mondediplo.com/2003/09/03egyptislam
Instead they are the disenchanted, here-now gone-tomorrow yuppie values: hedonism, individual ease and consumption. The issue of the Islamic headscarf - the hijab that was the symbol of the Islamic awakening of the 1970s - has now become emblematic. It no longer signals rejection of the West as it did then, but instead signifies a non-Islamist way of being Muslim: the end of an obsession with identity and an expression of the realities of globalisation, market reform and consumerism. The hijab has been re-appropriated by the fashion business, although it is still sometimes sold outside mosques. In boutiques that cater for women who veil, the hijab is now designed to the standards of international fashion. The shops have English or French names: al-Muhajaba Home, al-Salam Shopping Centre, Flash, LAmour. All far from the identity programme of the Islamists or the ethics of modesty. These liberal veiled women al-muhajabba al-mutaharrira have exhausted the patience of fundamentalists by wearing Paris-designed scarves and speaking to their children in English. They are condemned both by the activists of the Muslim Brothers and traditional preachers trying to invoke the omniscience of God. Similarly, the nashid religious chant has been ideologically deprogrammed and adjusted to globalisation. The old custom of chanting, inherited from the Sufis, was taken up in the 1970s by Islamist groups on university campuses, who were inspired by the writings of the many Islamist militants then in prison, with their references to jihad, martyrdom and heroism, and their condemnation of the arbitrariness of government. For a decade it was all politics - just as it was for the headscarf when it first appeared on the campus. The words of the chants were militant and criticised the state, and there were no musical instruments, which were deemed illegal. Later, influenced by the Islamic-nationalist music of the first Palestinian intifada 1988-91, the nashid was musically accompanied, first by tambourines, then drums, then synthesisers. At the end of the 1980s two performing groups were formed and were sought after in Islamist circles to play at the Islamic marriages that started a new fashion. The themes of the nashid were modified, and love, happiness and poetry appeared. This was partly to suit the less activist younger generation, but also because militant slogans did not fit the formalities of Egyptian marriage ceremonies. In the later 1990s the groups became more professional, widened their range of instruments, began to charge for perform ances and sold audio-cassettes. They have left jihad and its repertoire behind, and compete with Egyptian pop stars - and like those stars, they waver between a romantic mood and bursts of nationalism alluding to Palestine and Iraq. Nashid groups have less religious names than before - al-Wad promise or al-Gil generation are now common;
Khalids only project is to address the trendy young of Cairo or Alexandria through a religious discourse that talks of the values of self-realisation that are part of liberal modernity: ambition, wealth, success, hard work, efficiency and self-awareness. He offers them the model of virtuous wealth and salvation through deeds. One of his followers explains bluntly: Wealth is a gift from heaven and a rich Muslim will spend his fortune in the cause of God and in charitable deeds. In a rush of enthusiasm, he told his followers: I want to be rich so that people will look at me and say You see, rich and religious, and theyll love God through my wealth. I want to have money and the best clothes to make people love Gods religion. Khalid attaches importance to effort and the efficient use of time, and crusades against useless leisure and too much sleep. Like an entrepreneur, he believes that: The first thing, in building a serious life, is to define objectives, and write them down. He calls on his followers to be productive in the help you give to friends, productive in doing deeds, productive in developing society. He praises the value of ambition: One of the proofs of Gods love is that it encourages you to be ambitious, gives you the ambition to reach ever higher, to raise yourself ever higher in society. Khalid certainly has been successful: his sermons are now protected by copyright, he has set up several companies for distributing audio-cassettes, he is religious adviser to the Saudi firm Iqra and in demand on the boards of directors of Islamic banks. As a religious entrepreneur who sanctifies market values within the framework of depoliticised preaching, Khalid has become a media product, and he certainly sells. LBC, the chain founded by Christian Lebanese militias, unhesitatingly sacrificed its religious loyalties to the god of profit: last Ramadan, it broadcast Khalids Islamic chat show, Wa Nalqa al-Ahibba Meeting the Loved Ones, to woo audiences in the Gulf states and to maximise its advertising revenues. For the past five years Islamist publishers have been enthused by the idea of management. A former Muslim Brother, Muhammad Abdel Gawad, publishes an Islamised version of this in booklets with titles such as The Secrets of Efficient Administration during the Life of the Prophet and The Prophets Management of Human Relations . In Morocco similar pamphlets tell you to put Divine Blessing to the Service of Business , and in the Gulf an Islamist publisher sells The Ten Habits of a Successful Person . In Indonesia the most sought after of Jakartas trendy preachers, Abdullah Gymnastiar, does not only preach, he also gives courses in management and motivation. In Egypt state religious institutions have not escaped: at the ministry of waqfs 3, reform projects now concentrate more on the social role of the mosque, civil society and self-sufficiency. One of their seminars at al-Azhar University focused on rethinking dawa preaching, using the precepts of US-style marketing. There may be something to be said for these ways of affirming religion. And the syncretism that is creeping into new manifestations of the return to Islam may make us smile. But what we are seeing is not so much the rise of an Islamic humanism, more an Islamised renewal of economic liberalism. And this is happening in a climate of severe and increasing social inequal ities that urgently need an alternative solution to resist neoliberal globalisation. Thoughtful young Islamists show growing interest in movements that seek alternative solutions in the anti-global isation debate, such as al-Janub the South, an organisation oriented towards the third world. Their interest may still focus on recreating a utopia founded on Islam, but freed from its old obsession with identity. Husam Tammam is a journalist at Islamonline and Patrick Haenni a researcher at the Centre dEtudes et de documentation economiques, juridiques et sociales CEDJ in Cairo 1 See Ibrahim Warde, Islamic finance , Le Monde diplomatique , English language edition, September 2001.
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