1/14 Why do we put up with plurality voting for stuff like primaries?
When the "winners" get around a quarter to a third of the vote
something is broken. We should have IRV. And also, national
popular vote for president.
\_ IRV is not monotonic. What you want approval voting. -dans
\_ Actually I'd rather have IRV. I think we discussed this
before though. I think monotonicity is mostly irrelevant.
The arguments I've seen against IRV are either wrong (use
a misconception of what IRV is) or else cite concerns
about tactical voting. But we have tactical voting now.
The question is whether the situation is improved. I
believe we can be a lot more confident in broad support
of an IRV winner than a plurality winner.
\_ Uh huh. But approval voting has all the advantages you just
described, doesn't suffer from being not monotonic, and
elimnates tactical voting. As a practical matter, have you
ever tried to count the votes in an IRV system? It sucks,
and is completely opaque. -dans
\- See Arrow Impossibility Theorem
\_ Thank you for supporting my point. -dans
\- I am not supporting your point.
you pretty much cant eliminate tactical
or various other pathologies. if you think
you can, you dont understand the Arrow Thm ...
which is of course quite possible.
\_ Actually, you're the one who doesn't understand
it. Voting systems can and do eliminate the
pathologies mentioned, it's just that a given
system cannot eliminate *all* of them. Tactical
voting has a very specific definition in this
context, and you don't seem to understand it.
Indeed, all the arguments I've seen that suggest
approval voting is not strategy free seem rooted
in the same misunderstanding you hold. -dans
\_ What is the specific definition, and who
decides it? If there are problems that don't
fall into your specific definition, who cares
what the definition is, if the problems are
real? The fact is that approval voting does
not allow ranked choices and has its own
pathologies/strategies/whatever.
\_ Pathologies != Strategies. Obviously
approval voting does not have ranked
choices, but that's not the point. The
point is that all forms of ranked choice
voting I've seen add significant complexity
to the process, and can produce oddball
results where people's choices get
permuted. Both of these considerations are
unforgiveable. -dans
\_ Approval also adds complexity to the
process. IRV is being used already so it
is clearly a manageable complexity and
obviously "forgiveable". Oddball results
I think you're just wrong about.
\_ It does not have all the advantages. It does not eliminate
tactical voting, duh. If I approve A, but like B better
than C, I could vote B even though it hurts A's chances.
That is tactical. It does not let you rank your choices
which is the entire point. How is monotonicity relevant?
Who gives a shit?
With approval voting, approving another candidate could
lead to my preferred candidate losing. How is that
better?
\_ You're just wrong. If you vote for A and B in approval
voting, then you're saying you're okay with either A or
B, and there's no way your vote can help C, who you
don't approve of, win. In IRV, if you vote A as you
first preference and B as your second, you can actually
cause C to win. Whoops. -dans
\_ Show me a realistic example where that happens.
\_ Read the literature. -dans
\_ I have. It doesn't happen in any realistic
case. I believe, and I'm not alone in this,
that your concerns about being monotonic
totally irrelevant.
\_ You're making the assertion.
\_ It's not my job to do your homework,
especially when if you're just going to
assert that my example is unrealistic.
Don't be disingenuous, and don't bring a
knife to a gunfight. -dans
\_ I've done my homework and think you're
wrong. Many <learned authorities>
support using IRV. Show me where we
"cause C to win" by voting A. I think
you're selectively playing fast and loose
with terminology.
Examples of this problem:
Math Prof at Temple University:
http://www.csua.org/u/ki3
Wikipedia: Instant-Runoff Controversies:
http://www.csua.org/u/ki4
-dans
\_ I read the first example in the first
link and it's ridiculous. Range voting
is obviously less intuitive when you
have averages, and his first example
shows C winning even though the
majority of the voters either dislike
or know nothing about C.
The discussion of monotonicity also
shows how irrelevant the concern is.
Yes, it is unrealistic: it proposes
looking at the results after the fact
and saying "if I had done such and
such then the outcome would be
different". How would you ever know
to that detail how others would vote?
You could easily end up accidentally
electing C. The reality of the example
is that it is close to a 3 way tie
and any winner is "reasonable". Most
importantly, the result of the
"honest" IRV is reasonable.
And how would you translate that into
approval voting? All voters ranked
\_ <cut mostly irrelevant comments -op>
How would you translate the example
to approval voting? All voters ranked
all 3 candidates. Does that mean they
approve them all?
approve them all? Let's say they each
approve their top two choices. Then
B wins. But what if the supporters of
A, being crafty, decide to withhold
their approval of B, to make A win?
