Berkeley CSUA MOTD:1994:February:22 Tuesday
Berkeley CSUA MOTD
1994/2/22 [Uncategorized] UID:31490 Activity:nil
2/20    The disks are back and happy, and soda should perform much better now.
1994/2/22 [Politics] UID:31491 Activity:nil
2/21    Any news on /usr3?
             \_ (But I'm "happy" now.. my acount is back! (yay!))
        \_ /usr3 is back.  Thank you!  Double yeah!
 \_ TWINKS: /dev/zd3a             762464  686218       0    100%   /usr3
1994/2/22 [Computer/SW/Unix] UID:31492 Activity:nil
2/21    I've tested sz and rz and they both seem to work fine.  You can't
        use rz when you are telneting from another account and want to
        send through another account --- you have to be connected directly
        to the annex for that to work.  --hob
        \_ that's b/c sz and rz requires a 8-bit clean path, which
           telnet may or may not provide, use rlogin.
           \_I tried rlogin.  It works!!
           \_ Depends on the implementation of telnet and rlogin, some are
              8-bit clean, others aren't.  -hob
              \_ i know.  usually, only one implentation is 8-bit clean.
          rlogin was rec'ed b/c it works here, you may have to
          switch to telnet on other sites/annexen  --jwang
1994/2/22 [Uncategorized] UID:31493 Activity:nil
2/21    New version of term in /usr6/build/term. I've not installed yet,
        but those who wish to test may do so.  I've done some fixes in its
        pty-grabbing code to be a lot better at getting a terminal on soda.
        bugs (and/or kudos) to mehlhaff@soda
1994/2/22 [Computer/SW/Security] UID:31494 Activity:nil
2/21    Read ~boss/Clipper for info on the clipper chip, and for a chance
        to add your name to a petition against it.
         \_ The issue of whether the government has a legal right to
            monitor communications (with the proper search warrant)
            is clouded and ignored by bandying about terms like
            "big brother" and "facist." It's ludicrous to think that
            the government will monitor *more* communications if
            Clipper passes.
                   \_ It's not ludicrous at all. Monitoring resources are
                      costly. If Clipper is easier -- cheaper -- to monitor
                      than alternative technologies, than the government
                      can listen in more than they would otherwise. Even
                      totalitarians are subject to economics...
            \_ Encryption now: none.
        Ease of tapping: easy.
        Encryption with Clipper: some.
        Ease of tapping: Less.
        This isn't brain surgery.  The government isn't asking
        for anything it doesn't already have.  Deal with the
        real issues instead of fear-mongering.
          \_ In addition, clipper will fool people into thinking
             they're safe when they aren' communications
             that were thought too important to trust to the net
             before will become open to the government.
             \_ Not without a search warrant.
                           \_ No, Clipper will fool *stupid* people into
                              thinking they're safe.  There's a difference.
         \_ It could be argues that Clipper provides increased privacy
            since it gives cell phone makers, etc. free encryption
            with no r&d costs.  I'd prefer knowing the line was secure
            from everyone buty the cops than open to anyone who knows
          what frequency to listen in on...
         \_ You're assuming that this wonderful algorithm that the
            NSA came up with is a good one.  Since it's so secret,
            it could be total bullshit for all anyone knows...although
            far be it for me to imply that the government is somehow
            able to make mistakes...
          \_ With the incredibly quick advances
           in technology, nothing is secure for more than
           a decade or two.
Berkeley CSUA MOTD:1994:February:22 Tuesday