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The Clinton View of Iraq-al Qaeda Ties The Weekly Standard 12/29/03 Stephen F. Hayes Posted on 12/19/2003 7:40:46 PM PST by Pokey78 Connecting the dots in 1998, but not in 2003. ARE AL QAEDAS links to Saddam Husseins Iraq just a fantasy of the Bush administration? The Clinton administration also warned the American public about those ties and defended its response to al Qaeda terror by citing an Iraqi connection. For nearly two years, starting in 1996, the CIA monitored the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. The plant was known to have deep connections to Sudans Military Industrial Corporation, and the CIA had gathered intelligence on the budding relationship between Iraqi chemical weapons experts and the plants top officials. The intelligence included information that several top chemical weapons specialists from Iraq had attended ceremonies to celebrate the plants opening in 1996. And, more compelling, the National Security Agency had intercepted telephone calls between Iraqi scientists and the plants general manager. Iraq also admitted to having a $199,000 contract with al Shifa for goods under the oil-for-food program. While its hard to know what significance, if any, to ascribe to this information, it fits a pattern described in recent CIA reporting on the overlap in the mid-1990s between al Qaeda-financed groups and firms that violated United States sanctions on behalf of Iraq. The clincher, however, came later in the spring of 1998, when the CIA secretly gathered a soil sample from 60 feet outside of the plants main gate. The sample showed high levels of O-ethylmethylphosphonothioic acid, known as EMPTA, which is a key ingredient for the deadly nerve agent VX. A senior intelligence official who briefed reporters at the time was asked which countries make VX using EMPTA. There are a variety of ways of making VX, a variety of recipes, and EMPTA is fairly unique. That briefing came on August 24, 1998, four days after the Clinton administration launched cruise-missile strikes against al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan Osama bin Ladens headquarters from 1992-96, including the al Shifa plant. The missile strikes came 13 days after bombings at United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed 257 people-including 12 Americans-and injured nearly 5,000. Clinton administration officials said that the attacks were in part retaliatory and in part preemptive. United States intelligence agencies had picked up chatter among bin Ladens deputies indicating that more attacks against American interests were imminent. The al Shifa plant in Sudan was largely destroyed after being hit by six Tomahawk missiles. John McWethy, national security correspondent for ABC News, reported the story on August 25, 1998: Before the pharmaceutical plant was reduced to rubble by American cruise missiles, the CIA was secretly gathering evidence that ended up putting the facility on Americas target list. Intelligence sources say their agents clandestinely gathered soil samples outside the plant and found, quote, strong evidence of a chemical compound called EMPTA, a compound that has only one known purpose, to make VX nerve gas. Then, the connection: The United States had been suspicious for months, partly because of Osama bin Ladens financial ties, but also because of strong connections to Iraq. Sources say the United States had intercepted phone calls from the plant to a man in Iraq who runs that countrys chemical weapons program. The senior intelligence officials who briefed reporters laid out the collaboration. We knew there were fuzzy ties between bin Laden and the plant but strong ties between him and Sudan and strong ties between the plant and Sudan and strong ties between the plant and Iraq. Although this official was careful not to oversell bin Ladens ties to the plant, other Clinton officials told reporters that the plants general manager lived in a villa owned by bin Laden. Several Clinton administration national security officials told THE WEEKLY STANDARD last week that they stand by the intelligence. The bottom line for me is that the targeting was justified and appropriate, said Daniel Benjamin, director of counterterrorism on Clintons National Security Council, in an emailed response to questions. I would be surprised if any president-with the evidence of al Qaedas intentions evident in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the intelligence on chemical weapons that was at hand from Sudan-would have made a different decision about bombing the plant. I think you give the commander in chief the benefit of the doubt, said George W. Bush, governor of Texas, on August 20, 1998, the same day as the United States counterstrikes. Im confident hes working on the best intelligence available, and I hope its successful. Wouldnt the bombing of a plant with well-documented connections to Iraqs chemical weapons program, undertaken in an effort to strike back at Osama bin Ladens terrorist network, seem to suggest the Clinton administration national security officials believed Iraq was working with al Qaeda? Benjamin, who has been one of the leading skeptics of claims that Iraq was working with al Qaeda, doesnt want to connect those dots. Instead, he describes al Qaeda and Iraq as unwitting collaborators. The Iraqi connection with al Shifa, given what we know about it, does not yet meet the test as proof of a substantive relationship because it isnt clear that one side knew the other sides involvement. That is, it is not clear that the Iraqis knew about bin Ladens well-concealed investment in the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation. The Sudanese very likely had their own interest in VX development, and they would also have had good reasons to keep al Qaedas involvement from the Iraqis. After all, Saddam was exactly the kind of secularist autocrat that al Qaeda despised. In the most extreme case, if the Iraqis suspected al Qaeda involvement, they might have had assurances from the Sudanese that bin Ladens people would never get the weapons. That may sound less than satisfying, but the Sudanese did show a talent for fleecing bin Laden. It is all somewhat speculative, and it would be helpful to know more. It does sound less than satisfying to one Bush administration official. So, when the Clinton administration wants to justify its strike on al Shifa, this official tells me, its okay to use an Iraq-al Qaeda connection. But now that the Bush administration and George Tenet talk about links, its suddenly not believable? The Clinton administration heavily emphasized the Iraq link to justify its 1998 strikes against al Qaeda. Just four days before the embassy bombings, Saddam Hussein had once again stepped up his defiance of United States weapons inspectors, causing what Senator Richard Lugar called another Iraqi crisis. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, one of those in the small circle of Clinton advisers involved in planning the strikes, briefed foreign reporters on August 25, 1998. He was asked about the connection directly and answered carefully. Q: Ambassador Pickering, do you know of any connection between the so-called pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum and the Iraqi government in regard to production of precursors of VX? PICKERING: Yeah, I would like to consult my notes just to be sure that what I have to say is stated clearly and correctly. We see evidence that we think is quite clear on contacts between Sudan and Iraq. In fact, al Shifa officials, early in the companys history, we believe were in touch with Iraqi individuals associated with Iraqs VX program. Ambassador Bill Richardson, at the time United States ambassador to the United Nations, echoed those sentiments in an appearance on CNNs Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, on August 30, 1998. He called the targeting one of the finest hours of our intelligence people. We know for a fact, physical evidence, soil samples of VX precursor-chemical precursor at the site, said Richardson. Secondly, Wolf, direct evidence of ties between Osama bin Laden and the Military Industrial Corporation-the al Shifa factory was part of that. This is an operation-a collection of buildings that does a lot of ...
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