In this way, "lying" helps them. So
regardless of your terminology the
same "problem" exists.
\_ I am not advocating for range
voting, merely citing an egregious
flaw in IRV. Since we're asking
for citations, kindly cite all
future unnecessary changes of
subject and strawman arguments you
plan to make before continuing this
discussion. -dans
\_ I'm sorry you're too dense to
comprehend. I'll give up now.
I mentioned the range voting
because the source advocating it
as realistic means the source is
dense.
\_ You're right. I am dense.
If I was sparse I would have
also asked you to list all
ad hominem attacks you would
apply before continuing the
discussion. -dans
\_ The ball was in your
court and you gave a
worthless response so I
responded in kind.
\_ No, it doesn't. They approve of
both A and B. One of A or B wins.
Notably, in most actual ranked
choice systems, e.g. San
Francisco, you must rank all
candidates. Whoops. -dans
\_ In the example below, A or B
still wins. So it is the same.
Perhaps it is merely a bad
example. I found this one far
more convincing/damning:
http://rangevoting.org/CoreSupp.html
However, I still don't agree
with that article's conclusion.
Pairwise comparisons aren't so
meaningful. In this example,
C and G are sharply split: you
have those 5 voters in the
middle who rank C on top and G
on the bottom, who give their
votes to M.
votes to M. Condorcet isn't
provably the best winner.
(Example from the link:)
voter1: A>B>C
voter2: A>B>C
voter3: A>C>B
voter4: A>C>B IRV EXAMPLE.
voter5: B>A>C
voter6: B>A>C
voter7: B>C>A
voter8: C>B>A
voter9: C>B>A
One of IRV's flaws is that it is not monotonic
and dishonesty can pay. In the example, suppose
voter1, instead of honestly stating her
top-preference was A, were to dishonestly
vote C>A>B, i.e. pretending great LOVE for her
truly hugely-hated candidate C, and pretending a
LACK of affection for her true favorite A.
In that case the first round would eliminate
either C or B (suppose a coin flip says B) at
which point A would win the second round 5-to-4
over C. (Meanwhile if C still were eliminated
by the coin flip then B would still win over A
in the final round as before.)
In other words: in 3-candidate IRV elections,
lying can help. Indeed, lying in bizarre ways
can help.
\_ It sounds like your grief is with the imple-
mentation of IRV (i.e., mandatory ranking of
all candidates). If you allow voters to NOT
rank all candidates, this problem appears to
evaporate.
\_ And lying in approval voting can help. So what?
But you said "In IRV, if you vote A as first
preference and B as your second, you can actually
cause C to win." You haven't shown an example of
that, which is what I asked for.
\_ No, it can only hurt. Casting a vote for
someone you don't want in office helps them.
Not voting for someone you do want in office
hurts them. -dans
\_ Most real people have a top choice. If
everyone only votes for who they really
want then AV reduces to plurality voting.
\_ Really? Show me data. You realize
this flies in the face of a fairly
large body of psychological,
sociological, and hci research about
choice, and peoples ability to
effectively express their choices.
-dans
\_ Well *I* always have a top choice.
The problem with plurality winners
that the majority of the votes
did not count. A minority is able
to elect the winner. With IRV,
the rank system ensures that your
preferences get factored in to
the outcome. No, IRV does not
eliminate tactical voting: with
a field of strong candidates with
divergent voter preferences there
would be tough choices to make as
to which of your top 2 choices to
rank first. But that's perfectly
fine: it's inherent to any runoff
system. AV does not solve the
problem that IRV solves. It still
decides the winner based only on
plurality. IRV also solves the 3
candidate spoiler problem while AV
does not.
\_ I've read the wiki and other articles on most of the voting
methods. Although interesting most of them ignore the increased
complexity of the system over a simple, "mark an X next to my
favorite and drop it in the box" method we use now. Some people
say that various methods of anti-voter fraud are too high a burden
for voters and are discriminatory but that's nothing next to the
complexity of several of these alternative voting schemes. What I
got from my reading is that each of these other methods has a
different idea of the 'best' way to determine a winner but their
idea is based on their own notions of fairness. Fairness is not a
measurable absolute.
