 20,000 strong nuclear weapons program
discovered after the first Gulf War was a big surprise to...
Let's hear what Kerry had to say from the Congressional Record:
"I will be voting to give the President of the United States
the authority to use force-- if necessary-- to disarm
Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal
of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and
grave threat to our security."
- Sen. John F. Kerry (D, MA), Oct. 9, 2002
\_ Funny, Kerry seems to be the only one to believe that
there were WMDs. Even Bush said (usually), only that
they were being "assembled", not that they were
stockpiled.
\_ I don't really care what Kerry said. Maybe he's an idiot
and was duped. The point is that the intelligence data
did not match the adminstration's talk, and Rummy's
comical verbal dancing is the result. It is fact that
the administration suppressed contrary intelligence and
presented their agenda with certainty before the public,
and even invented ridiculous stuff like the niger thing.
\_ It is opinion that anything was suppressed.
"[W]e urge you, after consulting with Congress, and consistent
with the US Constitution and laws, to take necessary
actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile
strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to
the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons
of mass destruction programs."
- Letter to President Clinton, signed by Sens. Carl Levin,
Tom Daschle, John Kerry, and others Oct. 9, 1998
\_ Hahahah 1998. How many chemical weapons have a shelf
life of 5 years?
\_ All of them. Disprove it. And until we went there we had no
idea if *new* ones were being made or not. Scott Ritter said
the WMD programs were only 90-95% destroyed when they left in
1998. That means *not* 100% destroyed and thus still capable
of making WMD. Based on Scott Ritter's info alone we had
reason enough to go in.
\_ http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=15854
Yawn. Another lie of yours exposed.
\_ alternet? oh please. I've seen Ritter say on live TV
before it was cool to say there was nothing there that
there was something there. That was before he took $300k
in Saddam's blood money, btw.
\_There's no need to attack the source, this is the
exactly the same type of idiocy that _Time_ or any
other "reputable" news magazine would regurgitate.
\_ And the DIA and CIA.
\_ So you admit that you lied when you said that
all chemical agents have a shelf life of 5 years?
http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960705/73919_01.htm
\_ You understand that the "uhms" and "ahs" and other pauses and gaps
are normally cleaned up for *all* politicians and other government
figures. By putting them back in you're not making him look stupid
to educated people who actually understand how the media works. I'm
sure this impresses your ignorant friends, though. Watch CSPAN for
a few minutes.
\_ Okay, why don't you assemble it into something intelligent.
He only stumbled that much because he had no response.
\_ remove all uhms and ahs. next!
\_ there are no uhms or ahs in the quote, retard. |
| 5/25 |
|
| www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=15854 Home War on Iraq Lies About Iraqs Weapons Are Past Expiration Date By Cliff Montgomery, AlterNet May 8, 2003 For weeks, we have been hearing breathless media reports of possible discoveries of chemical and biological weapons by United States and British troops in Iraq. Within hours or days, if one scours the back pages of the newspaper, he finds that it was merely another false alarm. There was never any question Iraq once had weapons of mass destruction programs. Nor was the world nave enough to trust Saddam Hussein not to try and hide such weapons from UN inspectors. Unfortunately, there is absolutely no basis for this argument, made so forcefully by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the United Nations, when he claimed to possess clear evidence that huge stocks of everything from sarin gas to anthrax to sanction-violating missiles were stored in Iraq, ready for use. Never mind that the same Iraqi defector who told Powell about the stores of chem and bio weapons also said they had been completely destroyed, which Powell neglected to tell the United Nations. It doesnt matter, because those stores would almost certainly have become useless by now. Strangely, the United States media have, with almost no exceptions, failed to mention that most bio/chemical agents have a rather limited shelf life. The few who do usually quote Scott Ritter, former UN Iraqi weapons inspector and controversial opponent of Dubyas drive to Baghdad. According to Ritter, the chemical weapons which Iraq has been known to possess nerve agents like sarin and tabun have a shelf life of five years, VX just a bit longer. A former hawk keen on an Iraq invasion after the first Gulf War, as recently as 1998 he wrote in an article for the New Republic that Saddam may have successfully hidden everything from potent biological and chemical agents to his entire nuclear weapons infrastructure from UN inspectors. But the truth of the matter is that Iraqs WMD may have even less of a shelf life than Ritter now claims and the United States government knows it. The United States Defense Departments Militarily Critical Technologies List MCTL is a detailed compendium of technologies that the department advocates as critical to maintaining superior US military capabilities. It applies to all mission areas, especially counter-proliferation. Written in 1998, it was recently re-published with updates for 2002. When the Iraqis produced chemical munitions they appeared to adhere to a make and use regimen. Judging by the information Iraq gave the United Nations, later verified by on-site inspections, Iraq had poor product quality for their nerve agents. They had to get the agent to the front promptly or have it degrade in the munition. Furthermore, says this Defense Department report, The chemical munitions found in Iraq after the first Gulf War contained badly deteriorated agents and a significant proportion were visibly leaking. The shelf life of these poorly made agents were said to be a few weeks at best hardly the stuff of vast chemical weapons stores. There was some talk shortly before the first Gulf War that the Iraqis had been creating binary chemical weapons, in which the relatively non-toxic ingredients of the agent remain unmixed until just before the weapon is used; Both activities would have been easily detected by Western intelligence, and no such evidence has been produced. The argument for Iraq as a nuclear threat was built on even shakier ground, but this didnt keep hawks from exploiting non-evidence to frighten any reticent politicians. The New Yorkers Seymour Hersh writes that the very same day Blair unveiled this alleged smoking gun, CIA Director George Tenet discussed the documents between Iraq and Niger, the African country in question, during a closed-session Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Iraq WMD issue. Blair had handed the papers over to American intelligence, and at just the right time; Tenets evidence was instrumental in getting Congress to back the war resolution. As we now know, Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the IAEA, told the UN Security Council that the documents regarding the uranium sales were clear fakes. One senior IAEA official told Hersh, These documents are so bad that I cannot imagine they came from a serious intelligence agency. When asked about the forgeries at a later House hearing, Secretary of State Colin Powell said only, It came from other sources. Indeed, this administration often obscured the fact that the UN destroyed all of Iraqs nuclear weapons program infrastructure and facilities by the time inspectors left in 1998. Jay Rockefeller D-WV, formally asked for an FBI investigation into the matter, stating that, the fabrication of these documents may be part of a larger deception aimed at manipulating public opinion . |
| www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960705/73919_01.htm CIA AND DIA AGREE THAT IRAQLS CURRENT STOCKS OF MUSTARD ARE STABLE AND SHOULD REMAIN EFFECTIVE FOR SEVERAL YEARS. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT PROVIDE A BREAKDOWN OF THE CURRENT INVENTORY, CIA ESTIMATES THAT THE STOCKPILE IS DIVIDED FAIRLY EVENLY BETWEEN MUSTARD AND NERVE AGENTS 2. CIA AND DIA HAVE DIFFERENT ASSESSMENTS OF THE SHELF LIFE OF IRAQS UNITARY NERVE AGENTS. BOTH AGENCIES AGREE THAT IRAQ HAS ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS WITH THE SHELF LIFE OF ITS UNITARY NERVE AGENTS. DIA BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEM PERSISTS, THAT THE STOCKPILE OF NERVE AGENTS WILL BE UNUSABLE BY LATE MARCH, AND THAT DAMAGE TO PRODUCTION FACILITIES WILL FORCE THE IRAQIS TO RELY ON STOCKPILED AGENTS. CIA BELIEVES THAT A SUBSTANTIAL SEGMENT OF IRAQS NERVE AGENT STOCKPILE CONSISTS OF BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS-WHICH WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO DEGRADATION. CIA ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE SHELF LIFE PROBLEM WAS ONLY TEMPORARY AND THAT THE IRAQIS EVEN NOW MAY BE ABLE TO PRODUCE UNITARY AGENTS OF SUFFICIENT QUALITY BY ADDING A STABILIZER OR IMPROVING THEIR PRODUCTION PROCESS. DIA BELIEVES IRAQ HAS HAD INSUFFICIENT TIME TO PRODUCE LARGE AMOUNTS OF BINARY CW AGENTS. MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: IRAQI CBW STOCKPILE CHEMICAL WEAPONS: THE STOCKPILE PROBABLY IS FAIRLY EVENLY DIVIDED BETWEEN BLISTER AN NERVE AGENTS. THE MOST LIKELY AGENTS ARE THE BLISTER AGENT SULFUR MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS SARIN AND GF. WE ASSESS THAT MOST OF THE SARIN AND GF ARE WEAPONIZE IN BINARY FORM AND DO NOT NOT SUFFER FROM THE LIMITED SHELF-LIFE PROBLEM PREVALENT DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IRAQ PROBABLY ALSO HAS SMALL QUANTITIES OF THE ADVANCED NERVE AGENT VX, AND MAY HAVE LIMITED AMOUNTS OF OTHER AGENTS IN ITS STOCKPILE. IRAQ MOST LIKELY HAS WEAPONIZED THESE AGENTS IN AERIAL BOMBS, MORTAR ROUNDS, ARTILLERY SHELLS AND ROCKETS, AND MISSILE WARHEADS. WE BELIEVE THAT BOMBS AND ARTILLERY MAKE UP THE BULK OF IRAQS CHEMICAL ARSENAL. TO GIVE AN IDEA OF THE QUANTITIES OF MUNITIONS AVAILABLE, ONE TON OF AGENT WOULD BE ENOUGH TO FILL ROUGHLY TEN 500-KG BOMBS, 150 122-MM ARTILLERY ROCKETS, OR 350 152-MM ARTILLERY SHELLS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THIS QUANTITY OF AGENT WAS PRESENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, AND MOST OF IT PROBABLY REMAINS INTACT. WE ASSESS THAT THE LARGE MAJORITY OF IRAQS BW AGENTS ARE IN WEAPONS SUCH AS AERIAL BOMBS AND ARTILLERY, AND POSSIBLY MISSILE WARHEADS. |