\_ Approval voting is not complicated. Instead of mark an X next
to my your favorite candidate, you mark an X next to any
candidate you would accept in office. The winner is the one
with the most votes so its notion of fairness is pretty close to
that of plurality voting. -dans
\_ If it "pretty close" then why not just do the simpler way
we already have now? Seems like added complexity for no
reason.
\_ It eliminates spoilers and, more importantly, would make
it possible for us to grow viable third parties. -dans
\_ What you call a spoiler I call a low support third
party candidate. For example, I don't think Nader
ruined Gore in 2000. If those people really wanted
Gore to win, they understood the voting process and
should have voted Gore not Nader. I also don't see
the need for third parties. What has happened in this
country to third parties is the two major parties have
absorbed their platform when it became popular enough
eliminating the need for the third party without
causing the instability of a multi party mush that you
see in some other countries in Europe, Israel, etc.
In those place you end up in a situation where an
extremist party with a normally trivial number of votes
gets joins the majority party coalition and ends up with
power that far exceeds their vote count in the general
population. I don't see that as a positive.
\_ So in other words, you believe something, and
whenever someone presents evidence to the contrary
you redefine the terms to suit your purposes and
state that the evidence is irrelevant. Awesome!
P.S. Your assessments of the American two party
system as well as politics in "Europe, Israel,
etc." show an impressive degree of ignorance. -dans
\_ Why did you have to make this personal? What is
wrong with you? How about you provide some
actual facts or even some contrary opinions
instead of personal attacks? I think if you call
me a "douche" like you normally do, you'd look
really extra super duper smart. Good street cred.
\_ There's nothing personal about this. I
present facts, cite source, you repeat the
same arguments, change the subject, and
dissemble. Nothing personal about that,
unless you think my pointing out that your bad
form is 'personal', in which case, get a
thicker skin, and maybe join a debate or
forensics society. And, yes, you're being a
douche. -dans
\_ Of course it completely misses the point that "I could live
with this bozo" vs "I really want this guy" are two seperate
things. While IRV does have some theoretical issues, in
any real world situation they don't actually matter worth
a damn. Oh and as to how to count votes, well guess what,
there's this magical thing called software.
\_ Okay, "mark an X next to any candidate you want in
office". Don't be a douche. Of course, since you're
advocating a voting system that, by your own admission, is
so complex that it requires software to effectively
implement the count, you have shown yourself to be utterly
unqualified to take part in any discussion of voting
systems and methodologies. -dans
\_ Suppose I have an election with a total bozo (B) and
2 pretty good candidates. (A and C). Out of 100
people 99 like A and C but like C better. But 1
person likes A and B. In an approval vote system
that gets you candidate A. But if B isn't in
the race that gives you candidate C. Thus having
B in the race changes the results UNLESS people vote
with the knowledge that B has no chance. I'm not
saying it is likely, but then again neither are the
contrived IRV problems, and IRV has big wins because
ranking matters.
\_ By the numbers, more people wanted A. Get over it.
-dans
\_ No, more people "approved" A. But the vast
majority wanted C. There is a difference.
\_ Now you're just arguing with semantics. -dans
\_ No, because if C wasn't in the race the
\_ No, because if B wasn't in the race the
result would be different. But because
you have decided on a set of criteria that
happily ignores that you don't think it is
a problem. You've decided "tactical voting
is bad" and then defined tactical voting
in a nonsense way so that you don't have to
admit that in ANY voting system there will
be tactical voting. Oh and once again
in real world situations IRV is much less
likely to be broken and much less likely
for a small group of tactical voters to
throw an election. Plus it gives you
ranked choices which are a win.
\_ You're ignoring his point about ranked choices.
Don't be a douche. I've yet to see a case where
IRV produces results that are "unreasonable". (Where
"reasonable" is intuitive, since no one result is
provably "best" for all voting scenarios.)
Don't be a douche. Show me some cases where IRV
produces "bad" results and let's talk about how
bad they really are.
\_ Preference inversion (i.e not monotonic). Done.
-dans
\_ How's that STD going dans?
\_ Awesome! I've got a sentient talking boil on my ass that
likes your philosophy, and wants to know if you have a
newsletter it could subscribe to. As a practical matter,
would you actually make fun of someone who had an
nasty and possibly life-threatening disease? Wow, what an
asshole! -dans
\_ the most common STDs are not life-threatening.
\_ Yeah, 'Sorry about your syphilis man, Haw Haw!' like
I said, what an asshole. -dans |